See APPEAL, 1, 2,
3;

PRACTICE.

The fact that there is no controversy between the parties may be shown at
any time before the decision of the case; and there is no laches in de-
laying to bring it before the court until after argument heard on the
merits. Little v. Bowers, 547.

CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION IN OPINION;

EX POST FACTO LAW, 4;
JURISDICTION A, 11, 12.

PUBLIC LAND.

A rule in force for the subdivision of public lands for disposal under the
public land law does not necessarily apply to the subdivision of pri-
vate lands by their owners after they have been granted by the gov-
ernment without having first made official subdivisions. McKey v.
Hyde Park, 84.

See ACCRETION.

QUIET TITLE.

1. A State may provide by statute that the title to real estate within its
limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which the defend-
ant, being a non-resident, is brought into court by publication.
Arndt v. Griggs, 316.

2. The well-settled rules, that an action to quiet title is a suit in equity;
that equity acts upon the person; and that the person is not brought
into court by service by publication alone do not apply when a State
has provided by statute for the adjudication of titles to real estate
within its limits as against non-residents, who are brought into court
only by publication. Ib.

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company made a mortgage to secure an issue of 3000 bonds
of $1000 each. It contracted with a contractor for the construction
of 31 miles of its road, and as part consideration therefor agreed to
give him 310 of these bonds. Before any further issues were made it
agreed with a banking house in New York, as a part consideration for
their acquiring these bonds, that it would only issue bonds to the ex-
tent of $10,000 a mile on its constructed road, and on the faith of this
the New York house bought and paid for the bonds, and the 31 miles
of road were constructed. Subsequently, and without constructing
any additional miles, it issued 147 more bonds which were mostly
used in the settlement of debts to parties who had notice of the agree-
ment with the New York house. Default having been made in pay-
ment of interest a bill in equity was filed to foreclose the mortgage;
Held, (1) That as to all persons acquiring any part of the 147 bonds
with notice of the agreement with the New York house, the 310 bonds
held by the latter were entitled to priority; (2) That holders who

took them without notice of it, whether taking originally from the
company, or by purchase from one who took with knowledge, were
entitled to share with the New York house in the distribution.
Murray v. Moran, 150.

Mc-

was plainly intended to cover the whole subject embraced by both,
and to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject which are
to govern.

Tracy v. Tuffy, 206.
2. Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a State this

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. The plaintiff in error failed to make a return of its loans to the state

authorities as required by law, whereupon the auditor general, under
direction of state law, made out an account against it containing the
following charge : “Nominal value of scrip, bonds and certificates of
indebtedness held by residents of Pennsylvania, $539,000 — tax three
mills $1617.00.” The company appealed from this court to the
Court of Common Pleas, which decided in its favor, and the Common-
wealth from thence to the Supreme Court of the State, which rendered
a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth for $666. Among the
grounds for the appeal was, that the tax was in violation of section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the assessment was for the
nominal value, and not for the real value of the bonds; because the
owners of the bonds had no notice, and no opportunity to be heard ;
because the company was taxed for property that it did not own; and
because the deduction of the tax from the interest due the bondholders
in Pennsylvania took their property without due process of law, and
denied to them the equal protection of the laws. The case being
brought to this court from the state court by writ of error, a motion
was made to dismiss for want of jurisdiction; to which was united a
motion to affirm; Held, (1) That there was clearly a federal question
raised, and the writ could not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction;
(2) That although it was doubtful whether, under the rules, there was
sufficient color for the motion to dismiss to justify the court in con-
sidering the motion to affirma, yet, as the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in its opinion, did not seem to have expressly passed upon the
federal question, which was clearly in the record, the court could con-
sider that there was color for making that motion; (3) That the
provision for the assessment of the tax upon the nominal or face value
of the bonds, instead of upon their actual value, was a part of the
state system of taxation, authorized by its constitution and laws,
and violated no provision of the Constitution of the United States;
(4) That the failure to give personal notice to the owners of the bonds
involved no violation of due process of law, when executed according
to customary forms and established usages, or in subordination to the
principles which underlie them; (5) That it was not true, in point of
fact, that the corporation was taxed for property which it did not own.

Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania; 232.
2. The power conferred by the statutes of Missouri upon counties within

it to impose further taxation within the limit of the unexhausted

power, for his benefit. Macon County v. Huidekoper, 332.
3. The validity of a state tax upon corporations created under its laws, or

doing business within its territory, can in no way be dependent upon
the mode which the State may deem fit to adopt in fixing the amount
for any year which it will exact for the franchise. Home Ins. Co. v.
New York, 594.

See CONSTÍTUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18;

EQUITY, 10;
JURISDICTION, A, 11.

TAX-TITLE.
The provision in the constitution of Louisiana declaring a tax-title to be

prima facie valid is intended to be applied to cases in which the tar.
title is attacked for alleged informalities in the proceedings; but not
to cases in which it is attacked for fraud and collusion in effecting the
sale. Mendenhall v. Hall, 559.

See EQUITY, 10.

TENDER.
See EQUITY, 10.

TRUST.
1. A trustee of real estate, after a court of equity, on his own motion, has

discharged him and relieved him of his trust and appointed another
trustee in his place, has no remaining interest in the property which he

can convey by deed. Kenaday v. Edwards, 117.
2. A trustee of real estate, appointed by the court, subject to its control

and order, cannot give good title to the trust estate by a deed made
without the consent of the court. Ib.

TRUSTEE
See APPEAL 4.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2.

WARRANTY.
See CONTRACT, 8, 9, 10, 11.

WILL.
A testatrix, residing in South Carolina, who died in July, 1866, left a will

made by her in 1863, by a codicil to which, made in January, 1866, she
bequeathed to her daughter, then married to C., three-fourths of her,
interest in a bond and mortgage debt, to be vested in a trustee, who
was appointed, and to be enjoyed by the daughter during her life,

a