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sition of their guilt, at a time that he must have known their innocence. We believe that every one of these statements is, in point of fact, inaccurate; but, were every one of them literally true, we think he did no more than his professional duty. As to the statement, that the guilt was known to Heaven alone, it is unlikely that such a phrase was used; but if it were, it does not seem to us in reality to express more with reference to the case than is implied in the fact, that the prisoner is there an unconvicted man-that we have no right to presume his guilt. Some person must have committed the crime. The statement that Heaven alone knows who the guilty person is, cannot be intended to mean that the undiscovered criminal does not know his own guilt; and we cannot think that, whether such language was used or not, there is any violation of truth or candour in its use, when limited and restricted in its meaning by the known relations of client and counsel. As to suggesting, in his cross-examination of witnesses, that they, or any others, were guilty, and thus persuading a jury to acquit his client, we think nothing but the improbability of such a course succeeding, should necessarily deter counsel from venturing on it. We agree with Lord Brougham, in the fullest meaning that can be given to his words, that an advocate should "know, in the discharge of his office, but one person in the world-his client, and none other. To save that client by all expedient means-to protect that client at all hazard, and all cost to all others, and among others, to himselfis the highest and most unquestioned of his duties." It is mere affectation to say that, in ninety-nine out of every hundred cases in which counsel holds a brief for a prisoner, he does not know that prisoner to be guilty. Scarcely a man is put on his trial who is not guilty; and we think counsel's duty is in no degree affected by the fact of whether there has been a formal communication by the client of his guilt. On the contrary, we think the prisoner should not be deprived of the advan

tage of being able to consult with his counsel, and that for this purpose he should be free to tell him the fact of his guilt, without being, by such communication, deprived of his advocacy. As to the kind of pledges and protestations which counsel may give of their clients' innocence, we think this a mere question of taste, and that they imply nothing more of either truth or falsehood than the plea of "not guilty," which does no more than defy you to prove guilt. This entire controversy about Courvoisier's counsel seemed to us, from first to last, exceedingly foolish. No other right was claimed or exercised than the ordinary one of counsel; and had the barrister who held Courvoisier's brief thrown it down when he learned his client's guilt, such an act would, in our opinion, have been altogether inexcusable. The prisoner's counsel has the right-nay, we think it is his duty-to suggest every possible interpretation of the facts proved, consistent with the presumed innocence of his client; and in cross-examining, however severely, or however pointedly, a Crown witness, whatever suspicion such examination may throw on the witness, it seems to us plain that, in reality, no more is done than if counsel said in words, "It is just as reasonable to try and fix guilt on you as on the prisoner at the bar; as plausible a case might be made against you." To this, and to nothing more, does the assumed right amount; and this right does not seem to us in the slightest degree varied by the fact of counsel, from whatever reason, disbelieving his client's innocence. Courvoisier's counsel is not interested in pressing this to the extent that in principle it may be pressed, as it was on the first day of the trial he cross-examined one of the witnesses for the Crown in such a way as to suggest her participation in the crime; and it was only on the second that Courvoisier communicated to him the fact of his having committed the murder. We think that if, in his conduct with respect to his trial, counsel made any mistake, it was that of consulting with

"There is a wide step between the advocate and witness," an acute but severe judge once remarked to a jury. "The counsel has said, I think this, and I believe that. A counsel has no right to say what he thinks, or what he believes; but, since he has told you, gentlemen, his belief, I will tell you mine: that, were you to believe him, and acquit his client, he would be the very first man in the world to laugh at you."—Vol. i. p. 264.

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some of his professional friends how he ought to act in the circumstances that arose, as it is plain that cases may be easily imagined in which his communication to any one whatever of this confidential disclosure, might possibly affect his client's life. In this, and in this alone, we think he was wrong. There were in this trial some very remarkable circumstances. Though sus picion from the first was directed to Courvoisier, there was the absence of probable motive to the crime. trunk was searched by the police, and nothing to confirm suspicion was found there. A large reward was offered: and then, on a second search in the same trunk, gloves stained with blood were found; and again, some eight or ten days after, are found at the top of the trunk two blood-stained handkerchiefs, marked with the prisoner's initials. The handkerchiefs, which were not found on the two previous searches, it was surely fair in counsel to suggest had been placed in the trunk afterwards. Courvoisier was in gaol in the interval, and had no opportunity of placing them there. What is the fairness of reproaching counsel with suggesting that they had been afterwards placed there by others, and for the purpose of obtaining, by Courvoisier's conviction, a share in the large reward that was offered? Such a solution of the fact may not have been a true one. That is not the question. Was it not a possible one?-was it not a supposition that it was fair for the jury to examine? So much did one of the policemen shuffle, when examined with respect to this search of the trunk, that the judge who tried the case (Tindal) bid the jury to place no reliance on his testimony.

