There are about 200 boats in all, of different sizes, engaged in piracy. These boats are beautifully built, are very sharp fore and aft with great beam, and are double banked. The largest carry forty men, the smallest fifteen. If we take an average of thirty men for each boat, this will give 6,000 men engaged in piracy, which is the estimate the pirates themselves give of their numbers. The prahus both pull and sail well, and from their great beam, they can carry a heavy press of sail, and go at a great rate through the water. The size of the largest is sixty-eight feet, and the breadth of beam twenty feet, with a projecting stage outside of about one foot, along which the men walk. They have no deck, and are entirely fastened with rattans; they always go in fleets of 8, 10, 12, 20 or 30 prahus. Each prahus has several suits of sails of the form and material of those of the different races whose coasts they visit, and in each locality they hoist the sails used there by the native boats. The armament of a boat consists of one brass gun in front and one aft, and along the sides are placed swivels, rantakas, padjettys, &c. Each man is provided with a kleewang and lance, and there is a plentiful supply of muskets in each boat. Their guns are always concealed below when not immediately required.

The pirates take their departure at regular seasons for different places. In December or January, a fleet leaves the islands to go down to Macassar Strait, where it separates about Pulo Laut, one division going eastward to the Moluccas; some to the south of Java, Timor, Bali, &c., and the western squadron spreading along the shores of Java, Borneo, Banka, &c. They have particular haunts in all these places for which they have names of their own, on account of which it is difficult to ascertain their position. They often make descents upon villages when they know they are weak and unprepared. They have spies here and there, and always reconnoitre before they make their attacks, and their movements being very rapid they are seldom unsuccessful or encounter much resistance. Three or four boats almost always keep in company, there being very rarely so few as only two together. In these descents they take the women and children in preference to the men, because they are more easily caught, and at the same time are of much greater value, one woman being worth three men. This cruize of the long voyage lasts from December or January, until June, July or August.

At sea the pirates generally attack small vessels, such as native prahus, Chuliah schooners, and small Chinese junks. They keep a vigilant look out, and as they are provided with good glasses they keep out of the way of all dangerous looking vessels. They attack every boat which they think they are more than a match for, without any distinction of race, or having much regard to the value of the prize. None of the reckless boldness and hardihood which distinguish the European buccaneers is to be found in these pirates; but, on the contrary, they seem to be rather dastardly than otherwise, though no doubt they will fight desperately when they are surprised and they find that flight is impossible.

To be continued.

A REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARCTIC SEARCHING EXPEDITIONS, under the Command of Captain H. T. Austin C.B. and Captain Penny, with the recent despatches.

ARCTIC intelligence which concerns so numerous a portion of our countrymen abroad, and therefore deeply interesting to us at home, has now become of so much importance, that we need offer no other reason for allowing it to occupy so large a share of our attention. We shall, therefore, not only gratify our own readers now, but our absent voyagers hereafter, by preserving a full record of their gallant doings.

Capt. Penny has returned with his ship the Lady Franklin* and has brought "favourable" intelligence, for such is the concluding sen

With the view of facilitating a reference to the names of all the vessels and their several officers on these expeditions, we insert here the following list of them.

H.M.S. RESOLUTE.-Captain, Horatio T. Austin; Lieutenants, R. D. Aldrich, William H. J. Browne; Master, Robert C. Allen; Surgeon, Abraham R. Bradford; Paymaster and Purser, John E. Brooman; Mates, Richard B. Pearse, Walter W. May, John P. Cheyne; Assistant Surgeon, Richard King; Second Master, George F. McDougal.

H.M.S. ASSISTANCE, Captain, Erasmus Ommaney; Lieutenants, Francis L. McClintoch, James E. Elliott, George F. Mecham; Surgeon, James J. L. Donnett; Mates, George R. Keene, Richard V. Hamilton; Assistant Surgeon, Charles Ede; Second Master, Frederick J. Krabbé; Clerk in Charge, Edward N. Harrison; Clerk, Charles Richards, (b).

H.M.S. PIONEER, steam tender to Resolute, Lieutenant, Sherard Osborn; Assistant Surgeon, Thomas R. Pickthorn; Second Master, John H. Allard.

H.M.S. INTREPID, steam tender to Assistance, Lieutenant, B. Cator; Assistant Surgeon, John Ward (a); Second Master, William Shellabeer.

LADY FRANKLIN.-Captain, W. Penny; Executive, First Mate, Mr. John Marshall; Second Mate, Mr. John Leiper; Third Mate, Mr. John Stuart; Surgeon, Mr. Thomas Goodsir; Interpreter, Mr. Peterson.

SOPHIA, tender to the Lady Franklin.-Captain, Alexander Stewart, Commander; Executive, First Mate, Mr. Donald Manson; Second Mate, Mr. James Reid; Surgeon, Mr. Peter Sutherland.

FELIX, Captain, Sir John Ross, R.N., accompanied by Com. Phillips.
MARY, yacht tender to Felix.

U.S.S. ADVANCE.-Lieutenant Commander, E. J. De Haven, (Philadephia), Commander of the Expedition; Master, (acting), W. H. Meerdaugh, (Norfolk); Midshipman, W. S. Lovell (New York); Surgeon, Dr. Kane; crew, 15.

U.S.S. RESCUE.-Master Commander, passed Midshipman, J. P. Griffin; (Savannah), Master, (acting) R. R. Carter, (Virginia); Midshipman,- Brooks; Surgeon, Dr. Vruland, (New York); Crew, 13.

The PRINCE ALBERT, commanded by Mr. Kennedy, sailed for Prince Regent Inlet in May last. The vessels under the orders of Captain Austin sailed in May 1850.

We also add here the Enterprize and Investigator, having gone to the Polar Sea by Behring Straits in January 1850.

ENTERPRISE.-Captain, R. Collinson, c B.; Lieutenants, George A. Phayre, John J. Barnard; Alditional, Charles T. Jago; Surgeon, Robert Anderson; Mates, M T. Parks, Rowland T. G. Legg; Assistant Surgeon, Edward Adams; Second Master, Francis Skead; Clerk in charge, Edward Whitehead.

INVESTIGATOR.-Commander, Robert J. L. M. McClure; Lieutenants, Williamı H. Haswell, Samuel G. Cresswell; Surgeon, Alexander Armstrong, M.D.; Mate, Robert J. Wynniatt, Henry H. Sainsbury; Assistant Surgeon, Henry Piers; Second Master, Stephen Court.

NO. 10.-VOL. XX.

3 Y

tence of the despatch with which he was charged by Capt. Austin. We congratulate Capt. Penny on his safe arrival, as well as his own brave followers who have contributed so much to produce the favourable aspect which the whole subject has now assumed. Painful as it is to contemplate the condition of Franklin and his people, locked up so long from us, it seems to have fallen to the lot of Capt. Penny to clear up in a great degree, the preplexing doubts which have hitherto existed as to the route adopted by him in 1846. His letters as well as Captain Austin's despatches are before the world, and we hope in the course of these remarks to shew to our readers that by the knowledge we have gained of Wellington Strait, the prospect of further information respecting the missing Expedition, assumes a very fair degree of probability.

While Capt. Austin and his officers were examining every portion of coast which led towards Melville Island, removing all possible speculations that Franklin had adopted the route to Behring Strait by the southward and westward, Capt. Penny and his party were exploring new ground up the Wellington Strait, and with sledges and boats have opened out a navigation leading to the north-westward of the Parry Islands, which by many is believed to be that which was adopted by Franklin. We, however, do not join in this opinion, and these are our reasons for thus differing from so general an assumption. Wellington Strait is the contracted outlet of this navigation into Barrow Strait, and the ice brought by winds and tides from the north-west obstructs its passage and hence becomes mostly impassable. It was closed during the late visit of our ships, and although to all appearance it was open when passed and repassed in 1819 and 1820 by Sir Edward Parry, it must be remembered that he would be able to see about twelve or fourteen miles only from the entrance, and it is not likely that he could say whether this channel, of forty-five miles in length, was open or not.

Franklin having passed his first winter at Beechey Island, took care beyond a doubt fully to acquaint himself with the nature and extent of the icy barrier, which we have reason to conclude so effectullay bound his entrance into Penny's open sea beyond it, and which his reconnoitring parties must have discovered; and therefore seeing the impossibility of cutting his way through, (for we learn from Captain Penny, that such an attempt would have been fruitless when he was there) he might then having abandoned all hope of passing through that channel, retrace his course through Barrow Strait, and hasten at once to the northward up Baffin Bay, with the natural conclusion that Jones or Smith Sound offered the only probable road for reaching it.

Much has been said about the hurry in which Franklin left his winter quarters at Beechey Island, and that it had the apperance of a retreating party. We do not exactly understand what is meant by hurry and retreating. True it is, and much to be lamented, that no written document has been found there, to throw any light on his intended proceedings; but in our opinion had Sir John Franklin passed by that strait he would have left some document to say so, and as he failed in his attempt, it is quite possible that he might have thought it unnecessary

to leave memoranda at each point of failure, and considered that the unequivocal mark of his visit, without comment might serve to demonstrate his abandonment of the route by Wellington Strait.

Captain Austin was fully aware that Captain Penny's orders were "in the first instance specially to examine Jones Sound," proceeding by it in the direction of Wellington Strait, and on to the Parry Islands, and this not having been done, was an additional inducement for Captain Austin to prosecute his search in that direction. And yet opinions appear to be entertained both for and against the probability of Captain Austin's return to England, in the course of the present autumn, although there is no part of his despatch that can in any way warrant the former conclu

sion.

