6937-7868 THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL BY SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS, PH.D. ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE No. 1, SEPTEMBER, 1907 DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Columbia University NEW YORK THE SCIENCE PRESS INTRODUCTION IN the various attempts to render an adequate description of the world of experience as presented in the history of thought, we find recurring such conceptions as purpose, teleology, final cause, design, to denote certain features which have been deemed indispensable to an exhaustive interpretation of reality. Upon reflection it appears that these categories and their like constitute so many variants of the wider concept of control; and as such express specific ways in which control has been apprehended. That is, these different predicates are diverse methods of explaining control, of making explicit elements thought to be involved in its postulation. In the present essay, I propose to examine various typical conceptions of control as expressed or implied in the respective theories of philosophy, with the view to determine in what facts or ultimate assumptions these conceptions have their basis. To the same end the investigation will consider the concept of control as involved in the fundamental principles of the science of biology and in the formulations of mechanical explanation. The historical treatment of the subject falls naturally into two main divisions, distinguished, in one way at least, by their methods of approaching philosophical problems. These divisions are occupied with the metaphysical and epistemological discussions, respectively, the latter including the theory of pragmatism. Since the science of biology, in its explanation of organic nature, has employed certain categories generally regarded as peculiar to its subject-matter, the third section will consider the notion of control as involved in the characteristic principles of biology. Finally, mechanism, which formulates the principles obtaining in inorganic nature, or the physical world, will be treated in the fourth section. A comparison of the results obtained from these various sources will serve to manifest those characteristics common to all the conceptions, and at the same time indicate the ground of any peculiar features deemed essential to the category. Such an analysis of the data presented will seek to determine those elements of the conception which may be retained as justifiable, and those which must be rejected as unwarranted by experience; those factors which are purely gratuitous, and those which are the outcome of a logical demand. |