the rule is that time must be stated; not necessarily the day or a day. Jones v. Price, 3 Bing. N. S. 52; Wright v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 77; Tyr. 589; Lane v. Thelwell, 1 M. & W. 140; Leaf v. Lees, 4 M. & W. 579; Sprig v. Wright, 9 M. & W. 629; Bingley v. Durham, 8 A. & E. 775; Tempest v. Kilner, 2 C. B. 300. See Ch. jur. forms 345-replication to pleas of actio non accrevit, &c., that the cause of action did accrue.

MCLEAN, J.-I concur in the opinion given by the Chief Justice on the demurrers to the replications to the first, second and third pleas. There does not appear to me to be any foundation for any of them, inasmuch as the replications are clear and explicit answers to the several pleas of the tenant, and put in issue the very points which the pleas were intended to raise.

The first plea alleges that the demandant was not accoupled in lawful matrimony to Frederick Williams, and to this the demandant replies, that she was accoupled in lawful matrimony to the said Frederick Williams on the first day of May 1790, and before the commencement of this suit-there is surely an issue taken on the tenant's plea; and, whether the marriage was celebrated in one country or another, or by a clergyman of one denomination or another, or by a magistrate, in the absence of all clergymen, must be wholly immaterial, provided the marriage was one recognized by law. It is also assigned as a cause of demurrer to the first plea, that it does not allege that the marriage was solemnized before the seizin of Frederick Williams of the lands whereof dower is demanded. A day is specified on which the marriage is alleged to have taken place, but the demandant would not be bound to prove a marriage on that particular day-provided such facts were shewn as would establish a legal marriage at any time before or during the seizin of the husband in the premises.

The second plea of the tenant, on which issue is taken by the demandant, puts in issue the seizin of Frederick Williams in the premises during his marriage with the demandant. The replication to this plea, which is also demurred to, alleges that Frederick Williams, after his

marriage with the demandant, and while she was his wife, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the first day of May 1790, was seized of an estate in the pre mises whereby he could endow the demandant. To this the tenant objects, that the demandant does not shew the particular estate which Frederick Williams, her husband, had in the premises. Now, whether he was seized of a legal or an equitable estate, or whether she became entitled to dower by the common law or by statute, need not appear on the record. It is enough that it is distinctly stated that Frederick Williams had, during his marriage with demandant, such an estate in the premises as would entitle her to dower. On the issue, as taken by the demandant's replication, it would be incumbent on her to prove the estate of her husband, and she would be at liberty to prove any estate from which dower would arise to her. If she had set out any particular estate in her husband she would be limited in proof to that estate on the trial, and if she failed in that respect she would be defeated in her suit, though she might be able to prove such other estate in her husband as ought to entitle her to succeed. The demandant was not bound in her replication to shew any particular estate in her husband; it is sufficient if the estate from which dower is claimed is shewn by evidence at the trial.

The tenant's third plea alleges that Frederick Williams, the demandant's husband, was, at the time of his marriageto wit, on the first day of May 1802-and thereafter, until and at the time of his death, an alien and a subject of the United States of America, and was not then or at any time a subject of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; to this the demandant replies, that at the said several times when, &c., the said Frederick Williams, her husband, was a good and lawful subject of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and was not, at any of the said several times when, &c., an alien or subject of the United States of America.

The tenant demurs to this replication, on the ground that it is double and uncertain, in taking issue on several distinct and material facts, and that it does not shew whether

Frederick Williams was a natural born subject or a naturalized subject. The replication, however, is only an answer to the plea; and, being so, it is not liable to the objection that it is double or uncertain. It would probably have been a sufficient answer to the plea to have alleged that Frederick Williams, at the several times when, &c., was a good and lawful subject of the sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, because, if he was so, he could not at the same time be an alien or a subject or citizen of the United States, so that his wife could not be endowed of his lands. We are all aware that foreigners are admitted in the United States to the rights of citizens on certain terms; but a British subject does not by becoming a citizen under the laws of the United States divest himself of all right to return to his own country, and to resume the rights and obligations of a subject; and if previous to or in fact at any time during or after his residence and citizenship in the United States, he acquired property in this country, he would be entitled to hold it without question as to his right; and his wife, if a subject, would be entitled to dower in the event of his death. The demandant has gone farther in the replication than was perhaps necessary, in stating that her husband was not a subject of the United States; but her doing so cannot surely be a cause of complaint to the tenant, when it is only in reply to his own allegation on that subject.

