plaints and to further revise the assessment of real property as may be just and necessary. Section 40 provides that a failure to complete an assessment in the time required by law shall not vitiate such assessment, but the same shall be as legal and valid as if completed in the time required by law. Section 43 provides that when the books are completed the board of review shall deliver one set to the county clerk, one set to the board of assessors or supervisor of assessment, and the remaining set shall remain in the office of the board of review, and the assessment so completed by the board of review and certified to the county clerk and equalized as provided by law shall be the assessment upon which the taxes of that year shall be extended by the county clerk.

The construction to be placed upon these various sections was before this court in Barkley v. Dale, 213 Ill. 614, and on page 619 we said: "We think, from a consideration of all of said sections, that the provisions in section 38 that boards of review shall complete their work on or before the 7th day of September, annually, in view of section 40, is so far directory that the board may continue its sessions until it has completed the work then pending before it and is prepared to return the assessment books to the county clerk. It is clear, however, when a board of review has completed its work and attached the necessary affidavit to the assessment books and returned said books to the county clerk that the jurisdiction to act of said board of review for that year, except in counties of 125,000 or more inhabitants, which is covered by the proviso to section 38, has ceased, and that an assessment of omitted credits made by the board of review after the assessment books have been returned by the board to the county clerk is void."

In Carney v. People, 210 Ill. 434, this court had under consideration the proviso contained in the latter part of section 38, with reference to the board of review in counties

with over 125,000 inhabitants, and on page 441 we said: "The latter provision must necessarily be limited to the time that the board of review has control of the assessment books. When the books are completed and delivered to the county clerk, the assessment as completed and as equalized by the State Board of Equalization is the assessment upon which the taxes are to be extended and upon which the rate per cent of the taxes is to be computed. An original assessment may therefore be made by the board of review up to the moment the books are returned, and at a time that would deprive the person assessed of any hearing unless notice should be given him."

On July 1 the board of assessors, having completed the revision of their assessment and having appended to the assessment books the required affidavit signed by them, had no further power, by the express provisions of section 23, to change the assessment or alter the assessment books so as to change or affect the taxes of that year.

It is argued that under section 3 of the Revenue act the capital stock of a corporation is that, only, which is over and above the assessed value of the tangible property, and therefore a proper assessment of capital stock cannot be made until all assessments of tangible property have become fixed and beyond recall. When the Revenue act was first passed requiring the capital stock of all corporations to be assessed by the State Board of Equalization it was possible to ascertain the assessed value of all tangible property before the capital stock assessment was made, and this may still be done where assessments are made by the State Board of Equalization. The act has been amended, however, so that the capital stock of many corporations must be assessed by the local assessor, and the statute has expressly fixed a limit to the time within which the assessor has power to act. Where the corporation owns tangible property which is not assessed by the local assessor whose

duty it is to assess the capital stock, the law has made no provision for such assessor's ascertaining the assessed value and the assessor must use such means as are available for that purpose, but the difficulty of making the assessment will not extend his authority beyond the period fixed by law for its termination.

The assessment of appellant's capital stock was made by a body having no authority, at the time, to make it, and was void.

The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to enter a decree granting the relief prayed for.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

JOHN T. JOHANSON, Defendant in Error, vs. THE WIILIAM JOHNSTON PRINTING COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed April 23, 1914.

1. NEGLIGENCE—what elements are essential to actionable negligence. Before there can be actionable negligence there must be a duty due from the person charged to the injured party, a violation of that duty and resulting damages.

2. SAME-exception to rule that action must be brought against party causing injury. It is a general rule that a party injured by the negligence of another must bring his action against the person who caused the injury, but an exception exists in case the person causing injury is a servant who is acting in the scope of his employment, in which case his negligence is imputable to the master.

3. SAME what necessary to bring a case within exception to general rule. To bring a case within the exception to the general rule requiring a party injured to bring his action against the person causing the injury, it is necessary to show that such person was the servant of another and that the relation of master and servant existed at the time of the injury and in respect to the particular transaction out of which the injury arose.

4. SAME-act of servant outside the scope of his employment is not chargeable to master. Outside the scope of his employment a servant is as much a stranger to his master as any third person,

and an act of the servant not done in the execution of services for which he was engaged cannot be regarded as the act of the master.

5. SAME when lessee of a building is not liable for engineer's negligence. Where an employee of a boiler company is sent by the agent of a building to inspect a boiler which the lessee of the building has complained of, and such employee comes to the building without notice to the lessee or any request upon the lessee for help, and while there asks the lessee's engineer to turn the water into the boiler, the act of the engineer in complying with the request is not the act of the lessee, and the latter is not chargeable with the negligence of the engineer in going away after turning on the water, with the result that the boiler company's employee was severely scalded before the engineer returned.

CARTER, J., dissenting.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. FARLIN Q. BALL, Judge, presiding.

CHARLES J. O'CONNOR, J. C. M. CLow, and R. HAROLD O'CONNOR, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD J. QUEENY, and WILLIAM J. LACEY, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: The William Johnston Printing Company, a corporation, the plaintiff in error, was in the possession of the building known and described as Nos. 190 and 192 Fifth avenue, Chicago, under a five year lease. Bond & Co. were the agents of the owner in managing and looking after the demised premises. The boiler in the engine room began to leak, and Robert E. Johnston, president of the printing company, called up Bond & Co. and informed them of the bad condition of the boiler, and thereupon Bond & Co. called up the Page Boiler Company and asked that a man be sent to look at the boiler and report to them. William Rossow was the engineer of the plaintiff in error and had

charge of the boiler and the engine room. In compliance with the request of Bond & Co. the Page Boiler Company sent defendant in error, John T. Johanson, to make an examination of the boiler. On arriving at the building defendant in error inquired of another tenant occupying the first floor the location of the engine room, and having received directions proceeded to the basement and there met Rossow, the engineer. The fire had been drawn from the fire-box under the boiler a few hours before defendant in error arrived. Rossow explained to defendant in error that the boiler leaked to such an extent that it could not be fired. There was no person present except Rossow and defendant in error, and their statements are in conflict as to the conversation that followed, but the affirmance of the judgment below by the Appellate Court requires us to assume that defendant in error's version of the conversation is true. He testifies that he told Rossow that he would go into the combustion chamber and find the trouble, and that he directed Rossow to turn the cold water in and not to go away until he was through with his examination. Defendant in error went into the combustion chamber and Rossow turned the cold water into the boiler. After turning the water on, Rossow, who also was in charge of an elevator, got upon the elevator in answer to a bell above and left the basement and was gone several minutes, leaving the water turned on. The cold water leaked out first through the openings in the boiler, and soon after the hot water commenced running in upon the defendant in error while he was in the combustion chamber and he was severely scalded and burned. Rossow finally returned and assisted him to get out. Defendant in error's damages were assessed at $2916, and the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the judgment of the trial court for that

amount.

Plaintiff in error insists that the judgment should be reversed for the reason that, conceding Rossow was guilty