Opinion of the Court. These conveyances and mortgages were all recorded in 1871. Notice was thus given, by public record, of title in Mrs. Schreyer to both the real estate and the mortgages. Thereafter, and in 1874, buildings were erected on the two lots last mentioned, the mortgages for $5000 surrendered and two new mortgages taken-one from Gebhart to Mrs. Schreyer for $7750 on premises No. 420 West 40th Street, and one from Ritchie to Mrs. Schreyer for $8850 on premises No. 422 West 40th Street. The claim of Vanderbilt arose in this way: On February 2, 1874, a building contract was entered into between George Gebhart and Matthew L. Ritchie, as owners of premises Nos. 420 and 422 West 40th Street, with Vanderbilt, whereby he covenanted to erect two buildings on said premises for the sum of $8175, to be paid in the following manner: "When the said houses are topped out the payment of five thousand ($5000) dollars, by assignment of mortgage held by John Schreyer on the property of Anna Maria Schreyer, No. 350 West 42d Street, in the city of New York; three thousand one hundred and seventy-five ($3175) dollars when the houses are fully completed as above." On May 5, 1874, Vanderbilt had so far completed his contract that he was entitled to an assignment of the bond and mortgage. He then demanded and received from. Schreyer not only an assignment, but a guaranty of the bond and mortgage. There was no new consideration for this guaranty. In 1876 a prior mortgage on the premises covered by the bond and mortgage assigned as above set forth was foreclosed, and swept away the entire property, so that this bond and mortgage became worthless; whereupon Schreyer was sued on his guaranty, and judgment recovered· thereon. On September 17, 1878, John Schreyer was adjudged a bankrupt upon a creditor's petition, filed August 23, 1878. Several claims were proved against his estate in bankruptcy, but all have been satisfied except that of Vanderbilt; so that, while this action was brought by an assignee in bankruptcy, it was really for the sole benefit of Vanderbilt. On September 6, 1876, Mrs. Schreyer died, leaving a will by which her property was devised and bequeathed to her children; her husband was named as executor; and he, individually and as executor, Opinion of the Court. was the defendant in this suit. And now the contention of the plaintiff below is, that the conveyances of January 21, 1871, and the two mortgages from Gebhart and Ritchie to Mrs. Schreyer in 1874 were fraudulent and void as against the. claim of Vanderbilt. The conveyances were made and recorded more than three years prior to the building contract, out of which Vanderbilt's claim arose; and, while the mortgages to Mrs. Schreyer were executed and recorded during the same year with the bu ding contract, yet the obligation assumed by Schreyer was a voluntary one, without consideration, and after a contract expressly providing for payment in another way, was conditional, and only became a fixed indebtedness two years thereafter, when by the foreclosure proceedings the worthlessness of the guaranteed bond and mortgage was developed. Obviously, very clear and direct testimony is essential to support an adjudication that these various transfers were fraudulent and void as against this subsequent creditor. In determining the rules applicable to such transactions reference should be had not only to the decisions of this court, but also to those of the courts of New York, where the parties lived and the transactions took place. Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 351; Graham v. Railroad Company, 102 U. S. 148; Wallace v. Penfield, 106 U. S. 260, 263, 264. In a recent case in the Court of Appeals of New York, Todd v. Nelson, 109 N. Y. 316, 327, that court thus stated the law: "The theory upon which deeds conveying the property of an individual to some third party have been set aside. as fraudulent in regard to subsequent creditors of the grantor has been that he has made a secret conveyance of his property while remaining in the possession and seeming ownership thereof, and has obtained credit thereby, while embarking in some hazardous business requiring such credit, or the debts which he has incurred were incurred soon after the conveyance, thus making the fraudr lent intent a natural and almost a necessary inference, and in this way he has been enabled to obtain the property of others who were relying upon an appearance which was wholly delusive. Such are the cases cited by the learned, counsel for the appellants." See also Phillips Opinion of the Court. v. Wooster, 36 N. Y. 412; Curtis v. Fox, 47 N. Y. 299; Dunlap v. Hawkins, 59 N Y. 342; Carr v. Breese, 81 N. Y. 584; and Phoenix Bank v. Stafford, 89 N. Y. 405. Turning now to the cases in this court: It was said in Smith v. Vodges, 92 U. S. 183: "The law of this case is too well settled to admit of doubt. In order to defeat a settlement made by a husband upon his wife, it must be intended to defraud existing creditors, or creditors whose rights are expected shortly to supervene, or creditors whose rights may and do so supervene; the settler purposing to throw the haz ards of business in which he is about to engage upon others, instead of honestly holding his means subject to the chance of those adverse results to which all business enterprises are liable. Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229; Mullen v. Wilson, 44 Penn. St. 413; Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 478, 481.” In Graham v. Railroad Company, 102 U. S. 148, 154, it was said: "It seems clear that subsequent creditors have no better right than subsequent purchasers, to question a previous transaction in which the debtor's property was obtained from him by fraud, which he has acquiesced in, and which he has manifested no desire to disturb. Yet, in such a case, subsequent purchasers have no such right." In Wallace v. Penfield, 106 U. S. 260, 262, in which it appeared that the husband transferring property to his wife was indebted at the time of the transfer, though not to the party complaining of the transaction, the court observed: "His indebtedness existing at the time of the settlement upon the wife, as well as that which arose during the period of the improvements, was subsequently, and without unreasonable delay, fully discharged by him. Commenced in 1868, they were all, with trifling exceptions, completed and paid for before the close of the summer of 1869. So far as the record discloses, no creditor, who was such when the settlement was made or the improvements were going on, was materially hindered by the withdrawal by Williams, from his means or business, of the sums necessary to pay for the land and improvements. Those who seek, in this suit, to impeach the original settlement, or to reach the means he invested in improving his wife's land, became his creditors some Opinion of the Court. time after the improvements (with slight exceptions not worth mentioning) had been made and paid for. If they trusted him in the belief that he owned the land, it was negligent in them so to do, for the conveyance of February 11, 1868, duly acknowledged, was filed for record within a few days after its execution." And in Horbach v. Hill, 112 U. S. 144, 149, this language was used: "The complainant, not showing that he was at the time a creditor, cannot complain. Even a voluntary conveyance is good as against subsequent creditors, unless executed as a cover for future schemes of fraud." From these authorities, it is evident that the rule obtaining in New York, as well as recognized by this court, is, that even a voluntary conveyance from husband to wife is good as against subsequent creditors; unless it was made with the intent to defraud such subsequent creditors; or there was secrecy in the transaction by which knowledge of it was withheld from such creditors, who dealt with the grantor upon the faith of his owning the property transferred; or the transfer was made with a view of entering into some new and hazardous business, the risk of which the grantor intended should be cast upon the parties having dealings with him in the new business. Tested by these rules, it is impossible to sustain an adjudication, upon the testimony in this case, that the transfer of either the real estate or the bonds and mortgages was fraudulent as against the creditor Vanderbilt. Assuming, in the first instance, that both transfers were purely voluntary, the deeds to Mrs. Schreyer were made and recorded three years before the building contract was signed, or the work done, out of which Vanderbilt's claim arose. There was thus that constructive notice referred to in Wallace v. Penfield, supra, as sufficient. Further, on May 21st, 1872, Vanderbilt entered into a written contract with Mrs. Schreyer to do the mason work in the construction of a building on the lots conveyed, the contract price being $10,500. He thus had actual as well as constructive notice, more than two years before he entered into this last contract, that Mrs. Schreyer was the owner of these lots. With such knowledge he entered into the last contract, and thereafter accepted Schreyer's Opinion of the Court. guaranty. How can he then say, with such knowledge, that he was defrauded by those conveyances? Is it possible to suppose that the Schreyers, when they made those conveyances, looked forward three years, and anticipated that Gebhart and Ritchie would seek to improve their real estate, and obtain pecuniary assistance from them, and, with that prevision, planned to defraud any one who might rely upon Mr. Schreyer's guaranty? Further than that, Schreyer did not at the time purpose to, and did not in fact, change his regular business, or enter upon any new business. From 1854 his business was that of a stair-builder, which business he prosecuted steadily until he sold out, in 1876, six years after the conveyances. Notwithstanding these conveyances, he retained all the property used in his stair-building business, was in debt only from five hundred to one thousand dollars, and had money in bank, accounts due him, and personal property used in his business, aggregating from ten to twenty thousand dollars. It is true that some $12,000 of mechanic's liens had been filed against buildings which he owned, and which had been recently constructed; but these liens were by sub-contractors, with possibly one or two minor exceptions. Money for their payment was deposited with certain trust companies; and, as the amounts due were adjudicated, they were paid out of moneys thus deposited. Could anything be clearer than that these conveyances were free from all imputation of fraud, as against anybody, and especially as against such a remotely subsequent creditor? While the transaction as to the bonds and mortgages is nearer in point of time to the creation of the indebtedness to Vanderbilt, it is so remote in fact as also to be free from imputation of fraud. The circumstances surrounding the creation of this debt must be stated a little more in detail: Gebhart and Ritchie owned the lots; they were each subject to two mortgages; one was a mortgage of $3750, given to Ellen E. Ward, from whom the Schreyers had originally purchased the lots; and one to Mrs. Schreyer, originally $5000, but reduced by payments to about $2200. Desiring to build, in the belief that the rents from new buildings on the front of |