and their statesmen feed pigs. It is obvious that, in such a state of fociety, there can be no great refinement; and it seems alfo pretty clear, that the political inftitutions of this country have a natural tendency to add to that roughness of character which prevails here. The paffion for fpirituous liquors exifts in a very ftrong degree among them; and their caroufals feldom terminate without fome ferious affray. They are hofpitable to ftrangers, because they are feldom troubled with them, and because they have always plenty of maize and smoked hams. Their hofpitality, too, is always accompanied with impertinent queftions, and a difgufting difplay of national vanity. In politics, they are ftern Democrats, hating the Federalifts with appropriate ardour. As to religion, their minds feem to be in that ftate in which gloomy and fanatical impreffions find eafy accefs. Here is a fect called Dunkers, who cherith long beards; and also vast numbers of enthusiasts, who retire into woods, where they remain for days in holy communion, round large fires, frequently bawling out, Glory! Glary! As there is no established church in these states, it happens, as might be expected, that there are few places of public worship; and even where there are churches, it does not appear to us, that the noify itinerants who officiate, are remarkably gifted with those qualifications which are neceffary to attain the great ends of moral and religious instruction. ART. XII. Academical Questions. By the Right Honourable William Drummond, K. C. F. R. S. F. R. S. E. Author of a Tranflation of Perfius. Vol. I. 4to.. pp. 412. Cadell & Davies, London, 1805. WE E do not know very well what to fay of this very learned publication. To fome readers it will probably be enough to announce, that it is occupied with metaphyfical fpeculations. To others, it may convey a more precife idea of its character, to be told, that though it gave a violent headach, in less than an hour, to the most intrepid logician of our fraternity, he could not help reading on till he came to the end of the volume. The book is written, we think, with more rhetorical ornament, and enlivened with more various literature, than is ufual in fimilar difcuffions; but it is not, upon this account, lefs hard to be fpelled; and after perufing it with confiderable attention, we are by no means abfolutely certain that we have apprehended the true fcope and defign of the author, or attained to a juft perception of the fyftem or method by which he has been directed. The The fubjects of his inveftigation are fo various, his criticisms fo unfparing, and his conclufions fo hoftile to every fpecies of dogmatism, that we have fometimes been tempted to think, that he had no other view in this publication, than to expose the weaknefs of human understanding, and to mortify the pride of philofophy, by a collection of infoluble cafes, and undeterminable problems. It is but fair to recollect, however, that Mr Drummond has avowedly referved the full expofition of his own theory to a fubfequent volume, and profeffes, in this, to do little more than point out the infufficiency and contradictions that may be fairly imputed to thofe of preceding philofophers. It is only the tafk of demolition which he propofes now to accomplish; and it must be owned, that he has fpread abroad his rubbish, and scattered abroad his duft, in a very alarming manner. After being almoft ftifled and blinded in contemplating this operation, we hope foon to accompany him in a more pleafing and profitable labour, and to study the proportions of the fabric he proposes to erect on the ground which he has cleared with fo much activity. Though we do not exactly agree with the learned author in the estimate he has formed of the direct and practical utility of thefe abftract fpeculations, we certainly concur with him in thinking, that they afford a falutary exercife to the understanding, and indicate at leaft, if they do rot fatisfy, an exalted and philofophical curiofity. Inftead of unfitting the mind for fuccefsful exertion in other departments of study, we are inclined to agree with Mr Drummond in thinking, that they have a tendency to invigorate and incite it; and fubfcribe heartily to all the fentiments propounded upon this subject, in his eloquent, but somewhat rhetorical, preface. The following paffages are all we can afford to lay before our readers from this part of the work. Many perfons there are, who have conceived a prejudice against the fcience of which I fpeak, because they erroneously imagine, that it indisposes the mind towards other purfuits, which are more agreeable to popular taste. The examples of feveral celebrated men may be adduced in contradiction to this opinion, from the time when Omnis Ariflippum decuit color et flatus, et res. to the last century, when the taste and knowledge of Berkeley