ties to each other. The General Assembly also provided another remedy for such damages applicable only to persons engaged in mining coal, in which the liability of the employer rests upon somewhat different grounds. If the death is occasioned by any willful violation of the requirements of the act the employee is exempted from the obligation to exercise care for his own safety, and the action may be maintained although there was a want of such care. In providing a statutory remedy for the damages occasioned by death, the General Assembly, in the exercise of legislative discretion, might vest the right of action and the legal title to the damages recovered in an administrator, widow, lineal heirs or any person dependent on the deceased for support. In the general act the right of action is in the personal representative of the deceased, and the amount recovered is for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin, to be distributed to such widow and next of kin in the proportion provided by law for the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate. In the case of a death coming within the provisions of the act in relation to mines, the right of action for the damages was vested in the widow, if there was one, and if there was no widow, then in the lineal heirs or adopted children, and in default of lineal heirs or adopted children, then in any other person or persons dependent for support on the deceased. The right of action for the damages in either case being purely statutory, it was within the power of the General Assembly, in conferring the right, to decide who should bring the action and how the damages should be distributed,-whether in accordance with the rules for the distribution of the personal property of persons dying intestate or by some other method,—and in either case the right conferred is to recover the whole damage. Under the act in relation to mines in force when suit was brought, as well as in the general act, the statute authorized but one action and one recovery for the entire loss and damage occasioned

by the death. (Beard v. Skeldon, 113 Ill. 584; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Machl, 130 id. 551; Cook v. Big Muddy Mining Co. 249 id. 41; Claffy v. Chicago Dock Co. id. 210.) In this case there was no widow, and the father and mother, as lineal heirs, were the only persons authorized to bring suit under the act. (Willis Coal and Mining Co. v. Grizzell, 198 Ill. 313.) The right of action and the legal title to the damages recovered being in them, they had a right to control the prosecution and disposition of the case and to compromise and release the cause of action. (Henchey v. City of Chicago, 41 Ill. 136; Washington v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co. 136 id. 49.) If this suit could be prosecuted after the settlement and the payment of the damages which the lineal heirs were entitled to recover, and which under the decisions of this court were the whole damages resulting from the death, there would be a double recovery for the same loss and damage. If either party having by the statute the right of action for the damages resulting from the death should settle the claim and release the cause of action, the whole cause of action in either would be released and gone.

It is argued that the act relating to mines is special and does not repeal the general statute under which this suit was brought, which is true but is of no importance in this case. The person upon whom a right of action is conferred by the general act may bring a suit for the damages consequent upon the death of an employee on the ground of negligence of his employer, or the person entitled to sue under the special act relating to mines may bring an action for the same damages by alleging facts bringing the cause of action within the provisions of that act. The fact that a suit may be brought under either act does not affect the question whether the same damages may be recovered twice.

The court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the plea. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

THE ILLINOIS MALLEABLE IRON COMPANY, Appellant, vs. THE COMMISSIONERS OF LINCOLN PARK et al. Appellees. Opinion filed April 23, 1914—Rehearing denied June 4, 1914.

I. ORDINANCES-ordinance construed as not entirely excluding abutting owner's wagons from street. An ordinance prohibiting traffic wagons from using a parkway, except that in carrying goods to or from premises abutting upon the parkway the wagons may enter the parkway at the cross-street nearest the premises but shall not proceed farther than the nearest cross-street thereafter, must be construed as permitting the owner of premises situated on the parkway to use the parkway with his wagons in going to or coming from the premises as far as the nearest cross-street in either direction.

2. STREETS AND ALLEYS-power of legislature over streets is absolute 'so far as public is concerned. The power of the legislature over public streets, so far as the public is concerned, is absolute, and it may change their control at its pleasure, giving jurisdiction over them to the city, to park commissioners or any other authority it sees fit.

3. SAME-legislature may limit use of streets. So long as private rights are not invaded the legislature may authorize the vacation of streets or the limiting of their use, and may permit their use for any purpose not incompatible with the object for which they were established, and it is within its power to authorize park commissioners to exclude traffic teams from a pleasure driveway.

4. SAME a property owner's right of access cannot be taken away without compensation. Owners of property bordering upon a street have, as an incident of their ownership, the right of access by way of the street which cannot be taken away or materially impaired without compensation.

5. SAME when restricted use of street does not deprive abutting owner of property. An ordinance prohibiting the owner of premises abutting upon a street which has been set apart as a parkway, from using such parkway for his traffic wagons except between the premises and the nearest cross-street in either direction, does not operate to deprive the owner of his property without compensation, and is not, as to him, invalid.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES M. FOELL, Judge, presiding.

WILLIAM J. MAHER, and SAMUEL B. KING, for appellant.

FRANCIS O'SHAUGHNESSY, and CHARLES A. CHURAN, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court of Cook county dismissing for want of equity an amended bill filed by the appellant, the Illinois Malleable Iron Company, to restrain the appellees from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting vehicles carrying goods, merchandise or wares upon Diversey parkway. The appellant claims that the enforcement of the ordinance constitutes a taking or damaging of its property for a public use without just compensation, in violation of section 13 of article 2 of the constitution. A demurrer was sustained to the amended bill, and an appeal was taken to this court on account of the constitutional question.

The amended bill alleges that in 1887, prior to the time the commissioners of Lincoln Park acquired jurisdiction over Diversey parkway, the appellant acquired a tract of land fronting upon Diversey parkway and established there its plant and place of business. The business consisted of the manufacture, sale and distribution of iron products, and in its usual course horses and wagons were kept upon the premises for use in delivering the products of the appellant to different customers in the city of Chicago and to railway freight depots. The principal hauling was to the east, north-east and south-east of the premises. As wagons are ordinarily loaded with products such as those of the appellant, paved streets are necessary for them to travel upon, and Diversey parkway, extending east and west, was a paved street its entire length. The north and south streets east of the appellant's premises, which intersect Diversey parkway, in their order are Hemitage avenue, Paulina street

and Marshfield avenue, the latter extending south to and beyond Wrightwood avenue, which is parallel to Diversey parkway. At the time of filing the amended bill, and for many years before, all these streets were unpaved, muddy and almost uniformly unusable, so that appellant's wagons used in hauling its products became stalled therein. The first north and south street east of appellant's plant which is paved and usable by loaded wagons is Ashland avenue, which is the next street east of Marshfield avenue. On October 21, 1891, the commissioners of Lincoln Park established, and have since maintained, Diversey parkway as a boulevard within their jurisdiction, and on July 23, 1902, passed the following ordinance:

"No omnibus, wagon, cart, dray, truck or other vehicle. for carrying goods, merchandise or wares or other articles, except such as are engaged in repairing or constructing said parks, boulevards, parkways, streets or driveways, shall be allowed thereon: Provided, however, that wagons or other vehicles carrying goods, merchandise or other articles to or from any house or premises abutting upon such boulevards, parkways or streets shall be permitted to enter thereon at the cross-street nearest said house or premises in the direction in which the same are moving and deliver or receive such goods, merchandise or other articles, but shall not proceed thereon further than the nearest cross-street thereafter: And provided further, that at any time before the hour of two o'clock in the afternoon of each day, delivery wagons having wheels with tires of not less than three and one-half inches in width, drawn by one horse, only, shall be allowed to proceed on and along said boulevards, parkways and streets. But this provision shall not apply to any of the driveways within the limits of the parks. Any person violating any clause, section or provision of this chapter shall be fined in a sum not exceeding $100 for each offense."