more numerous and better educated than it has EVER yet been-so that, if properly organized against a foreign invasion, it may well be said, in the language of the English writer, Wakefield, in 1812, that "a country having such defenders, and capable of supplying one army after another in succession, would rise superior to every defeat, and the loss of a battle would only be a stimulant to a more vigorous and successful exertion!"

CHAPTER IV.

Examination of the assertion of Voltaire and others, that the Irish "have always fought badly at home," and confutation of that assertion, by an account of what men, and how much domestic dissension and money enabled England to terminate the Elizabethian and Cromwellian wars.

VOLTAIRE, indeed, though he admits the goodness of the Irish as soldiers abroad, ventures to infer—from his notion of their having always fought badly at home-from the mere occurrence of Ireland's annexation to England—and from his own extremely narrow and erroneous idea of the battle of the Boyne and the whole of the Irish war between the adherents of James and William-that Ireland is one of those countries which "seem made to be subject to another." But as, in the language of Dryden,

vonian infantry was dangerous by their speed, agility, and hardiness; they swam, they dived, they remained under water, drawing their breath through a hollow cane; and a river or lake was often the scene of their unsuspected ambuscade!" Gibbon, indeed, adds, that "these were the achievements of spies or stragglers; the military art was unknown to the Sclavonians; their name was obscure and their conquests inglorious.” But the military art has been made known to the Russians, the descendants of those Sclavonians, as it was to the Irish in the French service, and, since it has been known, have the names of either been obscure, or their conquests inglorious? The Russians may speak, as they have acted, on their own account!-and, as for us, "mere Irish," perhaps the "raw material" of the 600,000 men, who, according to Newenham, fought in the various continental services, during the LAST Century, and of those who have constituted two-thirds of "the British heart and the British arm" in THIS, may not be altogether "obscure" and "inglorious!" We have seen and shall see.

'Oeuvres de Voltaire, (Siecle de Louis XIV., chap. xv.) tom. xx. p. 408, edit. 1785

Errors, like straws, upon the surface flow

They, who would seek for pearls, must dive below!

so, in this superficial assertion, Voltaire can have no greater credit attached to his opinion-though a favourite one among a certain class of politicians,-than a judicious thinker should annex to a mere rapid and arbitrary generalization from a hurried and imperfect view of facts, without any endeavour to form a due conception of the causes from which those facts arose. As to Ireland's political junction with England, it took more than four hundred years to accomplish, notwithstanding the total national disorganization, the continual divisions, and even the constant, bitter, and sanguinary hostilities of the Irish against each other. But for these circumstances, it is admitted by Leland himself an historian, from his collegiate bigotry and clerical emoluments, no friend to his country's emancipation-that the native chieftains, by even a moderate degree of union among themselves, could have often destroyedas, indeed, they long kept tributary-the comparatively tolerated and insignificant feebleness of the English Pale in Ireland. A mere allusion to the defeat of Richard II. by Arth MacMurchad O'Cavenagh, and to the results of that defeat, is sufficient to establish the truth of this assertion. It was not until the bloody battle of Knocktow, in 1504, in which, too, the Earl of Kildare, the king of England's deputy, had far more native Irish troops on his side than men of English birth or descent, that the Pale only began to be raised to any thing that deserved even the name of an English government in Ireland, or rather in a portion of Ireland; and an anecdote that is related, on English authority, to have occurred on the field of Knocktow between two Irish lords, Kildare and Gormanstown, shows, from the discord and hatred between the Irish, how little a people so divided could ever be said to be conquered as a NATION by England. Lord Gormanstown turning, in the elation of victory, to Kildare, said, "We have slaughtered our enemies, but to complete the GOOD deed, we must proceed yet further-cut the throats of the Irish of our own party!"-to which Kildare coolly replied, ""Tis too soon YET!" The final submission of Ireland did not, however,

1 See Taaffe's History, 1st vol. passim, and for the above anecdote, p. 311-12. See, also, MacGeoghegan's History, vol. II. p. 377.

O'Kelly's translation.

occur till towards the close of Elizabeth's reign, after the protracted, bloody, and expensive contest against O'Neill and O'Donnell, which was terminated by the consequences of the victory of Lord Mountjoy over these brave and longtriumphant chieftains,' at the fatal battle of Kinsale, in December, 1601. And How this submission of Ireland was realized, will be best conceived from the facts-that, though Elizabeth's revenue "fell MUCH short of £500,000 a year,' Ireland, in ten years, cost the Queen, according to her minister Cecil's admission, no less than £3,400,000, which may be called, in the wondering or sceptical language of Hume," an incredible sum for that age!"-that, in only six months of one year, 1599, the public service of Ireland came to £600,000!-that, by the statement of the Lords of the Council, the average annual charge of the English military establishment in Ireland, which was usually as high as 20,000 men, came to £300,000, at a time when, as has been before observed, the revenue of England was "much short of £500,000 a year!"-that, after some of the best English commanders, who had distinguished themselves on the Continent, were baffled in Ireland, the gallant Essex, with a well-appointed army of no less than 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, was able to effect nothing of consequence against the Irish-that all the above-mentioned outlay of money was exclusive of large contributions by Ireland herself to put down the Queen's enemies-that the majority of the Irish nobility and gentry and all the great corporate towns were on the side of Elizabeth--that, if the Irish had joined with the Spaniards, at Kinsale, as numerously as, if directed by a spirit of national unanimity, they would have done, it appears that Kinsale could NOT have been taken--and lastly, and above all, that, according to the acknowledgment of Lord Mountjoy's secretary, the historian Moryson, MORE than one half of the army that

'The Abbé MacGeoghegan, in his enumeration of those who fought in the last war in Ireland against Elizabeth, very properly “begins with Ulster, because," says he, "the inhabitants of that province were the chief actors in the war. . . . . If their example had been followed, continues the patriotic Abbé, "the sway of the English would have been inevitably destroyed in Ireland!”—(History, vol. 111. p. 186.) This spirit showed itself amongst the Presbyterians of Ulster, in the time of the Volunteers, and at another time that need not be mentioned --but where is it now? Echo answers, Scotch "poleetikil occonnomy,” and "regium donum."

