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section and the true southern boundary of the McKey tract;" and
then directed the jury thus: "If you believe from the evidence that
the centre of the street is the centre east and west line of the quarter
section, then you are also instructed that it was and still is the true
boundary line, and that the plaintiff not entitled to land de-
scribed in the declaration on the theory that the Greeley survey was
correct;" Held, that this was erroneous as it in effect directed the jury
to find that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; and, as the evi-
dence was conflicting, that was a question to be determined by the
jury. McKey v. Hyde Park, 84.
2. When there is no evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, so that
if such a verdict were returned it would be the duty of the court to set
it aside, a verdict may be directed for the defendant. Gunther v. Liver-
pool and London Ins. Co., 110.
3. It is settled law in this court that when the evidence given at the trial,
with all the inferences that the jury could justifiably draw from it, is
insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such a verdict,
if returned, must be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the
case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant; while, on
the other hand, the case should be left to the jury, unless the conclu-
sion follows, as matter of law, that no recovery can be had upon any
view which can be properly taken of the facts which the evidence
tends to establish. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Woodson, 614.
1. Section 5467 of the Revised Statutes creates two distinct classes of
offences: the one relating to the embezzlement of letters, etc.; the
other relating to stealing their contents. United States v. Lacher, 624.
2. Section 3891 and 5467 of the Revised Statutes are to be construed
together the offences of secreting, embezzling or destroying mail
matter which contains articles of value being punishable under the
one, and like the offences as to mail matter which does not contain
such articles being. punishable under the other. Ib.
In Illinois the inference that an owner of land has dedicated it to the pub-
lic for use as a street can only be drawn from acts which show an
actual intention to so dedicate it, or from acts which equitably estop
the owner from denying such intention. McKey v. Hyde Park, 84.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia at special term confirmed
a sale of real estate by a trustee without notice having been given to
interested parties. Those parties subsequently appeared, and on their
motion, after notice and hearing, the sale was vacated and the trustee
at whose request it was made was removed; Held, that an appeal lay
from that decree to the general term of the court. Kenaday v. Ed-
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2;
1. Where, in a court of equity, an apparent legal burden on property is
challenged, the court has jurisdiction of a cross bill to enforce, by its
own procedure, such burden. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway
v. Third National Bank, 276.
2. The court which denies legal remedies, may enforce equitable remedies
for the same debt; and an application for the latter is not foreign to
a bill for the former. Ib.
3. A cross bill may be amended so as to work a change in the ground of
the relief sought, when the proofs which make it necessary are fur-
nished by the original complainant in support of allegations in his
4. A lessee of a railroad, receiving money to be expended on the leased
property, and misappropriating it by spending it on another property,
cannot, by afterwards spending an equal amount of its own money on
the leased property, deprive a creditor of the lessor of an equitable
right growing out of the misappropriation. Ib.
5. When a Circuit Court of the United States in Illinois obtains jurisdic-
tion in equity of a proceeding to establish title to real estate under
the act of the legislature of that State of April 9, 1872, known as the
"Burnt Records Act," in a case within the provisions of the act, it
may, following the decisions of the courts of the State, proceed to
adjudicate and determine in equity all the issues between the parties
relating to the property, as well those at law as those in equity; and
it is entirely within its discretion whether it will or will not send the
issues at law to be determined by a jury. Gormley v. Clark, 338.
6. It is no error in a court of equity to order buildings removed from a
tract of land over which a party to the record has a right of way for
ingress to and egress from his own property. Ib.
7. An insolvent corporation, with large properties scattered in different
States, having, for the purpose of keeping those properties together as
a whole, assented to the filing of a creditors' bill by three creditors,
(the debts of two of them not having matured and no execution hav-
ing been issued on that of the third,) and having assented to the
appointment of a receiver under that bill, and having for nine months
lain inactive while the receiver was managing the property and assum-
ing liabilities in reducing it to possession, cannot at the expiration of
that time, when the great majority of its creditors have become parties
to the suit, and its property is about to be ratably distributed by the
court among all its creditors, interpose the objection of want of juris-
diction on the ground that a court of equity could not obtain jurisdic-
tion when the plaintiff's creditors had plain, adequate and complete
remedies at the common law, or that their debts had not been con-
verted into judgments, or that no execution had issued and been re-
turned nulla bona-whatever weight might have been given to those
defences if interposed in the first instance. Brown v. Lake Superior
Iron Co., 530.
8. The maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity" is applicable to
the defendant as well as to the complainant. Ib.
9. Good faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the part of
a defendant in equity as they are on the part of the complainant. Ib.
10. When a mortgagee of real estate asserts in equity his rights as against
a tax-sale of the estate alleged by him to have been made collusively
in conjunction with the mortgagor for the purpose of getting rid of
the mortgage for the benefit of the mortgagor, he may either proceed
against the purchaser alone, or against the purchaser and the mort-
gagor and in any event it is not necessary for him to make tender of
the payment of the amount of the tax for which the estate was sold.