A strange incident occurred during the course of the trial, calculated to remove such doubt from the mind of the jury, as the absence of adequate motive might create. Courvoisier, a few weeks before the murder, left a parcel in the care of a Frenchwoman, who kept a sort of hotel, where he had been a servant some years before. She laid the parcel aside, and forgot all about it, till, on the second day of the trial, looking accidentally at a French newspaper, she saw something about Courvoisier, which led her to

examine the parcel, which was found to consist of plate stolen from Lord William Russell's. If there was a doubt, this unexpected circumstance, coming to light at such a moment, disposed of it. The sort of management, as it could not but appear to be, about the trunk, would have made it appear not improbable that there was something of trick in the getting up of other parts of the evidence, intended to show Courvoisier to be a thief. This came in to fix all that was doubtful. To conceal his thefts, and enjoy in security the stolen property, was the probable motive of the murderer. We regret that Mr. Townsend has been enabled only to give us fragments of the speech in defence of Courvoisier, which appears to have been a very able one.

In considering the question of the extent of counsel's privilege, it should not be forgotten that cases exist of moral guilt, where the prisoner is not legally guilty. It is not enough that a man is criminal, but a precise crime must be alleged against him; and with whatever skill an indictment may be framed, the crime charged may be different from that proved. The confessions of a prisoner will be to some particular fact, which it is not impossible may not amount to the crime charged, or may even exceed it; and, in either case, he may be legally entitled to an acquittal. Is that legal right to be annulled because he has said to his counsel "I am guilty--do the best you can for me?" With the exception that we have stated, we throughout approve of the course adopted by Courvoisier's counsel.

The remarkable case of "The King against M'Naughten, for the murder of Mr. Drummond," is the next in the volume. On this we are not now disposed to dwell, as it was a subject of discussion with us at the time of the occurrence; and there does not seem to be at the moment any object in bringing before the public mind the question of the responsibility of the insane in criminal cases. It does not seem possible to fix the law with more precision, than in the language of the judges of England, to questions submitted by the Lord Chancellor for their decision. Where insanity is set up as

Criminal Responsibility of the Insane.-Vide DUBLIN UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE, vol. xxi., p. 626.

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a defence, the jury ought to be told in all cases, that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

The next trial-that of "Alexander Alexander, claiming the title of Earl of Stirling, for forgery"—is the most remarkable in the volume. The rank of the accused, his character for integrity, and the nature of the documents alleged to be forgeries, gave to the trial unusual interest. It was before the High Court of Justiciary, Edin. burgh.

In 1621, James the First granted by charter the territory of Nova Scotia to Sir William Alexander; and on the 2nd of February, 1628, he received from Charles the First a grant of the province, since called Canada, and was raised to the peerage by the title of Viscount Stirling; he was afterwards created Earl of Stirling and Viscount Canada, and died at London in February, 1640. In 1739, on the death of the fifth Earl of Stirling, the title was supposed to have expired. Twenty years after, an ineffectual claim was made for it by some William Alexander, who was a general in the American army. The original patents were to the grantee and his heirs male. This William's statement was that the male heir, on the death of the fifth Earl, was John, uncle of the first Earl, whom he claimed to represent. In his petition to the House of Lords in 1761, he stated that his family had long resided in North America, from which he described himself as having returned in 1757. He also stated, as a formal part of his case, that he had been served and returned nearest and lawful heir of Henry the fifth Earl on the 20th of March, 1759. The claim was, it would seem from the journals of the House of Lords, abandoned, and William Alexander returned to America without having produced any evidence in support of

VOL. XXXVI.-NO. CCXI.

his petition. His, however, appears to have been by no means a claim destitute of some colour of probability, and one, at all events, consistent with the terms of the original patents. Half a century passed away, and no more was heard of the Stirling peerage, when another claimant rose up in the person of Alexander Alexander.

