Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

works at Portsdown were not called for, I enemy hand to hand, attacking him in and ought not to be carried on. He his ports instead of defending our own. hoped that they would be able to stop Our regular army had an admirable auxsome of these works. Then there was the iliary in the Militia. He trusted that next Fareham work, on which as yet only year steps would be taken for having more £8,000 had been expended, but on which of the militia embodied, or the period of there was to be a further outlay of training greatly increased. It was a mis£105,000-a very large sum in the con- take to suppose, however, that we could struction of a work of questionable ne- shut up the whole of our untrained force cessity. To that work, also, his argument alone in our fortresses. We must always in favour of delay might, he thought, be appropriate a large proportion of our reguvery fairly applied. Again, the Plymouth lar troops to our forts. To depend upon defences on the Eastern side were to cost fortifications for the defence of the metro£360,000, of which a sum of £50,000 polis would be, he thought, very unwise. was to be expended in the coming year. It would be very hard if we could not That line of defence would prove far too dispose of an enemy before he reached much for our military forces, and, more- London, if we did not shut up too great a over, he did not believe that an enemy number of regular troops in fortresses. would ever sit down before Plymouth. Great peril would result from defending It was too perilous an operation; for, in the capital by forts. The Duke of Welthat position, he would be exposed both lington used to say, referring to the in flank and in rear, and we should be march of the Allies to Paris, that it was able to pour upon him almost the whole lucky for France that Paris was not forof our disposable force. It appeared to tified; because, if the Allies had been him that it would be much wiser to con- obliged to assault it, they would not struct but one fort on that side, which have left one stone standing upon anowould be sufficient for all useful purposes, ther. He was afraid, that if we were to and might be made the nucleus for other attempt to defend the metropolis, some works, should they be subsequently found such terrible calamity would befall us in requisite. He was persuaded that the the event of a successful attack. He was Plymouth eastern line of defence, as now sorry to find, from what had been said proposed, would eventually be given up; in another place, that the Spithead forts for it is too extensive for the garrisons that were not altogether given up. Already could be spared, and yet not sufficiently we had a formidable series of works along distant from the dockyard to secure it from our coast, and he thought we should conbombardment-- in fact, it is an ill-chosen tent ourselves with doing that which the line. He wished to ask the Secretary for Government, strangely enough, had not War, what he proposed to do if an enemy yet done-namely, covering the existing were to land in Essex? how we could works with iron plating, and rendering operate upon either his flank or his rear? them in other respects more formidable. Such a contingency, in the event of an The stones of some parts of Southsea invasion, was by no means improbable. Castle, for example, were crumbling to It had been projected before, and might pieces, and he was at a loss to underbe projected again. In the reign of Louis stand why that work should not be Philippe, one of the French Marshals strengthened with iron-casing. The same actually drew up a plan of invasion, in remark applied to other works. He was which he proposed that while one division far from wishing to weaken the hands of the army was to land at Weymouth, of the Government, but he implored them another was to make an attempt some- to consider whether some reduction could where in Essex. The Secretary for War not be made. There was no reason why appeared altogether to overlook the importance of defending that part of the coast. But he (Sir F. Smith) agreed with Admiral Robinson, who gave admirable evidence before the Defence Commissioners, that all defensive war should resolve itself into violent aggression upon the enemy. No war worthy of the name could be carried on by England unless the main object were to deal with the

the works at Plymouth should not be delayed for a year or two, or why the works at Fareham should not be suspended, or why the works on Portsdown Hill should not be diminished from five to three. He agreed with Sir John Burgoyne that there should be no works but fieldworks on Portsdown Hill, and, certainly, the Government would exercise a wise discretion in restricting the number

Amendment proposed,

If

of works to three. He was impelled by | efficiency of these forts rested on an hypoa sense of duty to submit this statement thetical gun; and until that gun were to the House. He was as anxious as any constructed, he was of opinion that the man to see the country well defended, and forts should also be hypothetical to see fortifications where they ought to Spithead forts were to be suspended, he be; but he was extremely reluctant to see thought there were much stronger reathem placed where they ought not to be. sons for abandoning Plymouth fort. He One portion of his Motion had been in a was informed that no hostile vessel need great measure met by the Return presented approach nearer than 1,500 yards, and as by the right hon. Gentleman; but, enter- yet we had no gun which could destroy taining the views he had expressed, he an iron-plated vessel at 200 yards. He felt it his duty to move his Amendment. would remind the House, that considering the distress that existed in Ireland and in Lancashire, they were not warranted in expending the large sums of money on works which might turn out to be worthless. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech at Manchester, when referring to the expenditure of the country, said that expenditure was caused partly by "works of real necessity." If that was correct, there must be some part of the national expenditure caused-if he might use the term-by works of "unreal" necessity. He looked upon the construction of ships and floating batteries as works of real necessity; but these forts for the alleged protection of our dockyards, and inland defences to protect the country against invasion, he looked on as works of the most unreal necessity that the wit of man could devise. As to the Report of the Commissioners upon the Defences of the country, he did not think it was warranted by the evidence which they had