furprifed the artists of Italy; the accomplishments of the young Helvetius were admired in the circles of Paris; and the grave and the gay, the fage and the youth, could take delight in the converfation of the amiable Hume. I am the person whom you wish to fee, faid Plato to his foreign guests, who defired their agreeable hoft to introduce them to his graver namefake the philofopher. Why fhould it be imagined, that the mind grows fevere as it becomes enlightened, or that the knowledge of man unfits us for the fociety of mankind? It is, indeed, curious to remark the ftrange notions which men, who who are quite ignorant of its nature, ave formed of the first philofophy. There are fome who feem feriously to believe, that this fcience ferves only to darken and bewilder the understanding; while others fuppofe, that it confifts in the babbling of a pedantic jargon, which conftituted the barbarous language of the fcholaftic learning. If a perplexed reafoner puzzle himself and his audience, we are almost always fure to hear his metaphyfical fubtlety reproved or lamented; and he, upon his part, feldom fails to ascribe the confufion of his ideas to the obfcure nature of all fpeculative doctrines. If a pert rhetorician get entangled in his own fophiftries, he is ever ready to accufe himself of having too much of the very logic which he wants. There is not a mere Tyro in literature, who has blundered round the meaning of a chapter in Plato, but is content to miftake himself for a philofopher. A fciolift cannot fet up for an atheist, without firft hailing himself a metaphyfician; while an ignorant dogmatift no fooner finds himself embarraffed with a doubt, than he feeks to avenge his offended vanity, by reprefenting all metaphyfical inquiries as idle or mifchievous. Thus the nobleft of the sciences is mistaken and vilified by the folly of fome, and by the prejudices of others; by the impertinent pretenfions of a few, who could never understand it, and by the unjustifiable cenfures of many, who have never given it a fair and candid examination. He, however, who has been accuftomed to meditate the principles of things, the fprings of action, the foundations of political government, the fources of moral law, the nature of the paffions, the influence of habit and affociation, the formation of character and temper, the faculties of the foul, and the philofophy of mind, will not be perfuaded that these fubjects have been unworthy of his patient attention, because prefumptuous writers have abused the liberty of inveftigation, or because dull ones have found it to be unavailing. He knows that metaphyfics do not exclude other learning-that, on the contrary, they blend themfelves with all the fciences. He feels the love of truth to grow strong with the search of it; he confeffes the very bounded powers of human understanding, while he contemplates the immenfity of nature, and the majefty of God; but he thinks, that his refeaches may contribute to enlarge and correct his notions; that they may teach him how to reafon with precision; and that they may inftruct him in the knowledge of himself. His time, he believes, is feldom employed to greater advantage, than when he confiders what may be the nature of his intellectual being, examines the extent of his moral duties, inveftigates the fources of happiness, and demonftrates the means by which it may be more generally diffused. ' It is nothing to him, that his tone and his language are ill imitated by the fophift; that he is confidered as a useless member of fociety by the heavy plodding man of business; or that he is exposed to the impotent ridicule of the gaudy coxcomb, by whom he can never be approved, because he can never be understood. What is it to him, though bis name be unknown among the monopolizers, the fchemers, and the projectors, L. 3 : projectors, that throng the crowded capital of a mercantile nation? What is it to him, though his talents be undervalued by the votaries and the victims of diffipation, folly, and fashion? What is it to him, though grandeur fhould have withdrawn its protection from genius; though ambition fhould be fatisfied with power alone; and though power fhould only exert its efforts to preferve itself? These things may not affect him they may neither interrupt the courfe of his ftudies, nor disturb the ferenity of his mind. But what must be his feelings, if he should find, that philofophy is perfecuted, where fcience is profeffed to be taught? Are there not fome, who feem defirous of excluding it from the plan of public education? The advantages which are to be derived from claffical knowledge, are well understood in one place; and a profound acquaintance with mathematics is highly estimated in another while the study of the human mind, which is the ftudy of human nature, and that examination of principles which is so necessary to