Mendenhall v. Hall, 559.
11. In Illinois, a decree against a minor is subject to attack, by an original
bill, for error apparent on the record, for want of jurisdiction, or for
fraud. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.
12. In Illinois, the rule is that a decree against an infant is absolute in the
first instance, subject to the right to attack it by original bill, but until
so attacked, and set aside or reversed, on error or appeal, it is binding
to the same extent as any other decree or judgment. The right to so
attack it may be exercised at any time before the infant attains his
majority, or at any time afterwards within the period in which he
may prosecute a writ of error for the reversal of such decree. Ib.
13. A decree is subject to attack by original bill for fraud, even after
judgment in the appellate court; but a party, whether an infant or
adult, against whom a decree is rendered by direction of the appellate
court, cannot impeach it, by bill filed in the court of first instance,
merely for errors apparent on the record, that do not involve the juris-
diction of either court. Ib.
14. In Illinois, a cross-bill is regarded as an adjunct or part of the original
suit, the whole together constituting one case; and process against the
plaintiff is not necessary upon a cross-bill, even where he is an infant.
15. The plaintiff, by his bill, claimed to own certain real estate, by inheri-
tance from his father, to whom the defendants had conveyed it by deed,
absolute in form, and prayed for a decree confirming and establishing
his title. The defendants, by cross-bill, alleged that the deed was made
and accepted for the purpose of placing the title in trust for the bene-
fit of one of the defendants, and asked a decree to that effect; Held,
That the subject matter of the cross-bill was germane to that of the
original bill. Ib.
1. In the trial before a jury of an issue made up in a Probate Court as to
the incompetency of a deceased person, from unsoundness of mind or
undue influence, to make a will, declarations made by the deceased to
a witness that he received the bulk of his estate by breaking the will
of his grandfather, who was also the ancestor of the caveators, and
that his estate consisted in a great degree of that property and its
accumulations; and also declarations of one of the legateės, made
about, or after the date of the execution of the alleged will, that she
had knowledge at that time of the execution of the will and of its pro-
visions, should be excluded from the jury. Ormsby v. Webb, 47.
2. On the trial of that issue it was proper for the jury to consider whether
the undue influence alleged to have been exercised by a particular lega-
tee in respect to other matters extended to or controlled the execution
of the will, and give it such weight as, they might deem proper. Ib.
3. An instruction to the jury, at such trial, that if they should believe the
evidence of a witness named, they must find for the will, while appar-
ently objectionable, as giving undue prominence to the testimony of
that witness, was held, in view of the scope of her evidence, not to
have been erroneous.
1. A state statute, (enacted after the commission of a murder in the
State,) which adds to the punishment of death, (that being the punish-
ment when the murder was committed,) the further punishment of
imprisonment by solitary confinement until the execution, is, when
attempted to be enforced against the person convicted of that murder,
an ex post facto law, and & sentence inflicting both punishments upon
him is void; and the same is the case with a statute which confers
upon the warden of the penitentiary the power to fix the day of exe-
cution, and compels him to withhold the knowledge of it from the
offender, when neither of those provisions formed part of the law of
the State when the offence was committed. Medley, Petitioner, 160.
2. Any law passed after the commission of the offence for which a person
accused of crime is being tried which inflicts a greater punishment on
the crime than the law annexed to it at the time when it was committed,
or which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage, is an
ez post facto law within the meaning of that term as used in the Con-
stitution of the United States. Ib.
3. No one can be criminally punished in this country except according to
a law prescribed for his government by the sovereign authority before
the imputed offence was committed, or by some law passed afterwards
by which the punishment is not increased. Ib.
4. There being no error in the proceedings of the court below on the trial
and the verdict by which the party was convicted, and the error com-
mencing only when the sentence or judgment of the court on the
verdict is entered, the court, after deliberation, determines that the
Attorney General of the State shall be notified by the warden of the
penitentiary, of the precise time when he will release the prisoner from
his custody, at least ten days beforehand, and after doing this, and at
that time, he shall discharge the prisoner. Ib.
See COMMISSIONERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
Various charges of fraud and collusion upon the part of a guardian ad
litem examined and held not to be outlawed. Kingsbury v. Buckner, 650.
See INFANT, 1, 3;
JURISDICTION, D. 3.
1. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error to inquire
into all the errors committed by the court below. In re Wight, 136.
2. In a proceeding for a habeas corpus to release from confinement a letter
carrier charged with embezzling letters delivered to him for carriage,
this court will not inquire into the motives with which the letter was
put into the mail, even though the object was to detect or entrap the
party into criminal practices. Ib.
1. The rule cbtains in New York, and is recognized by this court, that
even a voluntary conveyance from husband to wife is good as against
subsequent creditors, unless it was made with the intent to defraud
such subsequent creditors; or, unless there was secrecy in the trans-
action, by which knowledge of it was withheld from such creditors
who dealt with the grantor, upon the faith of his owning the property
transferred; or, unless the transfer was made with a view of entering
into some new and hazardous business, the risk of which the grantor