ARTICLE XI.

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

ARTICLE XII.

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for president and vice-president, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president: and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as vice-president, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate; the president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representa. tives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted: the person having the greatest number of votes for president, shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such a majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immediately by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the president.

The person having the greatest number of votes as vice-president, shall be the vice-president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the vice-president; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of senators and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president shall be eligible to that of vice-president of the United States.

[NOTE. The eleventh article of the amendments to the constitution was proposed at the second session of the third congress; the twelfth article, at the first session of the eighth congress.]

1

II, III, IV, V. CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND IN-

Propriety of candid deliberation as to its provisions,
Public safety an important object of government,
Union will diminish the causes of war,

How and by whom the new constitution was framed,

10

10

11

12

12

13

14

15

Union will secure the election of capable men to office,
Union will lead to a readier settlement of differences with other
nations,

Union will strengthen the nation so as not to invite hostility,
Dangers arising from conflicting interests of nations considered,
Comparison of the facilities for defence by a union, and by sepa-
rate sovereignties,

Results of union illustrated by the history of Great Britain,
Danger of dissensions between separate confederacies or states,
Impossibility of lasting alliances between states whilst distinct,
VI, VII. CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES,
Frequent contests would arise between the states, if separate,
Illustrations from history of other nations,

-

The idea that the genius of republics and the influence of com-
merce will secure peace, chimerical,

Danger of collisions arising from the apportionment of the public
debt of the union,

VIII. THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY,
Nature of the contests which would arise between states,
Such contests would result in standing armies and military estab-
lishments,

Consequent danger from military usurpation,
Union the only security against such dangers,

IX, X. THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC
FACTION AND INSURRECTION,

33

34

34

36

37

38

Distractions which agitated the republics of Greece and Italy,
Enlargement of the republic a safeguard against such distractions, 39
Views of Montesquieu,

39, 40

Perfect equality of states not essential in a confederacy,
Dangers of factions in popular governments,

The remedies or preventives discussed,

Impracticability of removing the causes of faction,
A pure democracy admits of no cure for faction,
Checks and safeguards in a republic,
Superiority of a large over a small republic,

XI. THE UTILITY OF THE UNION WITH RESPECT TO

NAVY,

COMMERCE AND A

50, 51
51

49

50

Jealousy in Europe of our commercial tendencies,

Union will increase our power to obtain commercial privileges
from other nations,

Union will enable us to maintain a navy,

Weakness and insignificance will result from disunion,

Effect of a navy on our fisheries,

Union will increase the aggregate commerce of the states,

Union will give us the ascendant in the affairs of this continent, 53

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XII. THE UTILITY OF THE UNION WITH RESPECT TO REVENUE,·
Prosperity of commerce a source of national wealth,
Commerce increases the means of revenue,
Revenue from direct taxation impracticable,
Impost duties must be relied on for revenue,

XIII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW TO ECONOMY,
Union favorable to economy in public expenditure,
Probable confederations in case of disruption of the union,
Increased cost of separate governments,

AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF COUNTRY ANSWERED, 60
Practicability of extending the limits of a republic,
Distinction between a republic and a democracy in this respect, 61
Extent of the union compared with that of European states,
Jurisdiction of the general government limited,

Facilities of intercourse will increase,

Border states will need protection from the union,
Disunion more dangerous than union,

XV, XVI.-CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION,
IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN
THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES,

56

57

59

60

60

62

62

63

63

64

65

Insufficiency of the confederation to preserve the union,

65

Disastrous results of its defects,

Increase of power in the national government necessary,

National legislation must act on individuals instead of states,

In a league of states, the only remedy for disobedience is force,
Difficulties involved in this remedy,

XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.-THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND ILLUSTRATED
BY EXAMPLES, TO SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, RATH-
ER TO ANARCHY AMONG THE MEMBERS, THAN TYRANNY IN THE HEAD,

76

Danger of encroachment on state rights and powers, considered, 76
The danger of national weakness more to be feared,
Pervading influence of the local governments,
Illustration from the history of the feudal system,

Illustration from the history of Poland,

Illustration from the history of the Swiss cantons,

Illustration from the history of the United Netherlands,

XXI, XXII. — FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION,
Want of sanction to the laws,

Want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments,
Regulating state contributions to the treasury by quotas,
The proper remedy for this defect,

The want of a power to regulate commerce,
Difficulties arising from separate state regulations,

The raising of troops by quotas,

The right of equal suffrage among the states, an evil,

Requiring a vote of two-thirds of the states is not a remedy,

This principle gives scope to foreign corruption,

Instances from history of officers of republics corrupted by for-
eign powers,

The want of a judiciary power a crowning defect,
Necessity of a supreme tribunal,

Present organization of congress unsuitable for an executive head, 103
Propriety of the constitution being ratified by the people rather
than by the states,

XXIII. - THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC
WITH THE ONE PROPOSED,

The powers must be co-extensive with the objects of govern-
ment,

107

XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII. — THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH

AN ANSWER TO AN OBJECTION CONCERNING STANDING ARMIES,

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108

The constitution vests the power of raising armies in the legisla-
tive and not the executive branch,

108

Standing armies not prohibited by the state constitutions,
Nor by the articles of confederation,

109

109

Dangers of invasion from foreign countries or savage neighbors, 110
Necessity of national troops to protect commerce,
Difficulty of separate states protecting the frontiers,

111

112

Armies of separate states more dangerous to liberty than those
of the nation,

113

Objections to restrictions on the power of the government as to
armies,

113

Militia cannot be relied upon alone for national defence,
Armies sometimes necessary in time of peace,

114

115

Danger of making the government too feeble by restrictions,
Vesting the power to raise armies in the legislature is a sufficient
safeguard,

116

117

Effect of the limitation of appropriations to two years in the new
constitution,

Liberty cannot be subverted, nor large armies raised, without time, 119
Dangers from armies less in a united than a disunited state, 120
The idea that the laws of the union cannot be executed without
force unfounded,

121

The national government will be as well administered as state
governments,

121

It will be strengthened by extending into internal affairs,
And by operating on individuals rather than states,

122

123

The force occasionally necessary to execute the laws, an argu-
ment for union,

124

The same necessity for force might exist in case of several con-
federacies,

Union the best safeguard against the representatives of the peo-
ple usurping power,

125