what base; what just, what unjust; what wisdom, what folly; what courage, what cowardice; what a state or political community; what the character of a statesman or a politician; what a government of men, what the character of one equal to such a government. It was on these and other matters of the same kind that he used to discourse, in which subjects those who were knowing he used to esteem men of honor and goodness, and those who were ignorant to be no better than the basest of slaves."*

APPENDIX TO BOOK IV.

SINCE the publication of Mr. Stewart's work, two theories on the nature of virtue have appeared and attracted considerable notice in England and this country; one by Sir James Mackintosh, and the other by Jouffroy. A succinct account of each will be given in this Appendix.†

SECTION I.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH'S THEORY OF MORALS.

I. His Distinction between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Criterion of Morality.] Mackintosh has,

*

Memor., Lib. I. Cap. i.

[By reason, in this chapter, we are to understand the discursive reason, or reasoning. We have seen that Mr. Stewart, after Price, is disposed to refer the origin of moral distinctions to the intuitive reason.]

The first is taken from Dr. Whewell's Preface to his edition of Mackintosh's Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy; the second from Jouffroy himself, mostly from the twenty-ninth and thirtieth Lectures of his Cours de Droit Naturel, being part of the third volume, published since his death, and not yet translated into English. His criticism of other theories is taken from the twenty-second Lecture. The object of this work does not lead me to notice German speculations on ethics not yet naturalized amongst us. Those who wish to pursue the study in that direction must read Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten; and Critik der praktischen Vernunft. (Most of Kant's ethical writings have been translated into English by J. W. Semple, under the title of The Metaphysic of Ethics.) Schleiermacher, Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts.

- ED.

with great propriety, insisted upon the importance of a distinction of two parts of moral philosophy which are often confounded; the theory of moral sentiments, and the criterion of morality. The question of the independent existence and character of the moral faculty belongs to the former division of the subject; the construction of our system of ethics flows from the latter. There

is no necessary collision between doctrines on these two points. We may hold that morality is an original quality of actions, and may still form our rules of morality by tracing the consequences of actions.

Those who

This distinction has often been neglected. hold that utility constitutes morality often call upon the advocates of a moral sense to show how the assertion of such a faculty leads us to distinguish right from wrong, or how it can supersede the criterion of general utility. To this it may be replied, that the existence of a moral conscience in man is an important truth, but that this truth. alone cannot be expected to replace all the principles and deductions by which a sound system of philosophical ethics is to be produced; that the construction of such a system is undoubtedly a difficult problem, but that we shall inevitably obtain an erroneous solution of the problem, if we do not take into our account the operation of the moral faculty. The criterion of utility cannot safely be applied without acknowledging the independent value of morality, any more than the moral faculty can always decide well without the consideration of consequences. For among the most important results of actions, we must include their effect upon the moral habits and feelings of men; and must consider these effects as claiming attention for their own sake. The promotion of human virtue must be our aim, as well as the augmentation of human happiWe cannot by any analysis exclude the former of these ends; happiness depends on the exercise of the virtuous affections, far more clearly than virtue depends on the pursuit of happiness. The most wise and moderate of the utilitarian moralists do, accordingly, apply their method in this manner. Thus Paley, in estimating the guilt of corrupting a person to the commission of one offence, states it as one ground of condemnation, that such seduction

ness.

is the destruction of the person's moral principle.* And it appears, at present, to be generally allowed, that the utilitarian doctrine cannot be applied without considering the effect on the moral feelings of men as among the important consequences of action. "It often happens,” it is said, "that an essential part of the morality or immorality of an action, or a rule of action, consists in its influence on the agent's own mind." "Many actions, moreover, produce effects on the characters of other persons besides the agents." The effects here spoken of are, in fact, effects on the moral habits of thought; and thus the existence of the moral attributes of the mind, as original and independent objects of the attention of the ethical philosopher, is presupposed in this mode of applying the utilitarian scheme.

