follows us in all our intercourse with men, of whatever nature it may be, solemn or gay, serious or frivolous, it attends us in all our readings and meditations where our fellow-creatures are concerned, and when we remove from the busy world, it pursues us into the deepest solitude, and occupies the recesses of the heart. But though morals have in all ages been intimately present to men, though they are constantly thinking and speaking about them, and every day of their lives feel approbation or disapprobation of themselves or others, yet when they come to dive philosophically into the subject, they they soon are bewildered and lost. In proof of this we need only instance the numerous and opposite systems of ethics which have appeared from the earliest ages down to our own days. Perhaps the very nearness of the object has prevented it being distinctly perceived; for as in the world without we know that a certain distance is necessary to render any thing distinct, so it may be in the world within. Certain it is that the subjects which seem most intimately to concern man, are not those with which he has become first acquainted, for eclipses were foretold and the planetary system disclosed before he knew that his blood circulated. Nay, it was long supposed that the arteries contained no blood at all; and while the nature and motions of the real fluids were undiscovered, others, such as animal spirits, were created by the imagination alone. Even at the present day astronomy is much better understood than physiology; and while we can measure the distance of the most remote planets and calculate the forces which keep them in their orbits, we

still dispute about the ordinary functions of the human body. The theory of the tides is better understood than that of digestion, and the effects of the moon than the uses of the spleen. The same may be said of mental philosophy. While chemistry is daily enlarging the boundaries of our knowledge, while it analyses the earths and alkalis, and discovers the essential principles of bark, opium, and strycknia, we are still at a loss to analyse our moral sentiments, and doubt about the foundation of morals.

This diversity in theory must strike us as the more extraordinary when we reflect on the general uniformity which has prevailed in practical morality. With some exceptions the same actions have, in all ages, been approved or disapproved by mankind; and however much philosophers might differ in their reasons, they have generally been found to agree with each other and with the rest of the world in applauding or condemning certain actions and dispositions. Even those, such as Mandeville and Hobbes, whose principles seemed subversive of all morality, still felt and spoke about particular characters much as other people just as Berkeley and his followers who denied or doubted the existence of matter, acted in every respect as if it really existed. This may serve

9 Perhaps Berkeley was the only man who ever pretended to prove the non-existence of matter. This is in truth the peculiarity of his system, and distinguishes it from all others. Hume only said that we had no proof of the existence of matter; but Berkeley attempted to shew that we had a positive proof to the contrary. See the Principles of Human Knowledge, and the beautiful dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Hume was

But

to show us that practical morality falls peculiarly within the domain of common sense, an excellent guide in the ordinary business of life, though far from sufficient, as some metaphysicians suppose, to conduct us through the intricate paths of the higher philosophy. Common sense being, as the name implies, that portion of intelligence usually found among men, it follows that its decisions will be pretty uniform, much more so than those of the higher talents which admit of every variety and even eccentricity. This is one cause of the general agreement among mankind with respect to practical morality. though common sense, or, as some would say, common feeling, 10 be a safe enough guide in general, and pretty constant, it would be absurd to say that it cannot possibly be enlightened or corrected by more profound inquiry. Individuals produced, bought, sold, and grew rich; nations flourished and rose to opulence long before political economy was heard of, but we do not think this a sufficient reason for neglecting the cultivation of that science. Some of the greatest physicians the world ever saw are supposed never to have dissected a human body, and were entirely unacquainted with the circulation of the blood; but shall we therefore say that anatomy is useless, and

properly a sceptic, not so Berkeley. Matter, according to him, was the grand source of scepticism; and were it once exploded, infidelity and its consequences would for ever flee away.

10 The reader will observe that these two words are employed in order not to prejudge the question as to the prevalence of reason or of feeling in morals.

that Harvey laboured in vain? Children learn to speak their mother tongue fluently and pretty correctly without ever having heard of grammar, but still this is always considered as essential to a liberal education. Speculation constantly tends to influence practice, though it may be long of actually doing so. Nor perhaps ought we to deplore that it is so tardy in its effects, for were all the crude opinions of philosophers to be at once applied to real life, it is difficult to imagine the mischief that would ensue. Delay is absolutely necessary to try the merits of a system, and if at last it be proved sound, we may be sure that it will have an effect. Nor is this delay less advantageous to philosophers themselves than to society in general; for if they knew that their schemes would be instantly acted upon, their liberty of speculation would be greatly restrained from fear of the immediate consequences. As it is, they feel free to throw out many bold suggestions which in part at least may be correct, well knowing that Time, the sage, will separate the true from the false."

Nor is the uniformity of the moral sentiments of mankind with respect to actions and characters so complete as many have supposed. On certain great points all no doubt are agreed, but on others there has been a considerable diversity, particularly when we compare distant ages and countries. But the moment there is a diversity, we instantly perceive the necessity of a rule whereby to determine which opi

11 This may be pleaded as an excuse for Hume and others whose speculations have given much offence.

nion or practice is best. Even in the same or adjacent countries we often find a wide disagreement in judging of the merits of individuals. This may no doubt arise from some having had more opportunities of knowing the virtues, others the vices of the character in question; but even where these are a matter of history, and have appeared in the face of day, the estimate concerning them is sometimes very different. Take for instance the character of Napoleon. By the French in general he is regarded not only as a military and civil genius of the first order, but as one whose brilliant and useful achievements cast into the shade all minor faults; while by many of the English he is looked upon chiefly as a finished conqueror and tyrant. Nay, his conquests themselves are applauded or condemned according as they are talked of on this or that side of the channel; and in the eyes even of many who blame his ambition, his moral reputation has suffered more from the single murder of the Duc d' Enghien than from the sacrifice of a million of men in Italy, Spain, Germany, and Russia. Surely we must here see the necessity of a standard whereby to try the actions of men, and to discover such a standard is the principal object of ethical science.

By some, the axiom "de mortuis nil nisi bonum has been adopted, while by others, the very circumstance of an individual being no longer alive to feeling, is considered as a reason for canvassing his character more freely. The attempts of Alibeau, and Meunier, and Darmes, against the life of the King of the French, are in general regarded with abhor