when he howleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry. These creatures then are not void of outward speech.

If then these creatures excel man in sense, and are equal to him in inward and outward discourse, why should not their conceits and imaginations convey the outward object in as true a manner as ours? and if so, then seeing their imaginations are diverse, and they conceit it diversely, according to their diverse temperaments, I may tell what the outward object seemeth to me; but what it seemeth to other creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me, or any other of them, I know not.

But be it granted that the judgment of man in this case is to be preferred before the judgment of beasts; yet in men there is great difference, both in respect of the outward shape, and also of the temperature of their bodies; for the body of the Scythian differeth in shape from the body of the Indian; the reason of it ariseth (say the dogmatists) from a predominancy of humours in the one more than in the other; and as several humours are predominant, so are the phantasies and conceits severally framed and affected : so that our countrymen delight in one thing, the Indian not in that, but in another, which we regard not. This would not be, if their conceits and ours were both alike; for then we should like that which they do, and they would dislike that which we would dislike. It is evident also that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies, else why should some more easily digest beef than shell-fish? and others be mad for the time, if they drink wine? There was an old woman about Arbeus, which drank three drams of cicuta (every dram weighing sixty barleycorns, and eight drams to an ounce) without hurt. Lysis, without hurt, took four drams of poppy; and Demothon, which was gentlemansewer to Alexander, was very cold when he stood in the sun, or in a hot bath, but very hot when he stood in the shade. Athenagoras felt no pain if a scorpion stung him. And the Psilli, (a people in Libya, whose bodies are venom

to serpents,) if they be stung by serpents or asps, receive no hurt at all.

The Ethiopians, which inhabit the river Hydaspis, do eat serpents and scorpions without danger. Lothericus, a surgeon, at the smell of a sturgeon would be for the time mad. Andron of Argos was so little thirsty, that without want of drink he travelled through the hot and dry country of Libya. Tiberius Cæsar would see very well in the dark. Aristotle mentioneth of Thratius, who said, that the image of a man went always before him.

If then it be so, that there be such differences in men, this must be by reason of the diverse temperatures they have, and diverse dispositions of their conceit and imagination; for if one hate and another love the very same thing, it must be that their phantasies differ, else all would love it, or all would hate it. These men then may tell how these things seem to them good or bad; but what they are in their own nature they cannot tell.

If we will hearken to men's opinions concerning one and the same matter, thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we shall find this to be impossible; for either we must believe what all men say of it, or what some men only say of it. To believe what all men say of one and the same thing is not possible; for then we shall believe contrarieties; for some men say that that very thing is pleasant, which others say is displeasant. If it be said we must believe only some men, then let it be shewed who those men are; for the Platonists will believe Plato, but the Epicures Epicurus, the Pythagoreans Pythagoras, and other philosophers the masters of their own sects; so that it is doubtful to which of all these we shall give credit. If it be said we must credit the greatest number, this seemeth childish; for there may be amongst other nations a greater number which deny that very point, which the greatest number with us do affirm; so that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.

This argument seemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, touch

ing, and tasting be considered; for that the senses differ it seemeth plain.

Painted tables (in which the art of slanting is used) appear to the eye as if the parts of them were some higher and some lower than the other, but to the touch they seem

not to.

Honey seemeth to the tongue sweet, but unpleasant to the eye; so ointment doth recreate the smell, but it offendeth the taste. Rain-water is profitable to the eyes, but it hurteth the lungs. We may tell then how these things seem to our several senses, but what they are in their own nature we cannot tell; for why should not a man credit any one of his senses as well as the other?

Every object seemeth to be presented diversely unto the several instruments of sense. An apple to the touch seemeth smooth, sweet to the smell, and to the eye yellow; but whether the apple have one of these qualities only, or more than these qualities, who can tell? The organ hath many pipes, all which are filled with the same blast of wind, varied according to the capacity of the several pipes which receive it; even so the quality of the apple may be but one, and this one quality may be varied, and seem yellow to the eye, to the touch smooth, and sweet to the smell, by reason of the diverse instruments of the sense, which apprehend this one quality diversely.

It may be also that an apple hath many qualities besides; but we are not able to conceive them all, because we want fit means and instruments to apprehend them. For suppose that some man is born blind and deaf, and yet can touch, smell, and taste: this man will not think that there is any thing which may be seen or heard, because he wanteth the senses of hearing and seeing; he will only think there are those qualities in the object, which by reason of his three senses he conceiveth; even so the apple may have many more qualities; but we cannot come to know them, because we want fit instruments for that purpose.

If it be replied, that nature hath ordained as many in

struments of sense, as there are sensible objects, I demand, what nature? for there is a confused controversy about the very essence of nature. Some affirming it to be one thing, others another, few agreeing: so that what the quality of an apple is, or whether it hath one quality or many, I know

not.

Let a man also consider how many things that are separated, and by themselves, appear to differ from that which they seem to be, when they are in a mass or lump; the scrapings of the goat's horn seem white, but in the horn they seem black. The stone tænarus being polished seemeth white, but unpolished and rough it seemeth yellow. Sands being separated appear rough to the touch, but in a great heap soft. I may then report how these things appear; but whether they are so indeed, I know not.

SIR WALTER RALEGH'S

INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS SON

AND TO POSTERITY.

CHAP. I.

Virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends. THERE is nothing more becoming any wise man than to make choice of friends; for by them thou shalt be judged what thou art. Let them therefore be wise and virtuous, and none of those that follow thee for gain; but make election rather of thy betters than thy inferiors, shunning always such as are poor and needy; for if thou givest twenty gifts, and refuse to do the like but once, all that thou hast done will be lost, and such men will become thy mortal enemies. Take also special care that thou never trust any friend or servant with any matter that may endanger thine estate; for so shalt thou make thyself a bondslave to him that thou trustest, and leave thyself always to his mercy. And be sure of this, thou shalt never find a friend in thy young years, whose conditions and qualities will please thee after thou comest to more discretion and judgment; and then all thou givest is lost, and all wherein thou shalt trust such a one will be discovered. Such therefore as are thy inferiors will follow thee but to eat thee out, and when thou leavest to feed them they will hate thee; and such kind of men, if thou preserve thy estate, will always be had and if thy friends be of better quality than thyself, thou mayest be sure of two things; the first, that they will be more careful to keep thy counsel, because they have more to lose than thou hast; the second, they will esteem thee for thyself, and not for that which thou dost possess; but if thou be