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gained the decisive action of Kinsale against O'Neill and O'Donnell, and which, though receiving less pay, was exposed to the chief brunt of the engagement, was composed of IRISHMEN! So much, in this instance, for what some, with Voltaire, may choose to call an English conquest of Ireland!" The reduction of this country, in the time of Cromwell, can be as little entitled to the designation of an English "conquest of Ireland," owing to the religious and political divisions amongst its inhabitants; but, more particularly, to the base defection to Cromwell, through Lord Broghill's intrigues, of the forces of Lord Inchiquin, with the numerous garrison-towns and fortresses of Munster which he had under his command, and which the Irish had been at an "excessive charge" in supplying with every necessary during the preceding summer.

By this "untoward event," the fate of Ireland was decided, at a period, when, in consequence of the diminution of the English army from 12,000 to 5,000 disposable men, by the sword, by the climate, by garrison detachments, and by its two recent repulses at Waterford and Duncannon, Cromwell was in great difficulties in Munster, from the effects of the winter, the scarcity of provisions, and the approach of 5,000 foot and 500 horse, under the command of Major General Hugh O'Neill, the subsequent gallant

1

Hume, vol. v. p. 404, 473, 474. Cadell's edit. London, 1789. By the same authority it appears, that the Irish war was so expensive, that, in addition to the money granted by Parliament, the Queen was obliged to exact loans from her people, and even to adopt other expedients for "raising the wind," such as "selling the royal demesnes and crown jewels!" See, also, Lingard, (vol. v. chap. xI. p. 599, edit. 1823,) and, for the other circumstances in the text, Curry's Review of the Civil Wars of Ireland, (chap. IX. XII.) The reason why Lord Mountjoy was glad to avail himself of the service of so many Irish in the English army, is well described in the contemporary language of the English poet Spencer, who both lived and wrote in Ireland. "I have heard," says he, "some great warriors say, that in ALL the services which they had seen abroad in foreign countries, they NEVER SAW A MORE COMELY MAN THAN THE IRISHMAN, NOR THAT COMETH ON MORE BRAVELY TO HIS CHARGE!" As an additional example of the deadly animosity of the Irish against each other, at this period, when more than half the English army consisted of Irishmen, it may be mentioned, that, at the battle of Kinsale, Lord Clanricarde, an Irish Roman Catholic nobleman, in the Queen's service, would let no quarter be given, and killed no less than 20 men with his own hand! How long will ignorance, mendacity, and cowardice prate about an English “conquest of Ireland ?”

defender of Clonmel and Limerick.1 With this important force-disciplined and trained to victory as it had been, under its leader's late celebrated uncle, General Owen Roe O'Neill, the conqueror of Benburb2-there was every pro

I With a body of between twelve and sixteen hundred of his gallant northerns, Hugh O'Neill defended Clonmel for two months against Cromwell at the head of 20,000 men, killing between two thousand and two thousand five hundred of the English in one assault alone, which lasted, according to Lingard, no less than four hours! The Irish general finally evacuated the place only from the want of powder and provisions, and, when he retired, withdrew his garrison so skilfully, that Cromwell, being unacquainted with the circumstance, gave the unarmed citizens as honourable terms of capitulation as if the garrison had been in the town. O'Neill, who, on this occasion, proved himself worthy of having served in the continental wars under such an experienced captain as his uncle, afterwards defended Limerick against Cromwell's son-in-law, Ireton, till he was compelled to capitulate by the machinations of a traitor; and so favourable was the impression which the Irish officer's conduct made upon his prejudiced and bigoted enemies, that his life was spared, even by those sanguinary fanatics. Carte, Mac Geoghegan, Taaffe, and Lingard.

2 The inopportune death of the brave and accomplished Owen Roe O'Neill, and the equally unlucky revolt of Lord Inchiquin's army, may be looked upon as the two causes of the submission of Ireland to the English Commonwealth. General Owen Roe O'Neill had distinguished himself on the continent in the Imperial and Spanish services, especially at the siege of Arras, in 1640, which he defended against the French with such ability as to gain their respect, and, though eventually obliged to surrender, only did so on the most honourable terms. In the north of Ireland, this able commander had given a still further proof of his military talents by the defeat of Cromwell's brethren, the Scotch fanatics, under Monroe, at the battle of Benburb. With inferior numbers, or but 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to 6,000 foot and 800 horse, he killed 3,243 of the enemy on the field of battle, besides those who fell in the pursuit, taking, with other prisoners, Lord Montgomery and twenty-one officers, all the Scotch artillery, arms, tents, baggage, and thirty-two stand of colours, together with an immense booty, containing 1,500 draught horses, and provisions of every kind for two months! And all this was done with but a loss to the Irish of but 70 men killed and 200 wounded! The Scotch general, Monroe, only saved himself from his victorious pursuers by a precipitate flight on horseback, leaving his coat, hat, and wig behind him! If such a commander as the defender of Arras and the conqueror of Benburb had lived to measure swords with Cromwell, it is consequently very probable, that by encamping behind the English in their unsuccessful sieges of Waterford and Duncannon, and by thus besieging the besiegers themselves, General O'Neill might have either destroyed or driven back the enemy to Dublin, and have likewise prevented the revolt of Inchiquin's troops, which, as traitors know their own advantage, might not have occurred under such