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Alexander Alexander was the son of a Birmingham merchant of the name of Humphries, who went to France in 1802, was caught up like other English visitors, and imprisoned in Verdun, where he died in 1807. His son, who had accompanied him, was detained at Verdun till 1814; the affairs of the Humphries' became deranged, and how they were supported in France is not known. 1812, Alexander married a Neapolitan lady, "an intimate acquaintance of Madame Normand, the celebrated Parisian sybil." The prophetess read his destiny-he was "to attain high honour, and encounter severe trials.' The oracle was not altogether out, and the judicial investigation of Edinburgh was, we suppose, one of the predicted trials.

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In 1814 he came to England, and set up a school at Worcester.

In 1815, he first stated his claim to the earldom of Stirling, through his mother, Hannah Alexander, the daughter of a Presbyterian clergyman in Dublin. In 1824, he obtained the royal licence to take the name of Alexander, and soon after assumed the title of Earl of Stirling and Dovan, and designated his mother countess.

In 1831, he granted to his agent 16,000 acres of land in Canada, and made him a baronet, in the terms of a clause in the charter of 1621. In the same year he petitioned for leave to do homage at the coronation, as hereditary lieutenant of Nova Scotia. He then issued a proclamation to the baronets of Nova Scotia, informing them of important rights and interests of which they were not aware. He published a prospectus, offering for sale lands in any quantities that might be agreed on; and one of his advertisements stated that "at the hereditary lieutenancy office of the Lord Proprietor of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, every encouragement and countenance would be given to individuals who might be disposed to form a company, and the hereditary

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lieutenant would himself take onetenth of the shares of which each company might think it desirable it should consist." Oh, John Ball, John Bull, thou that hast ears to hear everything but the truth, for ten long years didst thou listen to these addresses to thy cupidity-for ten long years, thou that stonest and starvest thy prophets-yea, and in thy self-glorification, buildest monuments to those whom thou hast stoned and starved, didst support in what might be almost called affluence, this man, who had no other claim on thee than these impudent pretensions. It was, perhaps, but natural that the individual should be-as he certainly was a kind of favorite in society. He, and those to whom his applica tions were addressed, were worshippers of the same idols. His was but a shorter cut to wealth and rank, and for a while it seemed successful. In whatever state of mind he commenced this strange proceeding, it was soon tainted with fraud. The notoriety of his claims, and the boldness with which they were advanced, enabled him to raise money to large amounts. Through one agent he got £13,000. He sent in a protest to Lord Grey against any interference with his hereditary rights by Colonial Governments; and petitioned the House of Commons against the New Brunswick Company Bill, as interfering with the territories of the Earl of Stirling and Viscount Canada. He

voted at all elections of Scottish peers since 1825; and pleaded successfully, in the Common Pleas in England, his privilege as a peer from arrest. If he did not believe himself Earl of Stirling, never was there a bolder or more fearless impostor; if guiltless of imposture, never was there a man who lived so long in such strange delusion. It is not impossible that he was the dupe of a fraudulent trick; this, though there is little in the evidence to suggest or sustain such a view, we almost believe to have been the case.

In one of the many proceedings in which he claimed to be Earl of Stirling, he produced documents to establish his right which were impounded, and a prosecution for forgery directed against him.

The original patent gave the dignity of Earl to Sir William Alexander and his heirs male. This could answer no purpose for the present claimant, as, even on the supposition of his being

descended from Sir William, he was not heir male :

The excerpt on which he founded his claims, alleged to be a forgery, pretended to be taken from a charter which operated a change in the destination, and was a grant from the crown to William, first Earl of Stirling, and the heirs male of his body; whom failing, to the eldest heirs female, without division, of the last of such heirs male.' The Crown officers contended that this was not a genuine but a forged document, and made three startling propositions-that it was not the excerpt of any charter; that there never was such a charter; that there never could have been such a charter. Each of these positions was proved by internal and historical evidence."

