are destined later on to save in great measure the labour of moulding the material. We can see no reason, however, why we should not ascribe the new formations which here make their appearance, just as much as the new formations of after-life, to the purposive activity of the unconscious will; for the greater extent of these first formations, in comparison with the already existing body, can in truth establish no qualitative distinction, and that the moment of the individualisation of the new mind, if such a one may be assumed at all, is that of fertilisation, can certainly not be involved in doubt. That, however, the mind in that period affords no indication of consciousness can neither excite astonishment, since it has first to form the organ of consciousness, nor can it be anything but helpful to its concentration on the unconscious performances, since, indeed, even in after-life, the power of the Unconscious is most forcibly displayed when consciousness is entirely suppressed, as in remedial crises during deep sleep; and the embryo, indeed, lies too in deep sleep.

If we, however, once more consider the question whether in general an unconscious will can produce bodily effects, we have in preceding chapters arrived at the conclusion that every action of the mind on the body, without exception, is only possible by means of an unconscious will; that such an unconscious will can be called forth partly by means of a conscious will, partly, also, through the conscious idea of the effect without conscious will, even in opposition to the conscious will. Why should it not, then, also be called forth through the unconscious idea of the effect with which here, even to demonstration, the unconscious will of the effect is bound up, because the effect is end? But, lastly, that the mind, in the first period of embryonic life, must work without nerves, can certainly not militate against our view, since, indeed, not only in nerveless animals do we see all psychical effects follow without nerves, but even in the case of

man have cited above sufficient examples of the kind, and, moreover, the embryo in the first period has just that semifluid structure of highly organised matter, which forms an excellent substitute for nerve-tissue proper.

If now, in the first place, we perceive materialistic attempts at explanation to be insufficient; if, in the second place, a predestined fitness of development appears impossible, considering that any set of circumstances occurs only once in a lifetime, and yet each set of circumstances requires a novel reaction, and calls forth just that which is demanded; if, thirdly, the only remaining mode of explanation, that this unconscious psychical activity itself appropriately forms and maintains its body, has not only nothing to be said against it, but has all possible analogies from the most different departments of physiology and of animal life in its favour, the verification of individual providence and plastic energy appears to be as scientifically certain as is possible in inferences from effect to cause. (Comp. further, Ges. philos. Abhandlungen, No. vi., "Ueber die Lebenskraft.")

I close then this section with the fine words of Schopenhauer: "Thus even empirically every being stands before itself as its own handiwork; but the language of Nature is not understood, because it is too simple."

B.

THE UNCONSCIOUS IN THE HUMAN MIND.

"The key to the knowledge of the essence of the conscious life of the soul is to be found in the region of Unconsciousness."—C. G. CARUS.

I.

INSTINCT IN THE HUMAN MIND.

IMPOSSIBLE as it is to draw a strict line of demarcation between body and mind, no less impossible is it to discuss apart the instincts relating to our physical and to our psychical needs. Thus we have already in the preceding section alluded to several instincts of the human mind, as the capricious appetites of the sick or the pregnant, and the curative instincts of children or somnambules. A few others border on the bodily instincts, e.g., the fear of falling on the part of young animals and children, who, e.g., are quiet when carried upstairs, but become restless when carried downstairs; the greater caution and circumspection of the movements of pregnant horses and women ; the instinct of mothers to place the new-born at the breast, of children to suck; the peculiar talent of children to distinguish genuine from feigned friendship; the instinctive shyness in the presence of certain strangers which is wont to be manifested especially by pure, inexperienced girls; the good and bad presentiments, with their great motive power to commit and omit actions, especially in the female sex, &c.-We shall consider in the present chapter those human instincts which are more connected with the bodily life, and to which, therefore, the name instinct is willingly accorded, whereas an empty sentiment of human dignity dictates the refusal of the term to all manifestations of the unconscious more remote from the bodily life, but otherwise perfectly analogous, on account of its animal associations.