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words " there be laid before this House, a Return showing the original and every subsequent Estimate for each work recommended by the Defences Commissioners; the amount of any Contract for each work; what proportion of each work is completed; and what works can be postponed without injury to the Public Service," -instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

were called upon to report as to the most perfect system of defences they could devise, it was natural, notwithstanding the weight of evidence the other way, that they should produce a Report of this description. The Secretary for War said the other night that that was a question of

MR. GREGORY seconded the Amendment. He must confess, however, that he could not see how the Government could satisfy the latter part of the Motion or make a Return as to "what inconvenience or injury, if any, would result from the postponement of any of the projected works." He wished very much that a different course had been taken with re-heard. When military and naval men gard to this question of fortifications. He wished to see the question tested by some principle. He should have liked an issue to be raised which would have given himself and others who were opposed to those defences, as far as the evidence already given on the subject warranted an opposition to such works, an opportunity of re-insurance. He (Mr. Gregory) would say cording their opinions. He thought his that the question was whether they were hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. prepared to insure at a hazardous rate of Osborne) had taken the right course the interest at a time when there was nothing other evening to effect that object. His to justify the payment of a high premium own impression was that the works of when there was nothing in the position every fort should be suspended until it had been proved that they were worth any expenditure at all upon them, and he should have been glad to see the votes of hon. Members recorded on the question of suspending the execution of all the works at the forts until further experiments should have been made. As far as the evidence on the subject went, it showed that those forts would not be worth the expenditure. The whole question of the

The

of the country involving any extraordinary risk. They had to deal with an expenditure which the House could reach, which it could moderate and diminish. Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had often delighted the House with his eloquence, the other day created quite a sensation by the speech he delivered in Manchester. He showed, that if the House of Commons would only exert itself, great reductions might be made, and that finan

cial limit might at last be reached where | Then with respect to the large guns that the income tax should cease to trouble us; had been projected: the experiment of the and every one was anxious to smoothe the 12-ton gun had failed to go right through way to such reductions. If they could the side of the Warrior at 200 yards, and convince the House that it was not ex- they would therefore be useless against a pedient to spend money on these forts, passing vessel; and before constructing they would have done one of the best enormous forts something ought to be nights' work since the commencement known about the 300-pounders. The of the Session. He could not quit this only testimony in favour of those guns part of the subject without referring to was that of Sir William Armstrong himthe evidence given before the Committee self. Now, he would pair off Sir William on Colonial Expenditure last year. A Armstrong against Colonel Taylor of Shoecommittee of engineers had been making buryness, the only artillery officer who a circuit of the colonies to see where de- was examined before the Committee, and fences should be built. Some expendi- who was of opinion that a point might be ture had been incurred at the Mauritius. reached where the difficulty of handling The Chancellor of the Exchequer was ex- the guns would almost counterbalance their amined. He was asked whether he ap- increased power, and that it would be proved that expenditure. He said "No; difficult to bring a 300-pounder to bear the proper mode of defending the Mauritius against a moving object. It was very rewas by a fleet; but these defences had markable that this was not the first time been recommended by professional autho- that the question of defending our dockrities. The blame rested not with the yards by forts has been introduced. On professional authorities so much as with the 27th of February, 1786, Mr. Pitt prothose who set them about the work; for, posed a Resolution to the effectif they are desired to say what works are "That it appears to this House that to provide necessary for the defence of an island, they effectually for the security of His Majesty's dockgive a purely professional opinion." For yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth by permanent himself, he must say, although he was not fortifications, is an essential object to the safety a professional man, there were certain cir-ral defences of the kingdom, and necessary to of the State, intimately connected with the genecumstances that must strike any man of enable the fleet to act for the protection of comcommon sense. The object was to raise merce and the defence of our distant possessions." up a second line of naval defence. The The expenditure proposed at that time first line was our fleet, and the second amounted only to £396,000. should be floating batteries. Floating was the position Mr. Pitt occupied at batteries were far more reliable, far more the time? He was quite as popular available, and of far greater primary im- and powerful as the noble Lord at the portance than forts. By primary im- head of the Government, and he proposed portance he meant to say-Construct a Resolution, couched in words such as first your floating batteries; and if they the noble Lord or the Secretary of State should not be found sufficient, these forts for War might now employ-namely, that might be constructed; but no expenditure to provide effectually for securing Her could be more wanton or monstrous than Majesty's dockyards of Portsmouth and to spend money in forts until they had Plymouth, by a permanent system of forproved by actual experiment that they tifications, founded on the most economicould destroy a flotilla at the furthest cal principles, and requiring the smallest point at which that flotilla could attempt number of troops, was an object essential to pass them. He would read an extract to the safety of the State, &c. But the from an amusing letter written by Major House of Commons, who were perfectly Macrae, R.E., to Captain Coles, in which willing to be led by Mr. Pitt upon any it was stated thatfinancial question, refused to be led by him on that occasion; they looked upon the works as not of real necessity; and upon a division the number were 169 to 169, and the Speaker gave his casting vote against the Resolution. Now, there were certain points of similarity and dissimilarity between the state of affairs in 1786 and 1862 which were worthy of observation. As to points of similarity, the

