The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal ConstitutionCambridge University Press, 31.10.1980 г. - 231 страници Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations. |
Съдържание
Taxation in constitutional perspective | 1 |
4 | 50 |
income taxes capital taxes | 83 |
5 | 102 |
Money creation and taxation | 109 |
7 | 128 |
7 | 135 |
The domain of politics | 153 |
Open economy federalism and taxing authority | 168 |
prospects and prescriptions | 187 |
Epilogue | 206 |
| 221 | |
| 227 | |
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aggregate allow alternative analysis analytical argument assigned assume assumptions behavior capital levy Chapter citizen-taxpayer citizens commodity constitutional choice constitutional constraints constitutionally consumption cost demand curve depicted desired discrimination discussion economic effective efficiency emerge ensure equilibrium excess burden federal Figure financing fiscal constitution fiscal federalism Geoffrey Brennan Gordon Tullock implications imposed in-period income tax increase individual Knut Wicksell Leviathan model majoritarian majority marginal marginal cost maximize maximum revenue ment money creation money stock monopoly normative orthodox period persons political process positive possible postconstitutional potential taxpayer power to tax predicted preferences progressive tax proportional rate proportional tax Proposition 13 public-choice quantity rate of inflation rate structure rational relevant requirement restrictions revenue collections revenue potential setting surplus tax base tax institutions tax rate tax reform tax revenues tax rules taxation taxing power theory tion total revenue uniform units veil of ignorance welfare loss Wicksellian zero
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Страница iv - États modérés ; elle n'y est que lorsqu'on n'abuse pas du pouvoir; mais c'est une expérience éternelle que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser; il va jusqu'à ce qu'il trouve des limites. Qui le dirait! la vertu même a besoin de limites. Pour qu'on ne puisse abuser du pouvoir, il faut que, par la disposition des choses, le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir.