ouster was made at the outset, but the learned judge supposed it tacitly done, and noted it as made in the beginning of the case, but afterwards struck it out upon the objection being raised, and noted the restricted admission which was then made as to three demises only. I have referred to him on the point, and he says the admission of lease, entry, &c., as to the three first demises was made, as noted by him. After this it is too late to take exceptions to the regularity of the notice of trial, the defendants appearing, and consenting as they did, waived it, if irregular. The consent rule stands good for three demises. It is probable the lessors of the plaintiffs should have taken steps for its amendment by adding the additional lessors, as otherwise they would not become liable for costs. If the Nisi Prius record is supported by an amended declaration, and the contrary is not shewn, I do not see that it can be set aside the objection, if any, is higher up. It was not necessary to produce the consent rule-Doe Greaves v. Raby, 2 B. & Ad. 984-and it does not follow because the consent rule was not altered that the trial on the three admitted demises was not good; and the fact that such admission was made cannot be disputed in the face of the learned judge's report. Amendments by adding demises are not unusual.-1 D. & R. 173; 8 Ju. 363; 3 Dow. 206; 1 C. & K. 555; 1 Dow. & L. 954; 5 Tyr. 171; 6 Dow. 774. The practise as to the consent rule in making such amendments, I do not find laid down. But, until lessors or defendants become parties thereto, they do not seem liable to costs.-9 Ju. 829; Doe dem. Lloyd v. Roe, 15 M. & W. 431; Doe dem. Harrison v. Hampson, 4 C. B. 745; Doe dem. Merigan v. Daly, 8 Q. B. 934; 4 D. & L. 765.

Rejecting everything relating to the three new demises, all would be right; and I do not see they may not be rejected, or that they violate the Nisi Prius record or verdict in relation to the original three. An order to amend may be abandoned.3 Dow. 255; 5 Tyr. 171; 1 C. M. & R. 521. But notice must be given.-6 Dow. 774. Here it was done owing to the objections of the defendants' counsel in open court.

As to the entitling affidavits in several demises, see 5 Dow. 447; Cook v. Vaughan, 4 M. & W. 68; 11 Ju. 904, 905; Ross v. Graham, U. C. R.; Duke of Brunswick v. Sloman, 17 L. J. C. P. 81.

MCLEAN, J.-No affidavit of merits is put in; and unless the proceedings are wholly irregular, no reason is shewn for the interference of the court with the verdict. The defendants cannot object to the notice of trial. They appeared at the trial, and admitted a certain document necessary to the case of the lessors of plaintiffs, and by that waived all objection to the notice. Then they did confess lease, entry and ouster, as to the demises contained in the original declaration, and on which alone the verdict is taken. By the evidence admitted by the defendants, the lessors of plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict on these demises, and so far the verdict is right; but there is no finding of a jury on the demises contained in the amendment, which appears on the record. As to these, the lessors of plaintiffs might choose to abandon them at the trial, and to proceed only on the first three demises. In that case, the defendants might claim as to them a verdict in their favor, if they had gone on with their defence. There was a plea on the record which applied to them as well as the three first demises, though the consent rule was only to the latter. If the defendants abandoned any defence which they might have on the ground of irregularity, after entering upon the trial (and they have themselves waived these irregularities by their proceedings), they cannot now come into court and ask that a verdict properly found on the three first demises on the record shall be set aside, because certain other demises have not been disposed of. The lessors of plaintiffs may enter a nolle prosequi to these demises, or they may consent that a verdict may be entered on them for the defendants on the ground, that they were abandoned at the trial, or that no evidence was offered to support them.

SULLIVAN, J., concurred.

Rule discharged.

WILLIAMS V. Lee and WILLIAMS V. VANSITTART. Replication to a plea of ne unques accouple: that the demandant on the 1st of May, 1790, and before suit was accoupled to A. B. deceased, in lawful matrimony, concluding to the country. Demurrer: that the replication does not state or allege when, where, or in what kingdom, &c., demandant was accoupled to the said A. B. in lawful matrimony as therein alleged, or by what minister, &c., or according to what religious rite, or by what law, &c., nor is it therein alleged that the said marriage was contracted before or during seizin of the said A. B.. Held, that the replication was good without alleging when, or by whom, or by what form of religious rite the demandant was married.

Plea: That the said A. B. was not, &c., seized of the said lot, &c., or of any part thereof of such an estate, whereby he could endow defendant thereof: verification, &c.

:

Replication That the said A. B., &c., was seized of such an estate in the said lot, &c., whereby he could endow demandant thereof; to the country. Demurrer That the replication is uncertain and insufficient in alleging that he had such an estate, &c., without showing what estate he had or was seized or possessed of in the said land, or whether it was such an estate as entitled her to dower at common law, or under the statute 4 Wm. IV. ch. 1, &c. Held, That the plea should have concluded to the country, and that the objection applies equally to the plea, which does not deny that any such interest in the husband as under the statute would have entitled the demandant to dower, and that the replication meets the plea and alleges a seizin, which is therein denied.