the fcrutiny of truth, are either discouraged as dangerous, or neglected as ufelefs. Pref. p. v. viii. : In perufing this volume, we had occafion repeatedly to regret, that the author had not prefixed to it a fhort fummary or analyfis of its contents, by the help of which we might have pursued the chain of his reasonings with greater facility, and been better able to discover the coherence of his fpeculations, or to detect their inconfiftency. In order, in fome measure, to fupply this deficiency, and to enable thofe who may not agree with us in opinion, to judge for themselves of the value of our author's fpeculations, we fhall endeavour to combine, with our obfervations on his dif putable doctrines, a brief abstract of his whole course of reafoning. Mr Drummond fets out with fome obfervations upon the common philofophical definition or defcription of mind; and is very ill fatisfied with thofe who call it an incorporeal fubftance, in which powers or qualities inhere, as well as with those who affirm that it is fometimes active and fometimes paffive, according as it roufes itself to voluntary exertion, or receives impreffions from other exiftences. Of fubftance, he obferves, we know nothing; and can neither affume its existence, nor make any affertion with relation to it, without falling into the greatest contradictions. In particular, he obferves, we can never affume the exiftence of a variety or plurality of fubftances diftinguishable from each other: fubftance can only be defined relatively, as that in which qualities inhere, and which has an equal capacity to fupport all confiftent qualities. There can be no reafon, therefore, for distinguishing between incorporeal and corporeal fubftance; and the qualities of thought and feeling may inhere in the fame fubftance with the qualities of extenfion and folidity. It is Mr Drummond's opinion, indeed, that we have no idea of fubftance at all; and that the unwarrantable unwarrantable affumption of its existence has been the fource of much error and contradiction in philofophy. Subftance is that which remains after abstracting all thofe qualities, by which any fort of fenfation may be excited. How then is it poffible to prove its existence, or to pretend to have any conception of it? He who would find fomething,' fays our author, muft be careful not to take away until nothing be left.' The doctrine of feparate powers and faculties in the mind is alfo treated by our author with very little indulgence. The fuppofition of diftinct faculties is inconfiftent, he afferts, with the unity of the mind; and, in fact, we have no more notion of active power, than we have of fubftance. In material phenomena we perceive change only, but never the power by which change is produced; and, in mind, it is in vain to fay that we experience the power of volition over our ideas, unless it can be explained how the occurrence of an idea can be afcribed to an act of our will, when it must neceffarily have prefented itself before we could will any thing about it. Mr Drummond feems alfo to take part with those who maintain the doctrine of moral neceffity; and after obferving, that no man will pretend that he can choose whether he fhall feel or not,' he proceeds to state, that It is not because the mind previously wills it, that one affociation of ideas gives place to another. It is because the new ideas excite that attention, which the old no longer employ; and because the mind cannot but give its attention to the ftrongeft fenfations and clearest ideas, which offer themfelves to its contemplation; and as we thus perceive certain ideas and fenfations without our choice, fo we conftantly attend to them, and their dependent trains, until fome new leading fenfatious or ideas attract our notice. p. 13. 14. In order to illuftrate this pofition, and to fhew that in all cases where one fentiment or train of ideas gives place to another, it is only because a stronger fentiment or a clearer idea is fuggefted to the mind, he enters into an examination of the paffions of anger, grief, and love, and endeavours to make out that the fentiments and ideas to which they give birth, can never be fupplanted or removed by any act of the will or the understanding; but can only be effaced by fome more lively fentiment, or more interesting idea. It is not, then, from that ftate of the foul, which we denominate paffion, that we learn to acquire any notion of mental power. On the contrary, it is evident, that we always yield to the influence of the prevailing fentiment. If compaffion touch the heart, anger is difarmed; if fear alarm us, the projects of ambition are fufpended. When the rancour of envy is felt, the tenderness of friendship is forgotten. We are impelled to action, or we defit from it, as we are conftrained by the ftronger motive. Our paflions are not the children of our choice. L4 We |