"Iron-cased ships, or forts in motion, can alone contend with reasonable chance of success against forts in motion. If Tom Sayers were strapped to a post very tightly, and you and I were allowed to dodge round him, we might think we should be able to crush the champion; but if the cord happened to break, I know what I should do; and

when you write, please say what you would do. It is not unlikely our opinions might coincide upon this point, and that both should live to fight another day."

What

year 1876 witnessed the ratification of a treaty of commerce with France, and the proposition to erect forts of defence against France. The coincidence was singular. Mr. Pitt said he did not hesitate to contend against the frequently-expressed opinion that France was and must be the unalterable enemy of England, and that his mind revolted from a proposition so monstrous and impossible. Mr. Fox, on the contrary, asserted that France was the natural enemy of England, and he voted against the treaty of commerce; and he also voted against the scheme for the defence of the country-such was the spirit of faction in those days. The points of dissimilarity were these:-Mr. Pitt advocated the erection of forts-first, because every experiment tried at that time proved the efficacy of cannon against wooden ships; but the question of guns against iron-cased ships was by no means decided at present; secondly, because the construction of forts would enable him to let loose the navy for operations in every quarter of the globe; and, thirdly, Mr. Pitt said, that in case of invasion of the dockyards, the fleet, owing to winds and tides, could not go to their protection. But the present proposition was based on the supposition that steam had so bridged over the Channel between the two countries, that we were now defenceless against a sudden attack. In 1786 it was considered necessary to fortify the dockyards because of the winds and tides. In 1862 it was alleged to be necessary to fortify the dockyards, because we had overcome the winds and tides. And, lastly, Mr. Pitt argued that forts were necessary, because the country had not more than 21,000 troops, including the militia, available for the defence of the dockyards. But, in 1862, had we only 21,000 men available for that purpose? If they looked to what was done at Brighton the other day, where 20,000 men were sent down in a few hours, they might judge how easily the force that could be concentrated at any point might be made superior to any force that could be landed upon our shores. There was no greater bugbear than this bugbear of invasion; and he was fully persuaded that every farthing spent in preparing against invasion was money thrown away. It was assumed in the debate in another place, a few nights ago, that in case of invasion the invading force would be brought over in wooden ships. Now, he believed that would be perfectly impos

