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Opinion of the Court.


years, and an increase might have been going on, imperceptible from day to day and from week to week, which, during the lapse of so many years, might result in the addition of all the land; and hence the averment of the bill cannot be overthrown, notwithstanding what is known of the character of the Missouri River and of the soil through which it flows, and of the rapid changes in its banks which are constantly going on. (2) Where a water line is the boundary of a given lot, that line, no matter how it shifts, remains the boundary; and a deed describing the lot by number or name conveys the land up to such shifting water line, exactly as it does up to the fixed side lines; so that, as long as the doctrine of accretion applies, the water line, no matter how much it may shift, if named as the boundary, continues to be the boundary, and deed of the lot carries all the land up to the water line.

The propositions contended for by the defendant are these : (1) Taking the allegations of the bill with those facts in relation to the Missouri River of which the court will take judicial notice, it appears that the formation in question was not accretion. (2) Taking the allegations of the bill most strongly against the plaintiff, it must be assumed that some area, however narrow, had formed between the time when the survey was made, in 1851, and the time when the land was entered by the patentee, in October, 1853. (3) The patentee, by the deed made by him to Still and Joseph I. Town, conveyed only “lot 4;" and, while the successive grantees held the title to that lot, accretions were formed of greater or less extent, which were never conveyed to the plaintiff, the deeds to it calling only for lot 4. The substance of this contention is that, as the conveyance by the patentee to Still and Joseph I. Town described the land simply as “lot 4,” it passed the title to that lot as it was at the date of the survey in 1851, and not at the date of the deed, in 1856, and thereby excluded the new land formed after the survey of 1851; and that, as accretions of greater or less extent were formed while the several successive grantees held the title, such accretions did not pass by their respective deeds, and the title thereto has not come to the plaintiff.

Opinion of the Court.

It is distinctly alleged in the bill, that the new land is an accretion to that originally purchased by the patentee from the United States. The rule of law applicable to such a state of facts is thus stated by this court in New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717: “The question is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and, as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.” And in Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 67, it is said: “The rule governing additions made to land bounded by a river, lake or sea, has been much discussed and variously settled by usage and by positive law. Almost all jurists and legislators, however, both ancient and modern, have agreed that the owner of the land thus bounded is entitled to these additions. By some, the rule has been vindicated on the principle of natural justice, that he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs, imposed by the contiguity of waters, ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; by others it is derived from the principle of public policy, that it is the interest of the community that all land should have an owner, and most convenient that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore itself.”

It is contended by the defendant that this well-settled rule is not applicable to land which borders on the Missouri River, because of the peculiar character of that stream and of the soil through which it flows, the course of the river being tortuous, the current rapid, and the soil a soft, sandy loam, not protected from the action of water either by rocks or the roots of trees; the effect being that the river cuts away its banks, sometimes in a large body, and makes for itself a new course, while the earth thus removed is almost simultaneously deposited else where, and new land is formed almost as rapidly as the former bank was carried away.

Opinion of the Court.

But it has been held by this court, that the general law of accretion is applicable to land on the Mississippi River; and, that being so, although the changes on the Missouri River are greater and more rapid than on the Mississippi, the difference does not constitute such a difference in principle as to render inapplicable to the Missouri River the general rule of law.

In Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. 41, it was held that a riparian proprietor on the Mississippi River at St. Louis was entitled, as such, to all accretions as far out as the middle thread of the stream; and that the rule, well established as to fresh-water rivers generally, was not varied by the circumstance that the Mississippi at St. Louis is a great and public water-course. The court said that from the days of Sir Matthew Hale all grants of land bounded by fresh-water rivers, where the expressions designating the water line were general, conferred the proprietorship on the grantee to the middle thread of the stream, and entitled him to the accretions; that the land to which the accretion attached in that case was an irregular piece of 79 acres, and had nothing peculiar in it to form an exemption from the rule; that the rule applied to such a public water-course as the Mississippi was at the city of St. Louis; and that the doctrine that, on rivers where the tide ebbs and flows, grants of land are bounded by ordinary highwater mark, had no application to the case, nor did the size of the river alter the rule.