Replication to 3rd plea: That the said A. B. was at the said several times when &c., in the third plea mentioned a good and lawful subject of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c., and was not an alien or subject of the United States of America, as in said plea alleged to the country. Demurrer: That the replication is double and uncertain, in taking issue on several distinct and material facts-namely. in denying the allegation that the said A. B. was not a subject of the United Kingdom, &c. ; and also denying that he was not a subject of the United States, and also that he was at any time an alien that it should have shown either that the said A. B. was a natural born subject, or a naturalized subject, or how otherwise.

Held, That the replication, taking issue on both the branches of the plea, is good.

Replication to 4th plea: That she did become entitled to demand her dower, &c., within 20 years next before the commencement of the suit, modo et forma. Demurrer to replication: That it is not shown or stated affirmatively when or in what day the said demandant became entitled to demand her dower in the said land, &c. Held, that the replication alleges time-namely, within 20 yearsthough not the day, but that the day need not necessarily be stated.

Both these cases are before us upon demurers and upon rules to shew cause why the verdict for demandant upon the issues to the country should not be set aside.

The declarations are both entitled of Trinity Term, fifteenth Victoria, the former on the twenty-third of August, and the latter the first day of September, 1851. Venue, county of Oxford.

In the first case the demandant, who was the wife of Frederick Williams, deceased, demands against defendant

one-third part of ten messuages, ten barns, ten stables, ter gardens, four orchards, one saw-mill, two hundred acres of land, two hundred acres of pasture, two hundred acres of meadow, and two hundred acres of wood land, with the appurtanences, situate and being on lot number eleven, in the second concession of the township of East Oxford, &c., as the dower of the said demandant of the endowment of the said Frederick Williams, deceased, heretofore her husband, whereof she hath nothing, &c.

On the first day of October, 1851, the defendant Lee pleaded first-that the demandant ought not to have her dower in this behalf, because she was never accoupled to the said Frederick Williams in lawful matrimony, which he is ready to verify: wherefore he prays judgment, if she ought to have her dower of the third of lot number eleven, &c.

Second That said Frederick Williams was not on the day on which he espoused the demandant, or at any time afterwards, seized of the said lot number eleven, &c., or of any part thereof, of such an estate whereby he could endow her thereof, which he is ready to verify: wherefore, &c., concluding as in first plea.

Third That the said Frederick Williams, who was the husband of demandant, before and at the time of his marriage with her to wit, on the first day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two-and thereafter until his death, was an alien and subject of the United States of America, and was not then or at any time a subject of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland verification. Fourth That demandant hath not been entitled to demand her dower of and in the lands in the declaration mentioned, or any of them at any time within twenty years next before the commencement of this action, modo et forma, above demanded: verification, and prays judgment if she ought to have her dower in this behalf.

Fifth As to one hundred acres of land, with the appur tances, situate on part-to wit, on the south half of said lot number eleven, part of the said ten messuages, &c., (enu

merating the premises as in the declaration), in the said demand mentioned, and whereof, &c., that he cannot render to her her dower thereof, or of any part thereof; because he is not, nor from the day of the commencement of this suit, or at any time since, has been tenant thereof, or any part thereof, as of freehold or otherwise, or of any estate or interest whatsoever, solely or jointly with any other person verification. Wherefore, as to the said parcel, &c., he prays judgment.

On the ninth of October, 1851, the demandant replied: First to the first plea: That she, on the first day of May, 1790, and before this suit, was accoupled to the said Frederick Williams, deceased, in lawful matrimony: concluding to the country.

Second-to the second plea: That the said Frederick Williams, in his lifetime and after his marriage with her, while she was his wife and before this suit-to wit, on the first day of May, 1790, was seized of such an estate in the said lot number eleven, &c., whereby he could endow her thereof: concluding to the country.

Third-to the third plea: That the said Frederick Williams was at the said several times when, &c., in that plea mentioned, a good and lawful subject of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of this realm, and was not an alien or subject of the United States of America, as in said plea alleged concluding to the country.

Fourth-to the fourth plea: That she did become entitled to demand her dower in the said lands, &c., in the declaration mentioned, within twenty years next before the commencement of this suit, in manner and form therein demanded concluding to the country.

Fifth-to the fifth plea: That the defendant (Lee) was at the time of the commencement of this suit the tenant of the freehold of and in the lands with the appurtenances in the introduction of that plea mentioned, in manner and form as therein is alleged: concluding to the country, and similiter. On the sixteenth of October, 1851, the defendant or tenant, demurred to the first, second, third, and fourth replications, assigning for special causes :