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CHAPTER II.

POLICY OF LORD PALMERSTON IN THE EAST.

I WILL now refer to some occurrences which took place previously to 1841, when the Whig Government were defeated by the results of the general election.

The year 1840 saw the climax of Lord Palmerston's diplomatic ability and success as a statesman. For a long time he had observed a total silence with respect to his views on the complications of the East. At length he brought before the Cabinet a proposal, conceived with great foresight, and fully justified by the position of England. He asked from the Cabinet that he should be intrusted with power to conclude a treaty with Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the protection of the Turkish Empire, and resistance to the aggressive attempts of the Pacha of Egypt, supported by France, to destroy the integrity of the Turkish territory, by depriving the Sultan of his sovereignty over Egypt.

I concurred entirely in his plan, which seemed to me to afford the only alternative to abandonment of the Turkish Empire as a spoil to be scrambled for

more than compensated by the confidence and the friendship of the best men of my own political connection, and by the regard and favourable interpretation of my motives, which I have heard expressed by my generous opponents, from the days of Lord Castlereagh to these of Mr. Disraeli.

In political, as in other pursuits, men engage from various motives; and as in the Church and at the Bar, in the Army and in the Navy, some are to be found who do no credit to the gown or to the uniform, so in the State. But, so far as I have been able to observe, I can sincerely say that I believe the public men of Great Britain, whatever diversity there may be in their views, have sincerely and honestly at heart the welfare of that great and free nation to which they belong.

September 23, 1869.

R.

POSTSCRIPT. While these sheets have been going through the press, the news of the death of Lord Derby has afflicted his country, which saw in him a man, noble by character, as well as by rank, always ready to sacrifice office for the sake of maintaining his opinions, and forming those opinions, if with the fallibility of human judgment, yet with an integrity which must in all future times command respect.

November 23, 1869.

R.

CHAPTER II.

POLICY OF LORD PALMERSTON IN THE EAST.

I WILL now refer to some occurrences which took place previously to 1841, when the Whig Government were defeated by the results of the general election.

The year 1840 saw the climax of Lord Palmerston's diplomatic ability and success as a statesman. For a long time he had observed a total silence with respect to his views on the complications of the East. At length he brought before the Cabinet a proposal, conceived with great foresight, and fully justified by the position of England. He asked from the Cabinet that he should be intrusted with power to conclude a treaty with Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the protection of the Turkish Empire, and resistance to the aggressive attempts of the Pacha of Egypt, supported by France, to destroy the integrity of the Turkish territory, by depriving the Sultan of his sovereignty over Egypt.

I concurred entirely in his plan, which seemed to me to afford the only alternative to abandonment of the Turkish Empire as a spoil to be scrambled for

between Russia and France. On the one side was the treaty of Unkier-Skelessi, throwing its shield over Constantinople and the Dardanelles; on the other side were the intrigues of France and her Minister, M. Thiers, skilfully directed to the old French object, pursued by the first Napoleon before the Peace of Amiens, and carried on during the existence of that peace, of giving to France the dominion of Egypt.

But, although I fully concurred in the policy of Lord Palmerston, I saw that there was danger in forcing the Cabinet to an immediate decision. The Eastern question had been a topic of conversation for months among political parties. M. Guizot was the able and intelligent Ambassador of France in England. By his despatches it was known to the French Government that Lord Holland and Lord Clarendon were strong advocates for the French Alliance, which they wished to be continued and strengthened. It was doubtful how many members of the Cabinet might espouse these views. I therefore urged delay, and obtained the consent of Lord Palmerston to a postponement of the decision of this mighty question to the Tuesday following. After the Cabinet, I went down to Buckhurst, a country house which I had hired, on the borders of Windsor Park. There, on the following morning, I received a messenger from Lord Palmerston, with a box containing a long letter in support of his views. I at once answered his letter, telling him that I was fully con

vinced of the soundness of the policy he had explained to the Cabinet, but adding that I thought a short time was required to rally and to reconcile the opinions of our colleagues.

On the Monday morning I went to London, and had no sooner reached my office than Lord Melbourne came to me and consulted me on the impending decision. I told him that I completely embraced the opinions of Lord Palmerston, but that I thought it required an effort on his part to secure unanimity in the Cabinet. I told him that I thought he ought to tell Lord Holland that he was looked upon by Whig politicians as the representative of Mr. Fox, and that his resignation might break up the Ministry or even dissolve the party. Lord Melbourne consented. He had some doubts about the policy, but said he thought Lord Palmerston would resign if it were not adopted. The result of the meeting on Tuesday was an entire agreement in the Cabinet, and the signature of the Quadruple Treaty a few days afterwards.

There were, however, still some difficulties to be overcome, both Parliamentary and naval. Lord Minto, as head of the Admiralty, informed me that he should require an additional number of seamen, and asked me whether a vote of credit would not be necessary. I said I thought not; that an additional force of seamen might be levied; and if the policy of the

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