no ground for the charge that the execution of the Leach lease by Mary Prout was obtained by fraud.

The only remaining question is whether the evidence. sustains the charge of fraud in respect to the execution of the Leach lease by Joseph Prout. There is a conflict between the evidence of Joseph Prout on the one hand and that given by Leach and King on the other as to what occurred in Chicago at the time Prout signed the lease. Prout testifies that these men came to him where he was engaged at work and told him that they had a lease which they wanted him to sign; that his mother had signed it and they had left a check with her for $525, which would be cashed when he and his wife signed the lease; that they told him that the Biehl well was being drilled, and that if it came in good it would make him rich or make him a great deal of money. He also testifies that at the time he signed the Leach lease he did not know that the Biehl well had come in, and, further, that he did not know that his mother had signed the Carter-Rapp lease; that he had not received the telegram sent by Leighty at that time and that Leach and King did not show him the letter from his mother until after he had signed the lease, and he states that after he had executed the lease King and Leach started away, and had been gone some minutes when they returned to him and then for the first time gave him the letter which his mother had sent to him by them. Leach and King testify that Leach gave Mary Prout's letter to Joseph at the same time he handed him the lease and that Prout read the letter and then went over the lease. They testify that King told him that the Biehl well was in and was a very fair well; that it had been reported over the telephone as producing from twenty-five to one hundred barrels per day, and that some reports were as high as four hundred or five hundred barrels, and that the oil was running over the casing and out over the ground. If the version of what occurred, given by King and Leach, be accepted as true,

then there was neither fraud nor false representation. In fact, according to their testimony they gave Prout information which they were not required by the rules of law to give him. The parties were upon an equal footing and dealing at arm's length. There was no fiduciary relation of any character existing between them. Under these circumstances Leach and King were not bound to give Prout any information which they had. They had a right to remain silent without violating any rule of law or equity, yet if they volunteered to give information for the purpose of influencing the conduct of Prout it became their duty to tell him the truth and the whole truth. A misrepresentation which will warrant a court of equity in setting aside a contract must contain the following elements: First, it must be a statement of fact; second, it must be made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; third, it must be untrue; fourth, the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; fifth, the person to whom it is made must believe in and rely upon the statement; and lastly, the statement must be material. (Prentice v. Crane, 234 Ill. 302; Gillespie v. Fulton Oil and Gas Co. 236 id. 188.) The preponderance of the evidence does not establish any misrepresentation by Leach and King, or either of them, to Prout which under the authorities would warrant a court of equity in declaring the Leach lease void. This lease, when executed on the first day of August, conveyed all the right, title and interest which Prout had in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in the land described, from which it follows that his subsequent lease to Carter and Rapp is invalid.

Under the evidence in this record the court properly dismissed the appellants' bill, and its decree will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Dan McNeal, Appellant, vs. George W. DICK et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed April 23, 1914.

I. SCHOOLS when notice of appeal to county superintendent is filed in time. The provision of section 55 of the School law requiring notice of an appeal to the county superintendent "within ten days after final action by the trustees" upon a petition for consolidation, means the final action of all the boards of trustees required to act, and if the notice is filed within ten days after the last board has acted it is filed in time, even though more than ten days have passed since the final action of the first board refusing to grant the petition.

2. SAME-right of appeal is given to every petitioner from decision of either board of trustees. Under section 55 of the School law the right of appeal from a decision of either board of trustees upon the petition to consolidate school districts in separate townships is not limited to petitioners residing in the district or township whose trustees have refused the prayer of the petition, but the right of appeal is given to every petitioner from the decision. of either board of trustees.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. R. W. OLMSTED, Judge, presiding.

FLOYD E. THOMPSON, State's Attorney, and Searle & MARSHALL, for appellant.

F. H. RAILSBACK, and GEORGE W. WOODS, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

On leave granted, the State's attorney of Rock Island county filed an information in the nature of quo warranto against the appellees, calling upon them to show by what warrant they held and executed the offices of president and members of the board of education of school district No. 37, in Rock Island county. On the return of the summons the respondents moved to set aside the order granting

leave and to dismiss the cause. The motion was sustained, the cause was dismissed, and the People appealed.

School district No. 37 was formed by the consolidation of school districts No. 30 and No. 37 by an order of the superintendent of schools of Rock Island county, and the only question presented for our consideration is whether the county superintendent had jurisdiction to make that order.

School district No. 30 was in Hampton township and school district No. 37 in South Moline township, both in Rock Island county. In February, 1913, a petition, signed by a majority of the voters residing in district No. 30, was filed with the clerk of the trustees of Hampton township praying for the consolidation of district No. 30 with district No. 37, and a duplicate of the petition was filed with the clerk of the trustees of South Moline township. In the same month a like petition, signed by a majority of the voters residing in district No. 37, was filed with the clerk of the trustees of South Moline township and a duplicate with the clerk of the trustees of Hampton township. The trustees of Hampton township, at their regular meeting on April 7, refused the prayer of the petition. The trustees of South Moline township met on the same day, adjourned to April 14 and then granted the prayer of the petition. A. B. Dieterich, one of the petitioners residing in district No. 37, on April 19 filed in the office of the clerk of the trustees of Hampton township a written notice of appeal from their decision on the petition to the county superintendent of schools. If the county superintendent had jurisdiction of the appeal the districts were legally consolidated and the judgment must be affirmed.

Section 46 of the School law authorizes the trustees of schools to consolidate two or more districts situated wholly within the township into one district when petitioned by a majority of the legal voters of each district. Section 47 provides that changes in the boundaries of districts which lie in separate townships may be made by the concurrent

action of the boards of trustees, each board being petitioned as provided in section 46,—that is, by a majority of the legal voters in each district. Section 55 gives the right of appeal to the county superintendent of schools to the petitioners or the legal voters who appear to oppose the change of boundaries, and requires the appellant to file with the clerk of the trustees a written notice of appeal within ten days after final action by the trustees. The notice of appeal was filed more than ten days after the action of the trustees of Hampton township but less than ten days after the action of the trustees of South Moline township. The action of the trustees upon the petition must be concurrent. The action of each board is required. Final action of the trustees means the finished action of all the boards required to act. While the action of one board refusing the prayer of the petition makes it certain that the prayer cannot be granted, the final action of the trustees on the petition has not been taken until the last board of trustees has acted. The notice of appeal was therefore within the time fixed by the statute.

The further objection is made that Dieterich could not appeal because he was not a resident of district No. 30, in Hampton township, whose trustees refused the prayer of the petition. The right of appeal is not limited to petitioners residing in the district or in the township whose trustees have refused the prayer of the petition. The petition is required to be signed by a majority of the legal voters in each district, and the right of appeal is given to every petitioner from the decision of either board of trustees.

The appeal was properly taken and the county superintendent had jurisdiction to review the action of the trustees. Judgment affirmed.