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under the act, be reëxamined on writ of error, and we see no reason for a different ruling in this."

Neither of the above cases involved the precise question now under examination. The decision in Carter's Heirs v. Cutting was, that the final order of, the Orphans' Court, dismissing a petition which sought the revocation of the probate of a will, could be reviewed upon its merits in the Circuit Court, and that the final order of the latter court could be reëxamined in this court. The decision in both Van Ness v. Van Ness and Brown v. Wiley was, that an order by the Circuit Court in the first case, and by the Supreme Court of the District in the other case, which directed the finding of the jury to be certified, simply directed a fact to be certified, and, therefore, was not a final judgment, reviewable by this court. In none of the above cases did the question arise, whether a final order-made after the trial before the jury of the issue of will or no will-admitting to probate a paper presented as the last will of the decedent, was reviewable upon its merits; by the Circuit Court while the act of 1801 was in force, or by the Supreme Court of the District after the passage of the act of 1863. Nor did either of those cases involve any question as to the jurisdiction of this court to reëxamine a final judgment affirming an order of probate. The latter question is now, for the first time, presented for determination.

That an order in the Supreme Court of the District, at special term, admitting a will to probate and record is a final judgment, cannot, it seems to us, be disputed. It was so declared in Van Ness v. Van Ness and Brown v. Wiley. A will, admitted to probate and record by a court of competent jurisdiction, is a muniment of title for all receiving property under it; and, until the order so admitting it to probate is, by some appropriate proceeding, set aside or reversed, stands in the way of those who may have resisted the probate. In every sense, it is a final adjudication. And that an order of probate made in the Supreme Court of the District, special term, is reviewable by the general term is made clear by the provision that a party aggrieved by any order, judgment, or

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decree in a special term, involving the merits of the action or proceeding, may appeal to the general term, which "shall review such order, judgment, or decree, and affirm, reverse, or modify the same as shall be just." Rev. Stat. D. C. § 772; 12 Stat. 763, c. 91, § 5. Clearly an order of probate, based upon a finding by the jury upon issues as to the competency of the testator to make a will, is one involving the merits. If so, how is it possible, in view of the express words of the statute, to question the jurisdiction of the general term to review such final order of probate?

In respect to the authority of this court to reëxamine the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of this District, the words of the statute are quite as clear as those defining the jurisdiction of the general term to review the orders and judgments of the special term. It embraces the final judgment or decree of that court "in any case" involving a specified amount. It is true that this reëxamination must be upon writ of error or appeal "in the same manner and under the same regulations as are provided in cases of writs of error on judgments, or appeals from decrees rendered in a Circuit Court." But this language does not determine the nature of the "case" in the Supreme Court of the District, the final judgment in which is subject to reëxamination by this court. It only indicates the mode in which a case may be brought here for review. So that the only question is whether issues framed by the Supreme Court of the District, and which involve an inquiry as to whether the decedent was or was not incompetent, from unsoundness of mind or because of undue influence exerted upon him, to make a will

issues to which there are adversary parties—constitutes a "case," within the meaning of the act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of this court over the final judgments and decrees of the court below. If it does not, then it would follow that a proceeding in the Supreme Court of the District to revoke the probate of a will is a "case," the final judgment in which, as held in Carter's Heirs v. Cutting, may be reëxamined by this court, when the value of the matter in dispute is sufficient, while a proceeding in the same court involv

Opinion of the Court.

ing the validity, as a last will and testament, of an instrument offered for probate, and, therefore, its admission to probate, is not a "case," the final judgment in which can be here reviewed. We cannot assent to this view. The latter proceeding is as much a case" as the former. One involves the validity of the probate of a will, the other the validity as a will of a paper offered for probate. Upon the determination of each depend rights of property, and in each are adversary parties. There can be no reason why Congress should extend the jurisdiction of this court to proceedings involving the validity of the probate of wills, and not to proceedings involving the validity of an instrument offered for probate as a will. That the issues in the former may be heard and determined, in the first instance, without a jury, and upon evidence before a court, while the issues in the latter may, and if the parties require, must, be tried, in the first instance, by a jury, with the right in the parties to have bills of exceptions showing the rulings of the court, cannot affect the nature of the "case."