If, indeed, we take such good and bad consequences into the account, - if, among the useful effects of actions, we conceive the most useful to be the improvement of man's moral character, if we frame our rules so that they shall conduce as much as possible to virtuous feeling as well as to beneficial action, to purity of heart as well as to rectitude of conduct, if we aim at man's general well-being, and not merely at his gratification, — I know not what moralist would object to a criterion of morality so drawn from consequences, or would deny that the promotion of human happiness, and of human virtue, require the same practical rules. Mackintosh would undoubtedly have assented to this; for he not only allows the universal coincidence of virtue with utility in the largest sense, but founds his recommendation of the highest forms of virtue on the advantage of virtuous habits and feelings, both to the possessor and to the community; as when he speaks of the trite example of Regulus, of the character of Andrew Fletcher, and of the virtue of courage. we could take into due account the whole value of right principles, and the whole happiness produced by virtuous feelings, we could commit no practical error in making the advantageous consequences of actions the measure of their morality.

* Moral Philosophy, Book III. Part iii. Chap. iii,

If

t See the extract from him on the followers of Bentham in this volume.

But this can happen only by considering moral good as a primary object, valuable for its own sake; not by supposing that virtue is aimed at, as subservient to some other purpose of more genuine utility and no sagacity or fairness in estimating useful consequences can stand as a substitute for the love of right itself. It is true that honesty is the best policy; but he who is honest only out of policy does not come up even to the vulgar notion of a virtuous man. If a man were tempted by the opportunity of gaining a large estate through a safe but fraudulent proceeding, the utilitarian doctrine would seem to recommend him to weigh both sides well, though it would direct him in conclusion to decide in favor of probity; but the common judgment of mankind would hardly deem him honest if he hesitated at all. And in like manner in regard to other temptations, the safety of virtue appears to consist so little in tracing all possible consequences, that it has been held that to deliberate is to be lost, and that the only secure protection is that purity of mind which will not look at the prospect of sensual pleasure when it forms one side of the account. We cannot help saying, with Cicero, "Hæc nonne est turpe dubitare philosophos, quæ ne rustici quidem dubitent ? "*

Indeed, it appears to be acknowledged by the advocates of the rule of utility, that it is not safe to apply the principle separately in each particular case. Mr. Bentham has urged, with great beauty of expression,† the propriety of framing general rules, and conforming our practice invariably to these, so as to avoid the temptations of our frailty and passion in particular instances. If a reverence for general maxims of morality, and a constant reference to the common precepts of virtue, take the place, in the utilitarian's mind, of the direct application of his principle, there will remain little difference between him and the believer in original moral distinctions; for the practical rules of the two will rarely differ, and in both systems the rules will be the moral guides of thought and conduct.

But though the two schools agree so far, there still will

De Off., Lib. III. 19. "Is it not base for philosophers to doubt that which even peasants admit?"

Deontology, Part II. Chap. i.

be found a deficiency on the part of the consistent utilitarian. A persuasion that moral good is something different from, and superior to, mere pleasure, is requisite to give to our preference of it that tone of enthusiasm and affection which belongs to virtuous feeling. To approve a rule as right, is different from liking it as profitable; to admire an act of virtuous self-devotion as we are capable of admiring, is a feeling so different from the apprehension of any usefulness the act may have, that the comparison of the two things is altogether incongruous. The moral faculty converts our perception of the quality of actions into an affection of the strongest kind; nor can we be satisfied with any account of our moral sentiments which excludes this feature in the process. Thus, as we hold the affections to be motives of an order superior to the desires which have reference to ourselves only, we maintain the moral faculty, the conscience, the affection towards duty, to be a principle of action of an order superior both to the desires and to the other affections. Without the acknowledgment of this subordination, the language and feelings of men when they compare the claims of personal pleasure, of social affection, and of duty, are altogether unintelligible and absurd.

II. He refers the Formation of our Active Principles to the Association of Ideas.] I proceed to notice another principle which enters into Mackintosh's philosophy, and which, in the way in which he holds it, constitutes one of his leading peculiarities. He assents, in a great measure, to the explanation suggested by Hume and Smith, but more fully developed by Hartley, of the formation of our passions and affections, and even of our sentiments of virtue and duty, by means of the association of ideas.

1. But into this view, as usually understood, he introduces several modifications; and, in particular, he asserts that the effect of such "association" may be something very different from the mere juxtaposition of the component elements. Thus he says that the result may be so entirely a single sentiment, that "the originally separate feelings can no longer be disjoined"; and, moreover, that "the compound may have properties not to be found in any of