sible, owing to the destructive character of our new arms of precision. But suppose iron-cased transports were used, the length of time necessary for their construction would give us most ample time to prepare for their reception. Under any circumstances whatever, the embarkment of an invading force, with guns, horses (which could only be embarked in wooden ships, because iron vessels could not approach the shore), and all the material of war, was no easy matter; and could it be supposed, then, that a landing in this country could possibly be effected? In the Crimea, where there was no opposition, it took two days to effect a landing; and it was perfectly notorious, for they had it upon the highest professional authority, that if the landing had been reresisted, it could not have been effected without great difficulty and great loss. An argument in favour of forts was used the other night, based upon the successful defence of New Orleans by General Jackson. But this incident told completely the other way, for the resistance offered by General Jackson was perfectly impromptu, and was effected by means of cotton bags thrown up at a moment's notice. He had said that he thought these forts and internal defences against invasion useless, but he would go further, and designate them as absolutely mischievous, for they would cause the people of this country to rely on what was utterly unreliable. When the futility of these defences should be proved, the common sense of the country would revolt against the unnecessary expenditure, and any proposition to lay out money on real and substantial defences would then be probably met by a stern denial of the necessary means. He had never scrupled to support the Government when they brought forward the proposition for defences based on experiment and experience. When the fortifications at Cronstadt and Sebastopol had proved powerful against the English fleets, he supported the proposition for fortifications. But now there was evidence that these forts could be passed by ships not penetrable at the present moment, and therefore the Secretary of War was not justified in accusing hon. Members of vacillation, lightness, and inconsistency, because they now opposed this system of fortifications. If they should ever be engaged in a struggle with their neighbours on the other side of the Channel, it would be well for this country to enter upon the

contest with unstrained and elastic resources. War taxes in time of peace were a bad preparation for contest. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty said, "If you wish to bring your ships victorious out of action, for God's sake keep out the shells." So he (Mr. Gregory), too, said, if the Government wished to bring the country victorious out of the next great struggle, he advised them, for God's sake, in times of peace, to keep out the income tax.

SIR JAMES FERGUSSON thought that in the present discussion some points which deserved consideration had been lost sight of, in consequence, probably, of the speeches delivered the other evening being directed very much to the question of erecting defences at Spithead. It appeared to him that the question now before the House was simply whether they should proceed with the land defences for the dockyards and arsenals. [Cries of Plymouth Breakwater.] There was the proposition of the fort at Plymouth Breakwater, but the main provisions of the Bill referred to the land defences of Her Majesty's dockyards. It seemed to him, in the discussion of this question a great many fallacies had been uttered. They had been told that the system of fortifications entailed larger expenditure, increased military forces, and permanent and extensive armaments; that it amounted to a confession of weakness, and involved disregard of the natural and main defence of England-its naval supremacy. He, on the contrary, maintained, that if a vast army could be kept up in this country, no such expense on fortifications as now proposed would be necessary, and they might contemplate without alarm the possibility of the landing of the largest force that could be brought by a fleet to the shores of England. Any sound system of fortifications should entail reduced expenditure and the maintenance of a small army, constituting a cheap insurance of the valuable property of the kingdom. But whether advocating or opposing these forts, all admitted that the maintenance of the naval supremacy of England must be the first element of consideration. To their naval supremacy must be committed the preservation of those imports on which the industry of the country so greatly depended; the protection of the foreign dependencies of England must depend on this country keeping the command of the sea, so as to be able to proceed to their

succour whenever they might be in danger. But the question arose, was the naval supremacy of the country a sufficient protection, and, without fortifications, could that naval supremacy be preserved? Naval supremacy implied that they should have a force able not only to defend the shores of this country from the possibility of invasion, but also able at all times to protect England's important dependencies and military positions; and therefore it involved the necessity of having a fleet able to cope with the largest navy maintained by any other European Power, or with two European navies combined. It was also necessary that that fleet should be at the place where it was required. Since this country was last called on to defend itself by means of the fleet the character of naval warfare had undergone important changes. Naval hostilities in the present day partook more of the character of land warfare than they had ever done before, because fleets propelled by steam could be brought to bear upon a given point with almost as much certainty as armies on land. The effects of a great naval engagement, fought with modern artillery, would be such that one of the fleets at least would not be soon available for service at a great distance from the scene of action. If, therefore, a British fleet were, he would not say defeated, but checked, in any great action, a national misfortune might be impending over us. According to the statements of Her Majesty's Government, this country was at the present moment in a state of inferiority to the greatest military Power of the Continent in regard to the possession of an ironplated fleet. If the British Government were compelled to send a fleet to relieve Gibraltar or Malta from a naval siege, where would they find sufficient ships to blockade Cherbourg and Brest, and at the same time preserve the Channel from the invasion of the fleets of a hostile coalition? He was surprised to hear it stated the other night that steam gave increased facilities for blockading a hostile. port. A blockading squadron must keep its fires constantly lighted, and how long would the coal of a line-of-battle ship last under such circumstances? If they were attacked at a moment when they were short of coal, would they not engage the enemy at the greatest disadvantage? The enemy's ships in a blockaded port, on the contrary, would be fully coaled, and would be ready to run out at a moment's notice.

« ПредишнаНапред »