pear ftrange if in a Defcription of the World, while itself and its Inhabitants were fo very different from what they are at this Day, we meet with fome Scenes of which the present State of Things can furnish us with no Refemblances. And if, for this Reason, and for the Shortness of the Account given of it, we cannot arrive at a full Knowledge of the Nature of all Things in it, nor a clear Conception of the Manner in which fome Actions were performed, it cannot be justly wondered at. But while we own some Obscurities in this History, it must at the same Time be confeffed, that there is not a fingle Circumstance in it which is abfolutely incredible, or which could not poffibly have been. And if there be a Poffibility of Things having appeared under that Form, and having happened in the Manner in which they are represented, all the reft depends upon the Hiftorian. That Poffibility alone is fufficient to rescue it from being condemned to the Clafs of Apologues or unnatural Fictions, and it is alfo fufficient to vindicate its Truth if it be attended with a fufficient Strength of Authority in the Relater, and if it seems more consistent with his Design to esteem it a true History. The Question of the natural Credibility or Incredibility of Things is decided, if it be acknowledged that they might exift: that fuch Things did exift muft depend, no longer on their Nature, but folely on the Evidence offered in Proof of their Existence. If then it appears that every Circumftance in the

History of the Creation and Fall might poffibly be true, all Objection from the Nature of Things against their being true is answered, and the Remainder of the Enquiry muft turn wholly on the Authority and Defign of Mofes. His Authority has not here been called in Question, and what has been advanced with Regard to his Defign shall shortly be confidered. At present the Nature of the Things demands our Attention. The Circumstance he has placed first, amongst those which he thinks determine this Account to be fabulous, is the Plantation of a Paradife for the Habitation of Man. We are not to transfer any unworthy Image to God's Manner of forming this Garden from the Word Plantation here made ufe of. It fignifies no more than that fuch a Garden was formed by God, without defining the Manner in which it was done. It is applied here, because the common Manner of forming Gardens amongst Us is by Plantation. Surely then there can be no Difficulty or Incongruity in conceiving that a Place of fuperior Beauty and Delight was prepared for the first Reception of Man. It will not be faid that God wanted Power to do this. The Vegetable Creation was obedient to his Word, and he could affemble the Parts of it in whatever Manner it should please him for the Service of his Will, and the Accommodation of, his yet Favourite Creature, Man. The Exiftence of a Tree of Life is as eafily conceived as that of a Paradise. For the Production of it also depended on the Power of

God.

God. And We cannot say that its Production was improper, if we will grant God the Liberty of bestowing his Favours in what Manner he fhall think fit. In like Manner We cannot object to the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, but by prefcribing to the Creator what Teft of Obedience he shall require from his Creatures. If we admit the Plantation of a Paradise for the Habitation of Man during his Innocency, We cannot find Fault with his Expulfion out of it when he had render'd himself unworthy longer to enjoy the Pleasures and Benefits of it. And having expelled him out of it, God might prevent his Return to it by whatever Guard he should think proper to appoint. What Quarrel can any one have with their hearing the Voice of the Lord God walking in the Garden in the Cool of the Day, except it be against the Expreffion? The Actions of God cannot be otherwise spoken of than in Terms taken from human Actions. And therefore if his fenfible approaching be fignified by the fame Word which expreffes the Motion of a Man, it is because human Language cannot fupply a better Expreffion. We have before fpoken of Adam's Attempt to hide himself amongst the Trees from the Sight of God, as the natural Effect of that Confufion of Mind which Sin and the Terror of Punishment had thrown him into. Had he been represented as effectually eluding the all-piercing Eye of his Judge, the Objection would have been strong; but the vain Attempt to do this is no more than the foolish

Cowardice of Guilt; which belongs to it, and which, even to fhort-fighted Man, often betrays instead of hiding it. A Serpent speaking, is what we would not give Credit to, no more than to any of the foregoing Circumstances, but upon the best Authority. However it cannot be thought incredible by thofe who hold the Existence of inferior Spirits good and bad, and who, believing the Scriptures, acknowledge that they have a limited Power not only over Beasts but even over Men. The Curfe upon the Serpent and upon the Ground, though we could affign no Reason for them, yet would not furnifh any Charge against the Justice of God, fince they are both his Creatures to be disposed of according to his Will, except we could say, that, in punishing them, he changed their State against the Conditions of fome Grant he had made them of continuing in it. But there can be no Room for Cenfure, when we confider the latter as a Part of the Punishment of Man, and the former as a Memorial of his Fall, and a lasting Mark of God's Hatred of Sin. In a Word, there is Nothing here that can appear incredible to any one, who believes that the World was created, and is governed, by a divine Providence, who admits the Agency of Spirits, and who does not hold Nature immediately to be reduced to an empty Name, by allowing that it is not only variable, but has been often actually varied at the Pleafure of its Author. a

LET us now see what Opinion these angry Attacks, upon that which is commonly received, were intended to make Way for, and what Kind of Scheme was defigned to be set up, when the Historical fhould be depofed. We are not at all concerned to take the least Notice of that Reafoning which has been erected on a chimerical Suppofition fubftituting Sanchoniatho, instead of Mofes, for the Author of this History. The Enemies of the revealed Writings, when they find themselves unable to injure them as they stand impregnable in their native Strength, may find a Pleasure in fuppofing them weaker than they are, and may divert themselves with those imaginary Triumphs which fuch a Suppofition gives them an Opportunity of acting over in Thought. But it is a Suppofition, which they can never seriously hope they will be allowed decifively to argue upon. For it alone in a great Measure would determine the whole Question in their Favour. The Facts related in this Account appear to be all poffible. The Belief of their Reality therefore depends not on their Nature (for Nature's Voice is that they may be real) but folely on the Authority and Intention of the Writer. If we fee Cause to conclude that his Intention was to deliver this as a History of real Facts, and if his Authority be strong enough to perfwade Us that He has faithfully executed his Intention, We must then admit the Account to be a true History. But if his Authority is leffened, its main Support is withdrawn, and the

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