The 4th plea alleges that the demandant has not become entitled to dower at any time within twenty years, and to this the demandant replies, that she has become entitled to dower within twenty years. This replication is demurred to because it is not stated when the demandant became entitled. To the plea of non-assumpsit infra sex annos, or non accrevit actio infra sex annos, the reply always is, that the defendant's promise is within six years, or that the action has accrued within six years: so in this case, it is sufficient to shew that the demandant has become entitled to dower at any time within twenty years; and whether within five or fifteen years must be wholly immaterial, so far as the right to dower is concerned. As the several grounds of

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demurrer appear to me to be wholly untenable, it is unnecessary to enter into the consideration whether the pleas objected to are good or not-my impression is that the objections taken to them are well founded.

SULLIVAN, J., concurred.

Judgment against the demurrer.

WHITE V. LAING.

A demandant of dower is not entitled to dower out of land of which her husband died seized, and likewise out of other land of which the husband was seized in his lifetime and which he had given in exchange for the land of which he died seized. The widow is entitled to elect out of which property she will take her dower-such election must be pleaded by a party defendant in an action for dower. The widow of an alien who has been naturalized is entitled to dower,

Declaration dated 5th September, 1850.

Demandant, who is wife of John White, deceased, demands against defendant one-third of ten messuages, &c. in the township of Charlottesville, county of Norfolk, as her dower of the endowment of said John White, &c.

By particulars annexed the dower is said to be claimed out of the south-half of No. 9, 2d Concession, Charlottesville. On the 16th October, 1851, defendant pleaded:

1st. That the demandant is an alien, born out of the allegiance of the late King George the Third, and in a foreign state-to wit, the United States of America; and has not become a subject of the Queen by naturalization or otherwise verification (no time.)

2d. That said John White was an alien, born in a foreign state, and out of the allegiance of George the Third, (no time laid,) and within a foreign state-to wit, the United States of America; and was not at any time made a subject of the Queen by naturalization: verification.

3d. Ne unques seized.

On the 20th October, 1851, demandant replied to 1st plea that after her marriage with her said husband and after he became seized of the said land (does not say and while so seized,) and during his lifetime, and before this suit-to wit, on the 1st of January, 1841-she became and was and thence continually hath been a subject of this

realm, (does not say naturalized,) absque hoc, that she is an alien, born in foreign parts, and is not made a subject of the Queen by naturalization or otherwise, modo et forma alleged; to the country and similiter.

To the 2d, that after her marriage with the said John White, and after he became seized (does not say and while he continued seized), and during his life, and before suitto wit on the 25th of October, 1850-he became and thence until his death was a subject of this realm (does not say naturalized), without this that he was an alien, born in foreign parts, and was not before or at his death made a subject of the Queen by naturalization or otherwise, modo et forma, alleged &c. ; to the country and similiter. Verdict for defendant.

Martin, for demandant, obtained a rule calling on the tenant to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a new trial had without costs, as being perverse, or as contrary to law, evidence, and the charge of the judge who tried the cause, upon such terms as the court may think fit. The cause was tried before Mr. Justice McLean at the last Norfolk assizes, when it was proved that John White owned the land out of which the dower is claimed, and was in possession thereof as far back as the year 1824 or 1825, claiming it as his own, and so continued until he parted with the possession.

That White and the demandant came to this province. from the United States in or shortly after the year 1820, and continued here until his death.

That on the 23nd October, 1830, John White took the oath of allegiance under the act of 1828, and complied with its provisions, in order to be naturalized. That defendant had admitted getting the land from Douglas Barman, who got it from Charles Barman; and that there had been an exchange for it with John White. That a letter demanding dower was delivered at defendant's house in September, 1849.

The defence was rested on the ground that it appeared John White had exchanged the land in question for other land on which the demandant was then living with her