It would appear that the forms of Scottish law give some facilities for fraud in the case of titles. Suppose a person wishing to represent himself as heir to anybody, he has but to get a brieve from Chancery, and a jury is empannelled, and such evidence as the party chooses to produce is laid before the jury. The proceeding is altogether ex parte, and no person is heard in opposition to the claims, except one who makes precisely the same claim in the same right. Imagine a

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choosing to give himself any extinct title, and no one heard in opposition to this who has not a fancy for the same title. In this way a case is made, and where property is not affected, the thing is very likely never to be examined, and an ambitious man may exalt himself into a peer, perhaps, or a baronet of Nova Scotia, or some such dignity, with no great difficulty. He is served, as it is called, as heir of so and so, and the service being returned into the Court of Chancery, is evidence of his right. In this way the claimant of the Stirling peerage had himself served as heir of the first and the fifth Earls of Stirling. The claimant appears to have thought that there was no way of getting rid of the effect of the service, inasmuch as there was no rival claimant; but by some prerogative process, if we understand the matter rightly, his pedigree was investigated, and the services reduced; or,

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we would say, quashed. Lord Cockburn's judicial decision against the validity of the services was expressed in a very able judgment. This was in 1836. When that judgment was pronounced, he went to Pa

ris-again consulted the prophetess, and in July, 1837, received from her a map of Canada, with certificates on the back which supplied all the defects pointed out in his case by the judicial determination of 1836. These certifi cates were all charged to be forgeries. They were dated in 1706, and purported to be statements about an ancient charter preserved in Acadia. One is from a person named Philip Mallett, who sends his friend this map to show him what vast territories the King of England has given to one of his subjects; and he then states the grant to be to William Earl of Stirling and the heirs male of his body, whom failing, to the eldest heirs female, without division, &c., of the last of said males." This memorandum, which runs to great length, is followed by another, in which a M. St. Estienne certifies all the reasons which led Mallet to inscribe this on the map, and adds:" With such documents, no person in France can question the existence of such a charter." Then comes another inscription on map:-"Flechier" Bishop of Nismes authenticates it with his autograph, and his certificate is so framed as to imply that he has compared the abstract on the map with a copy of the original charter.

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Pasted on the back of the map was a letter from John Alexander, whom the claimant calls John of Antrim, and who makes such a statement in this document of the pedigree as meets Lord Cockburn's objections. This letter is dated Antrim, August 25th, 1707.

This old map must have been a curiosity; for in addition to all that we have mentioned, there was a certificate from Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray, who vouches for Mallet, and authenticates the map. Next comes the strongest fact of all: Louis XV. writes on the map-" This note is worthy of more attention under present circumstances, but let the copy of the original charter be sent to me.'

De Foe himself could not conjure up more shadows from the world in which dead kings and archbishops are likely to be found, than appear on this map which came from the hands of the French prophetess. It seems almost a pity to disturb the necyomantia. On the front of the map was the date of 1703, and all the docu

ments, whether written or pasted, on the back-some were written, others pasted-bore dates later than 1703. Unluckily, the date on the map was not that of the issue of the particular copy, but of the period from which the copyright was to run: the words at the bottom of the map were,

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Avec privilege pour vingt ans, 1703." The particular copy adds the words, "Par Guillaume Delisle, premier geographe du Roi." Delisle did not obtain his appointment of premier geographe till 1718. The patent appointing Delisle was put in evidence, and bore date August 24th, 1718. Flechier and Fenelon had both died before this copy of the map was in existence.

Evening visits of the claimant to the prophetess, who was seventy-five years of age, were proved; and letters proved to have been given by her to the claimant, seeking to establish some of the facts stated on the map. But these were not proved to be forgedthey were very probably genuine, but proved a part of the fraud.

It does not seem necessary, after what we have stated, to give the evidence of chemists and others as to the character of the ink with which the certificates on the map were written. The jury unanimously found, "the excerpt-charter and the documents on the map to be forged; and they, by a majority, found it not proven that the pannel [the traverser] forged the said documents, or is guilty art and part thereof, or that he uttered them knowing them to be forged." This is an exceedingly painful case. Nothing could be higher than the testimony given in favour of the claimant's honour and integrity, by witnesses of the highest rank-men who had known him at school and through life, and who continued his friends. It is certainly consistent with the evidenceperhaps with the probabilities of the case that this man, possibly half insane with his dream of peerage and property, was himself, as has occurred in the case of other claimants of titles, the victim, not alone of his own eager credulity, but of the dishonest purposes of persons speculating on the success of this miserable imposture. The French prophetess, and the documents supplied by her, are more like this than anything else. It is impossible not to regard the claimant as

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