The Paradox of Self-consciousnessMIT Press, 2000 - 338 страници In this book, Jos Luis Berm dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Berm dez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox of self-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer. |
Съдържание
IV | 1 |
V | 2 |
VI | 5 |
VII | 9 |
VIII | 14 |
IX | 21 |
X | 24 |
XI | 27 |
XXXI | 135 |
XXXII | 145 |
XXXIII | 151 |
XXXIV | 163 |
XXXV | 168 |
XXXVI | 188 |
XXXVII | 193 |
XXXVIII | 198 |
XII | 28 |
XIII | 39 |
XIV | 43 |
XV | 49 |
XVI | 50 |
XVII | 58 |
XVIII | 62 |
XIX | 76 |
XX | 83 |
XXII | 94 |
XXIII | 103 |
XXV | 115 |
XXVI | 123 |
XXVII | 128 |
XXVIII | 131 |
XXIX | 132 |
XXX | 134 |
XXXIX | 203 |
XL | 207 |
XLI | 220 |
XLII | 229 |
XLIII | 230 |
XLIV | 237 |
XLV | 241 |
XLVI | 247 |
XLVII | 267 |
XLVIII | 275 |
XLIX | 291 |
L | 294 |
LI | 299 |
313 | |
327 | |