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objects which are everywhere before their eyes. To which I might further add, that several are of opinion, there is no other use in many
of these creatures, than to furnish matter of contemplation and wonder to those inhabitants of the earth, who are its only creatures that are capable of it.
After having presented my reader with this set of letters, which are all upon the same subject, I shall here insert one that has no relation to it. But it has always been my maxim, never to refuse going out of my way to do any honest man a service, especially when I have an interest in it myself.
“ MOST VENERABLE NESTOR,
As you are a person that! very eminently distinguish yourself in the promotion of the public good, I desire your friendship in signifying to the town, what concerns the greatest good of life, health. I do assure you, sir, there is in a vault, under the Exchange in Cornhill, over against Pope's-Head Alley, a parcel of French wines, full of the seeds of good-humour, cheerfulness, and friendly mirth. I have been told, the learned of our nation agree, there is no such thing as bribery in liquors, therefore I shall presume to send you of it, lest you should think it inconsistent with
As you are a person that.] In our management of the relatives, who, which, that, it may be a good general rule, to apply who to persons ; which, to things ; and that, to things chiefly. But, when the antecedent is the second person, not only that, but which, is used for who, by our best writers. And this use, which is enough authorized, may be worth retaining, not merely for the grace of variety, but for the convenience of pronunciation.
As to the second person singular, we have an instance of that, for who, in the passage before us—“You are a person that very eminently distinguish yourself;" and elsewhere, frequently. But, when a vowel follows the relative, it seems preferable to who, as “ It is thou, O king, that art become strong.” Dan. iv. 22.–And again, “ Thou that art named the house of Jacob.” Micah ii. 7.—Which, in the same circumstance, is preferred to who,-“ Our Father, which art in heaven”-plainly, to avoid the ill effect, which the open vowels in—who art—would have on the ear, in both cases. So, likewise, in the second person plural, “ Ye that are of the fountain of Israel,” Ps. Ixviii. 26, (marginal reading in our Bibles,] — and. “Ye which are spiritual, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness.” Gal. vi. 1.
integrity to recommend what you do not understand by experience. In the mean time, please to insert this, that every man may judge for himself.
“I am, sir,”' &c.
No. 161. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15.
-incoctum generoso pectus honesto. Pers. EVERY principle that is a motive to good actions ought to be encouraged, since men are of so different a make, that the same principle does not work equally upon all minds. What some men are prompted to by conscience, duty, or religion, which are only different names for th same thing, others are prompted to by honour.
The sense of honour is of so fine and delicate a nature, that it is only to be met with in minds which are naturally noble, or in such as have been cultivated by great examples, or a refined education. This paper, therefore, is chiefly designed for those who, by means of any of these advantages, are, or ought to be, actuated by this glorious principle.
But as nothing is more pernicious than a principle of action when it is misunderstood, I shall consider honour with respect to three sorts of men. First of all, with regard to those who have a right notion of it. Secondly, with regard to those who have a mistaken notion of it. And, thirdly, with regard to those who treat it as chimerical, and turn it into ridicule.
In the first place, true honour, though it be a different principle from religion, is that which produces the same effects. The lines of action, though drawn from different parts, terminate in the same point. Religion embraces virtue, as it is enjoined by the laws of God; honour, as it is graceful and ornamental to human nature. The religious man fears, the man of honour scorns to do an ill action. The one considers vice as something that is beneath him, the other as something that is offensive to the Divine Being; the one as what is unbecoming, the other as what is forbidden. Thus Seneca speaks in the natural and genuine language of a man of honour, when he declares, that, were there no God,
to see or punish vice, he would not commit it, because it is of so mean, so base, and so vile a nature.
I shall conclude this head with the description of honour in the part of young Juba.
" I shall conclude this head.] Mr. Addison here applies, and, in applying, explains, his own famous verses, in Cato.
The honour, which the Guardian celebrates in the first division of this paper, is true honour : so he expressly calls it; and the false is considered distinctly under the second head.
Now true honour, as contrasted to religion, may be well enough given, as it is here, under the idea of philosophical or stoical virtue ; but, as opposed to false honour, in the days of paganism, it could only be that principle, which we call a love of honest fame. This last, then, is Juba's honour, in his panegyric, as is clear, indeed, from his own words in the close of the scene, where, speaking of Cato, he says
“I'd rather have that man approve my deeds,
Than worlds for my admirers.” And what Mr. A. has been describing in this paper, under the name of true honour, is pagan virtue itself. It was proper to begin with this observation, because it lets us see in what manner, and to what purpose, he applies Juba's panegyric to the present subject. It is as if he had said,
-What Juba says of true pagan honour, when compared with stoical virtue, holds, in proportion, of stoical virtue, i. e. true philosophical honour, when compared with religion. Each is assistant or supplemental to the other.
This being premised, let us now consider the verses themselves.
