do the first, he needeth not doubt; but being driven to the other, his greatness cannot long continue: for albeit a matter of no difficulty it is to persuade a people, yet to make them constant is a work well near impossible. Example, Theseus, Cyrus, Romulus. The second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favour or corruption, or by the virtue or greatness of fortune or friends: a prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his estate, must endeavour by his own virtue to maintain himself without depending upon any other, which may be done by this means: first, to assure all enemies from offending; secondly, to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may; thirdly, to compass all designs tending to his honour or profit, and bring them to pass either by fraud or force; fourthly, to make himself honoured and followed of captains and soldiers; fifthly, to oppress all those that would or can offend; sixthly, to be obsequious and liberal to friends, magnanimous and terrible to foes; seventhly, to casse all old and unfaithful bands, and entertain new; eighthly, to hold such amity with kings and princes, as they ought reasonably to favour him; or if they would offend, easily they cannot. Example, Giovannic, Torrigiani, Cæsar Borgia. The third and last means, whereby private persons do aspire to principalities, is not force and violence, but mere good-will and favour of men. The cause or occasion thereof is only virtue or fortune, or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness, because he aspireth either by favour of the people, or by favour of the nobility; for these contrary humours are in all commonwealths to be found; and the reason thereof is, that the great men do ever endeavour to oppress the people, and the people do labour not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed; viz. principality, liberty, or licentious life. Principality may come either by love of the multitude, or of the great men; for when any of these factions do find themselves oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a prince, hoping by his virtue and valour to be defended. Example, Francesco Sforza, Alessandro de Medici. A prince in this sort aspired, to maintain his estate, must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced; for if by favour of great men he be aspired, then must he meet with many difficulties; for having about him divers persons of great quality, and such as were but lately his equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth: but if the prince be advanced by the people, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own, and to be defended from oppression; but great men do study, not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon inferiors. Note, That all monarchies are principalities, but all principalities are not monarchies. CHAP. VII. Of councils, and counsellors in general. A SENATE or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors, to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweal power sovereign. A counsellor is called in the Latin senator; which word signifieth in effect an old man. The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons; for if they, or the greater part of them, had been young men, then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate. The chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is, to have no dependance on any other prince or commonweal; either oath, homage, natural obligation, pension, or reward. In this point the Venetians have been ever most precise, and for that reason do not admit any cardinal or other clergyman to be either of or at their councils; therefore, when the Venetian senate is assembled, the usher being ready to shut the door, crieth aloud, Fuora preti, De part priest. Note also, that in every state, of what quality soever, a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary. CHAP. VIII. Of councils in some particular monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies. THE king of Spain, for the government of his dominions, hath seven councils; viz. the council of the Indies, the council of Spain, the council of Italy and the Low Countries, the council of war, the council of orders, the council of inquisition, and the council royal. In France are three councils, viz. the council-privy, the council of judges, which they call presidents et conseillers de parliament, and the great council, which they call assemblée du trois estates. Of councils in aristocracies. In Venice, besides the senate and great council, are four councils; viz. the sages of the sea, the sages of the land, the council of ten, the three presidents of Quarantia, and the senate: all which councils do amount to an hundred and twenty persons, with the magistrates. The great council of Ragusa consisteth of sixty persons, and hath another privy-council of twelve. Of councils in democracies. Genoa hath three councils; the great council of two hundred, the senate, which consisteth of sixty, and the privycouncil, which hath twenty-six counsellors; so it doth appear that in all commonwealths, be they monarchies, aristocracies, or popular states, the council-privy is most necessary, and often used; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies and the councils in aristocracies and states popular; that is to say, that all deliberations fit to be published are in a monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the council-privy, and after ratified by common-council: but in optimacies, or popular government, the custom is contrary. Here also is to be noted, that albeit the use and authority of every senate and privy-council is most needful, yet hath it no authority to command, but in the name of those in whom the sovereignty resteth; for if counsellors had power to command absolutely, then should they be sovereigns, and consequently all execution at their pleasure; which may not be without detracting from majesty, which is a thing so sovereign and sacred, as no citizen or subject, of what quality soever, may touch or approach thereunto. CHAP. IX. Of officers and commissioners, with their respective dis tinctions. AN officer is a person public, that hath charge ordinary, and limited by law. A commissioner is also a person public, but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission. Officers are of two sorts, and so be commissioners; the one hath power to command, and are called magistrates, the other hath authority to execute; so the one and the other are persons public, yet are not all public persons either officers or commissioners. Commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces, in war, in justice, in disposing the treasure, or some other function concerning the state; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the sovereign, magistrates, and commissioners. And here is to be noted, that every commission ceaseth, if he that granted the commission doth die, or revoke it, or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equal to his that made it. CHAP. X. Of magistrates, their qualifications and elections. A MAGISTRATE is an officer having power to command in the state; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer, yet every officer is not a magistrate, but they only that have power to command. Also in making of officers and magistrates in every com monweal three things are specially to be observed; viz. who doth make them, what men they are that should be made, and the form and manner how they are made. The first appertaineth to him or them in whom the sovereignty resteth; the second also belongeth to majesty, yet therein the laws are commonly followed, especially in aristocracies and states popular: in the one, the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble; in the other, elected out of the whole multitude. The form and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular, is either by election, by lot, or by both, and their office is to compel those that do not obey what sovereignty commandeth; for all force of commandment lieth in compulsion. Commandment likewise is of two sorts: the one may be called sovereign and absolute, above laws, above magistrates, and above people. In monarchies such command is proper to the prince only; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility, and in democracies the people have that power. The second commandments are subject both to sovereignty and law. Here is to be noted, that every magistrate may recall his own commandment, and forbid what he did command, yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged. Also in presence of the sovereign, all authority of magistrates ceaseth; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power: and magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by consent, if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present. CHAP. XI. Observations intrinsically concerning every public state in points of justice, treasure, and war. THE first concern matter intrinsic. The second touch matter extrinsic. Matters intrinsic are three. The administration of justice. |