pound which (as body) is subordinate to a monad or an individual of higher order (as soul). Had the results of modern physics, anatomy, physiology, been at the command of Leibniz, he would not have neglected to carry further his theory with respect to atoms, cells, and organisms; but as it was, it remained only a stroke of genius without the necessary empirical supports.-What, on the other hand, we can not accept is the artificial and unsatisfactory hypothesis of the pre-established harmony, by which all real happening is altogether abolished, and the worldprocess is disintegrated into an unrelated juxtaposition of separate trains of ideas in inactive isolated monads. If Leibniz expressly excludes all real influence of the monads on one another, yet the influxus idealis which he puts in place of the influxus physicus is an ill-chosen, because misleading expression. For undoubtedly, according to him, the content of the chain of ideas in each monad must at any given point of time correspond to the ideal chain of every other monad in a certain fashion, but this correspondence (chiming, harmony) is by no means said to result from this, that (say) the idea of a monad determines by an ideal influence the simultaneous idea of another (as one might indeed suppose from the wording influxus idealis), but from this, that the content of the flow of ideas has been predetermined or predestined from all eternity and for ever and ever for every monad, and is predestined, moreover, in such a way, that between the various trains of ideas there always exists a certain harmony. The harmony thus predetermined or pre-established is accordingly a sportive mechanism, which, moreover, is quite aimless; for if, for example, the various ideal currents had a velocity so different that harmony never took place between them, the monads would notice nought thereof, and would behave themselves just the same as in the contrary case. This theory, which abolishes all influence of the monads on one another, thus all causality, is consequently perfectly useless.

What further distinguishes us from Leibniz is the knowledge we have gained-firstly, that the organic individual of higher order only subsists in the particular unity of the individuals of lower order, and that the conscious individual altogether only arises through a reciprocal action of certain material parts of the organic individual with the Unconscious. It follows from this that the central monad or the central individual, neither in respect of the organism nor in respect of consciousness, is something standing beyond or outside the subordinate monads or individuals, but that if, in the higher individual, something else is contained in addition beyond the union of the inferior individuals, this can only be an unconscious factor. But in regard to this unconscious factor, which we have come to know as the regent in the organic and conscious life of the individual, the question may arise whether we have to do with a central monad separate for each individual, or whether the functions of the Unconscious proceed from a being identical and common for all individuals? Since, in conclusion, even Leibniz saw himself compelled to transform the unrelated coadjacency of his windowless monads into their coinherence, i.e., to take up all monads into an absolute central monad, one may also put the question thus: Do the bundles of rays of unconscious psychical functions in the different individuals point directly to one and the same absolute centre, or do they in the first instance lead to different relative centres, and only mediately through these to the universal centre of the world? In this culminates the question with respect to the individuality of the Unconscious, after one has assured oneself in general of the unity of the Unconscious as such. In conformity with the importance of this problem we discuss it in a chapter of its own.

VII.

THE ALL-ONENESS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

THAT to the Unconscious, as actively manifested in an organic and individual consciousness, there is not wanting strict unity, is probably at once evident We altogether know the Unconscious only by means of causality; it is just the cause of all those events in an organic and conscious individual which lead us to suppose a psychical and yet not conscious cause. All that we have found within this Unconscious of distinctions or parts is limited to the two moments Will and Idea, and of these we have also indeed again perceived the inseparable unity in the Unconscious. But in case some one should insist that Will and Idea are to be conceived as different parts of the one Unconscious, yet their reciprocity in the motivation of the Will through the Idea and arousing of the Idea by means of the interest of the Will would be quite unmistakable. What in the organism we were still compelled to apprehend as unity through mutual action of the parts is in the One cause of these events taken up into the unity of the end, to which these several activities of the one and another part are all posited only as common means. The unity of Time in the continuity of action is likewise present. The unity of Space can here, of course, be no longer spoken of, because we have to do with a nonspatial being; in the effects, however, it is just as much present as the unity of Time. Thus much, then, is settled, that the unity of the psychically Unconscious in the individual is the strictest one can find. It is, however, not

implied in this that there are unconsciously psychical individuals, for if the unity of the Unconscious were so strict that it undividedly embraced in itself all the unconsciously-psychical, wherever it might be operative in the world, there would be only one Unconscious, and not several Unconscious; then there would be also no longer individuals in the Unconscious, but the entire Unconscious would be as one single individual, without subordinate, coordinate, or super-ordinate individuals. Since also Matter and Consciousness are phenomenal forms of the Unconscious, this being would then be the all-embracing individual which is all-being, the absolute individual, or the individual κατ' ἐξοχήν.

In organisms we had no occasion to raise the question whether we then had actually several things and not one before us, because the spatial distinction of the form answered it by anticipation. In the case of consciousness we have answered the question, which could hardly be decided à priori, in conformity with internal experience, which teaches us that the consciousness of Peter and Paul, of brain and abdominal ganglia, are not one, but many and different. In the Unconscious, however, this question is robbed of half its force; since the essence of the Unconscious is non-spatial, and the inner experience of consciousness of course says nothing at all about the Unconscious. Nobody is directly aware of the unconscious subject of his own consciousness. Everybody knows it only as the in itself unknown psychical cause of his consciousWhat ground could he have for the assertion that this unknown cause of his consciousness is another than that of his neighbour, whose immediate knowledge is just as limited as his own? In a word, immediate inner or outer experience affords us no aid in deciding this important alternative, which accordingly is provisionally a perfectly open question. In such a case the maxim carries full authority that principles are not to be unnecessarily multiplied, and that in the absence of direct experience

ness.

the simplest assumptions are always to be entertained. According to this, the unity of the Unconscious would have to be supposed so long as the opponent of this simplest assumption had not satisfactorily relieved himself of the onus probandi incumbent upon him. But of this no attempt is yet known to us; for Herbart's proposition, "As much appearance, so much indication of existence," can manifestly only serve to prove the many-sidedness, but not the multiplicity of being, since, as is well known, one and the same being appears for the most part quite different according to different aspects. That the assumption of direct unity is really much simpler hardly needs special proof, since here there is only question of the relations of the actor to his activities, and of the reciprocal action of the activities of one and the same actor; whereas, on the opposite assumption, the relations of different actors to their activities, and, moreover, those of the actor and his activities inter se, are in question, the latter of which must either be acknowledged to be quite inexplicable, or be explained by the further perfectly inaccessible and incomprehensible relations of these many actors to the Absolute standing over them and including them.

Only because the one part of my brain has a direct communication with the other is the consciousness of the two parts unified (conf. C. Chap. iii. 5. pp. 113–118); and could we unite the brains of two human beings by a path of communication equivalent to the cerebral fibres, both would no longer have two, but one consciousness. Could a union of two consciousnesses into one, such as actually occurs, be at all possible if the Unconscious, from which consciousness is born as a sequel of natural stimulation, were not already in itself one?

The entire ant has one, the divided ant two consciousnesses; and if one sews together the halves of two different polyps (thus two previously divided consciousnesses), one polyp will result with a single consciousness. Wealth and poverty of consciousness can make no difference in