Honour, in these verses, means true pagan honour, and is that principle of human action, which respects honest fame, that is, the esteem of wise and good men : as the virtue celebrated in them is stoical virtue, which regulates itself by the sense of the honestum simply, or, in other words, by self-esteem.
These principles are clearly distinct from each other, but may subsist together; and, when they do so, they as clearly draw the same way. Hence we see, that the principle of honour must needs
-aid and strengthen virtue where she is," i. e. when it associates with her in the same breast; for it adds its own impulse to that of virtue, and in the same direction. It likewise
Imitates her actions where she is not,” i. e. when virtue, properly so called, is not the principle of action ; for honour, by itself, prompts to the same conduct which virtue prescribes. Honour, then, enforcing the virtuous principle, or doing its work, is either way a sacred tie, and not to be sported with.
Such is the natural, unforced reasoning of the poet: and that honour in the ideas of a Roman, was a different principle from virtue, is further manifest, because Rome had temples of both; though the way to the former lay through the latter; by which contrivance was only expressed this moral lesson, that the surest means of obtaining the consentient praise
Honour 's a sacred tie, the law of kings,
In the second place, we are to consider those who have mistaken notions of honour; and these are such as establish anything to themselves for a point of honour, which is contrary, either to the laws of God, or of their country; who think it more honourable to revenge, than to forgive an injury; who make no scruple of telling a lie, but would put any man to death that accuses them of it; who are more careful to guard their reputation by their courage than by their virtue. True fortitude is, indeed, so becoming in human nature, that he who wants it scarce deserves the name of a
but we find several, who so much abuse this notion, that they place the whole idea of honour in a kind of brutal courage; by which means, we have had many among us, who have called themselves men of honour, that would have been a disgrace to a gibbet. In a word, the man who sacrifices any duty of a reasonable creature to a prevailing mode or fashion, who looks upon anything as honourable that is displeasing to his Maker or destructive to society, who thinks himself obliged by this principle to the practice of some vir
of the good (so Cicero, somewhere, defines true honour) was, first to secure the suffrage of our own hearts.
Besides, in fact, these two principles governed, separately, in ancient Rome. Honour was the ruling principle of Cicero's splendid life; and virtue, of Cato's awful one. Whence it may appear, that virtue is the stronger and steadier principle; but that honour is qualified to be a good second, or even substitute of virtue; that is, in the poet's words, to aid her enthusiasm, or to imitate her actions.
The conclusion is, that the learned poet has not violated decorum, in transferring to Juba the ideas of modern times; but has made him speak in the true Roman style, when he distinguishes between honour and virtue : for a distinction, we see, there was; but not the same which our Gothic manners have since introduced.
The mistake might arise from the poet's calling his honour—the law of kings—that being the common boast of Gothic honour. But he only means, that public persons are chiefly governed by the law of honour or outward esteem ; which, of course, is a more obvious, and, generally, a more binding law, to men so enployed, than that of virtue or self-esteem ; the first rule of which is-tecum habita—a hard injunction to such as are taken up with the great affairs of the world.
tues and not of others, is, by no means, to be reckoned
among true men of honour.
Timogenes was a lively instance of one actuated by false honour. Timogenes would smile at a man's jest who ridiculed his Maker, and, at the same time, run a man through the body that spoke ill of his friend. Timogenes would have scorned to have betrayed ? a secret that was intrusted with him, though the fate of his country depended upon the discovery
of it. Timogenes took away the life of a young fellow, in a duel, for having spoken ill of Belinda, a lady whom hé himself had seduced in her youth, and betrayed into want and ignominy. To close his character, Timogenes, after having ruined several poor tradesmen's families, who had trusted him, sold his estate to satisfy his creditors; but, like a man of honour, disposed of all the money he could make of it, in the paying off his play-debts, or, to speak in his own language, his debts of honour.
In the third place, we are to consider those persons who treat this principle as chimerical, and turn it into ridicule. Men who are professedly of no honour, are of a more profligate and abandoned nature than even those who are acted by false notions of it, as there is more hopes of a heretic than of an atheist. These sons of infamy consider honour, with old Syphax, in the play before-mentioned, as a fine imaginary notion, that leads astray young, unexperienced men, and draws them into real mischiefs, while they are engaged in the pursuits of a shadow. These are, generally, persons who, in Shakspeare's phrase, “are worn and hackney'd in the ways of men;" whose imaginations are grown callous, and have lost all those delicate sentiments which are natural to minds that are innocent and undepraved. Such old battered miscreants ridicule everything as romantic that comes in competition with their present interest, and treat those persons as visionaries, who dare stand up in a corrupt age for what has not its immediate reward joined to it. The talents, interest, or experience of such men, make them very often useful in all parties, and at all times. But whatever wealth and
" To have betrayed.] It should have been, to betray.
2 In the paying off his play-debts.] He should have said—in the paying off of his play-debts-or, rather, to avoid the offensive sound, off of_in paying off his play-debts ; that is, paying should be a participle, properly so called, and not a substantive, as it is when preceded by the article.