In Saulet v. Shepherd, 4 Wall. 502, the doctrine of accretion was applied in respect of a lot of alluvion or batture in the Mississippi River fronting the city of New Orleans, in favor of the riparian proprietor; and it was held that the right to the alluvion depended upon the fact of the contiguity of the estate to the river, and that where the accretion was made to a strip of land which bordered on the river, the accretion belonged to such strip and not to the larger parcel behind it, from which the strip, when sold, was separated.

In County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, the same doctrine was applied to a piece of land situated on the east bank of the Mississippi River opposite St. Louis. It was there held that where a survey began “on the bank of the river,"

Opinion of the Court.

and was carried thence “to a point in the river,” the river bank being straight and running according to such line, the tract surveyed was bounded by the river; that alluvion meant the addition to riparian land, gradually and imperceptibly made, through causes either natural or artificial, by the water to which the land was contiguous; that the test of what was gradual and imperceptible was that, although the witnesses might see from time to time that progress had been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on; and that it was alluvion whether the addition was made on a stream which overflowed its banks, or on one which did not. The authorities on the subject are collected in the opinion in that case.

The rule is as applicable to the Missouri River as it is to the Mississippi, whether the principle on which it rests be that the riparian owner is entitled to the addition to his land because he must bear without compensation the loss of land caused by the action of the water and any consequent expense of repair to the shore, or whether that principle be one of public policy, in that it is the interest of the community that all lands should have an owner, and most convenient that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore.

In the present case, the land in question is described in the bill as a tract of 40 acres and more. How much, if any, of it was formed between the date of the original survey in 1851 and the time of the entry in October, 1853, cannot be told; nor how much was formed between 1853 and 1856, while the patentee owned the lot; and so in regard to the time when it was owned by each successive owner. There can be, in the nature of things, no determinate record, as to time, of the steps of the changes. Human memory cannot be relied on to fix them. The very fact of the great changes in result, caused bø

by imperceptible accretion, in the case of the Missouri River, makes even more imperative the application to that river of the law of accretion.

The bill must be held to state a fact, in stating that the land in question was formed by “imperceptible degrees,” and that the process, begun in 1853 and continued until 1870, resulting

Opinion of the Court.

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in the production by accretion of the tract of 40 acres and more, "went on so slowly that it could not be observed in its progress, but at intervals of not less than three or more months it could be discerned by the eye that additions greater or less had been made to the shore.” The fact, as thus stated, is, that the land was formed by imperceptible degrees, within the meaning of the rule of law on the subject, and it is not capable of any construction which would result in the conclusion that the land was not formed by imperceptible degrees.

In the Roman law, it was said in the Institutes of Gaius, Book II, § 70.: “Alluvion is an addition of soil to land by a river, so gradual that in short periods the change is imperceptible; or, to use a common expression, a latent addition.” Justinian says, Institutes, Book II, title 1, $ 20: “That is added by alluvion, which is added so gradually that no one can perceive how much is added at any one moment of time.”

The same rule was introduced into English jurisprudence. Bracton says, Book II, c. 2: “Alluvion is a latent increase, and that is said to be added by alluvion, whatever is so added by degrees, that it cannot be perceived at what moment of time it is added; for although you fix your eyesight upon it for a whole day, the infirmity of sight cannot appreciate such subtle increments, as may be seen in the case of a gourd, and such like.” Blackstone says, 2 Com. 262: “And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to make terra firma; or by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks back below the usual water mark; in these cases the law is held to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non curat lex; and besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss."

The whole subject was fully considered in England, in the case of Rex v. Lord Yarborough, in the King's Bench, 3 B. & C. 91; S. C. in the House of Lords, 2 Bligh N. S. 147 and 1 Dow & Cl. 178; S. C. sub, nom. Gifford v. Lord Yarborough,

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