We are disposed to believe that the return of Captain Austin's Expedition this year will entirely depend upon the success or failure of his attempt to reach Penny's open sea, by Jones Sound. Should this prove an available channel it is a manifest absurdity to expect Austin home this winter. Is it likely that any officer, much more one of Captain Austin's zeal and devotion to the cause in which he is embarked, would go to Jones Sound, merely to reconnoitre the entrance and then return? And is it not equally certain that if he once penetrated into the open sea by that Sound, that he could not return to England this year if he would?

On the other hand, if Captain Austin finds Jones Sound impassable, or a blind channel, we confess that we are at a loss to know what better step he could take than to return with his ships to England, and start afresh in the spring of next year.

But for the solution of these and many other questions, which it presents, we must patiently wait the issue of time, or perhaps in the midst of our speculations the arrival of that hardy old seaman Sir John Ross, with the next despatch from Captain Austin himself; satisfied we may be that everything at home has been done that could be, and that as much has been effected abroad as circumstances permitted, and as even the most sanguine amongst us could have expected.

Opinions of parties who appear to be ill informed on this subject have been freely delivered, condemning Capt. Austin's proceedings, and producing an impression on the public mind, highly unfavourable to that officer. To say the least, this is not only unfair but it is ungenerous. The whole subject is not only important at the present moment, but it is most especially necesssary that, clear and comprehensive views should be taken of it, so that the real motives which are directing Capt. Austin's (we will say judicious) exertions should be clearly understood.

The expedition under Capt. Austin has been pronounced a failurethe fairest expedition which ever left this country, has been declared ineffective, because, its leader has chosen to adopt a course under circumstances that he considers to be the most proper one, but, which does not appear to be understood by these writers. One speaks of Franklin taking the middle passage across the bay as an index of his knowledge of the subject, when he ought to know that Franklin's ships adopted the usual track through Melville Bay, and were last seen in the parallel of

Lancaster Sound in the upper part of the bay standing for its entrance. Again Capt. Austin is blamed for turning his back on Wellington Chaunel, when he had satisfied himself that the passage by Cape Walker was closed against him, and for intimating his intention of pursuing his search by Jones Sound.

It is asked why did not Austin proceed up Wellington Channel? For this plain reason we may answer, because he saw that unhappily there lay a stout barrier of ice between him and the open sea beyond it of some twenty or thirty miles extent, which not only it was impossible for his ships to penetrate, but in all probability had been equally fatal to the progress of Sir John Franklin's. This we consider to be a sound reason why Austin turned his back on Wellington Channel and for pursuing his search by Jones Sound. We must not lose sight of the main object of Capt. Austin's expedition. It is simply, if possible, to trace step by step the missing ships in their progress, and, we therefore, quite agree with him in the conclusion at which he arrived, or at least such is our construction of its meaning;-that having made up his mind that Franklin after failing in Wellington Strait had gone to Jones Sound, he would at once follow him there rather than penetrate the icy barriers of that strait even if it had been practicable. For let us ask what possible service towards the great object of Austin's expedition would have resulted had his ships reached Queen Victoria Channel, and thence pushed on to the north-west with the unhappy chance of having left the missing ships behind them! This dilemma Austin has wisely avoided.

But we will now refer to the opinions of our most experienced and eminent officers on the necessity of not only exploring Jones Sound as intended by the Admiralty orders, but of the probability of that being the route which was adopted by Sir John Franklin, and these we find in a useful little volume from the pen of Mr. P. L. Simmonds, which appeared only a few months ago.

Sir F. Beaufort says, Sir John Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity, and therefore, his first attempt was undoubtedly made in the direction of Melville Island to the westward. If foiled in that attempt, he naturally hauled to the southward, and using Banks Land as a barrier against the northern ice, he would try to make westing under its lee. Thirdly, if both of these roads were found closed against his advance, he, perhaps, availed himself of one of the four passages between Parry Islands, including the Wellington Channel, or, lastly, he may have returned to Baffin Bay, and taken the inviting opening of Jones Sound.

Sir E. Parry says, and this idea receives no small importance from the fact (said to be beyond a doubt) of Sir John Franklin, having before his departure expressed such an intention in case of failing to the westward; "much stress has likewise been laid, and I think not altogether without reason, on the propriety of searching Jones and Smith Sound in the north-eastern part of Baffin Bay. Considerable interest has lately been attached to Jones Sound, from the fact of its having been recently navigated by at least one enterprising whaler, and found to be of great width, free from ice with a swell from the westward, and having no land visible from the mast head in that direction. It seems more than proba