There are other decisions that throw some light upon the inquiry as to the jurisdiction of this court to reëxamine the final judgments or decrees of the highest court of this District. In the case of Custiss v. Georgetown and Alexandria Turnpike Company,. 6 Cranch, 233, one of the questions was as to the jurisdiction of this court to review the final order of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia quashing an inquisition taken by the marshal condemning land for a turnpike road. Its jurisdiction was maintained. By the words of the act constituting the Circuit Court of the District, this court was given jurisdiction to reexamine any final judgment, order or decree in said Circuit Court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value," etc. These words, Chief Justice Marshall said, were "more ample than those employed in the judicial act.” It will be found upon comparing the statute defining the jurisdiction of this court over the judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of this District, with the statute of 1801 creating the Circuit Court of the District, that the words of the former are as broad and ample as the words of the latter. The jurisdiction

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of this court extends to "the final judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in any case," etc., while the words in the act of 1801 were "any final judgment, order or decree in said Circuit Court, wherein the latter in dispute," etc. In Railroad Co. v. Church, 19 Wall. 62, the jurisdiction of this court, to reexamine the final order of the Supreme Court of this District confirming an inquisition of damages returned therein, and which was instituted before the marshal and a jury of the district, was sustained. The court said that its power to review the judgments and final orders of the Supreme Court of the District was as ample as its power over the final judgments, orders and decrees of the Circuit Court which it superseded. These two adjudications illustrate, to some extent, the nature of the cases from the courts of this District which may be reëxamined here, and show that the question now before us is to be determined by the acts of Congress defining the relations between this court and the highest court of this District, and not by reference to the statutes of Maryland, or to the statutes defining our jurisdiction to review the judgments of the Circuit Courts of the United States, held in the several States. And we may repeat here what Chief Justice Marshall said in Young v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 384, in which the main question was as to the power of this court to review the judgments of the Circuit Court of this District in a certain class of cases: "The words of the act of Congress being as explicit as language can furnish, must comprehend every case not completely excepted from them."

Whatever difficulties may have arisen, in cases like this, while there existed in this District a separate, distinct tribunal, having original cognizance of the probate of wills and the administration of the estates of deceased persons, cannot arişe under existing legislation, which brings all such business within the cognizance of the Supreme Court of the District, and makes all orders, whether in its special or general term, the orders of that court. As was said in Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558, 571, 573, the act of 1863 was the introduction into this District of a new organization of its

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judicial system, under which all the courts previously existing here as separate and independent tribunals, having special and diverse jurisdictions, were consolidated into the new Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. For this reason, it was said that the new statutory provisions should be construed in the sense of the New York system, from which they were imported, rather than in the light of the jurisprudence of Maryland previously prevailing in this District. Referring to the clause in the Constitution declaring that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Matthews, said: "But that rule is not applicable as between the special and general terms of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia as now organized. The appeal from the special to the general term is not an appeal from one court to another, but is simply a step in the progress of the cause during its pendency in the same court. The Supreme Court sitting at special term, and the Supreme Court sitting in the general term, though the judges may differ, is the same tribunal."

We are of opinion that an appeal to the general term from the final order of probate made in the special term, which is not based upon a judicial determination of facts, but merely upon the finding of a jury, of necessity, brings into review before the general term all the questions of law that are properly presented by the bill of exceptions taken at the trial We say, of necessity, because: 1. The statute requires the Supreme Court of the District, at general term, to review, upon appeal, any order, judgment or decree of the special term, involving the merits of the action or proceeding. 2. The judgment of the special term admitting a will to probate and record, pursuant to the verdict of the jury upon issues relating to the competency of the deceased to make a will, clearly involves the merits of the controversy, because it establishes the validity as a will of the writing offered for probate. 3. The right of appeal to the general term from such a judgment of the special term would be of no value whatever, in most cases, unless the former could, upon such appeal, deter