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facility or convenience to the collection of taxes. Sup-pose this were true; yet the constitution allows only the means which are ‘necessary, not those which are merely ‘convenient,' for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one; for there is no one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase, as before observed. Therefore it was, that the constitution restrained them to the necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant of the power would be nugatory. But let us examine this ‘convenience', and see what it is. The report on this subject states the only general convenience to be, the preventing the transportation and re-transportation of money between the States and the treasury. (For I pass over the increase of circulating medium ascribed to it as a merit, and which, according to my ideas of paper money, is clearly a demerit.) Every state will have to pay a sum of tax money into the treasury; and the treasury will have to pay in every state a part of the interest on the publick debt, and salaries to the officers of government resident in that state. In most of the states, there will be still a surplus of tax money, to come up to the seat of government, for the officers residing there. The payments of interest and salary in each state, may be made by treasury orders on the state collector.— This will take up the greater part of the money he

has collected in his state, and consequently, prevent the great mass of it from being drawn out of the state.— If there be a balance of commerce in favour of that state, against the one in which the government resides, the surplus of taxes will be remitted by the bills of exchange drawn for that commercial balance. And so it must be if there were a bank. But if there be no balance of commerce, either direct or circuitous, all the banks in the world could not bring us the surplus of taxes but in the form of money. Treasury orders, then, and bills of exchange, may prevent the displacement of the main mass of the money collected, without the aid of any bank; and where these fail, it cannot be prevented, even with that aid. - Perhaps, indeed, bank bills may be a more convenient vehicle than treasury orders. But a little dif. ference in the degree of convenience, cannot constitute the necessity which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power. Besides, the existing banks will, without doubt, enter into arrangements for lending their agency, and the more favourable, as there will be a competition among them for it; whereas this bill delivers us up bound to the national bank, who are free to refuse all arrangements but on their own terms, and the publick not free, on such refusal, to employ any other bank. That of Philadelphia, I believe, now does this business by their post notes, which, by an arrangement with the treasury, are paid by any state collector to whom they are presented. This expedient alone, suffices to prevent the existence of that necessity which may justify the assumption of a non-enumerated power, as a means for

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sarrying into effect an enumerated one. The thing
may be done, and has been done, and well done, with-
out this assumption; therefore, it does not stand on that
degree of necessity which can honestly justify it.
It may be said, that a bank, whose bills would have
a currency all over the states, would be more conve-
nient than one whose currency is limited to a single
state. So it would be still more convenient, that there
should be a bank whose bills should have a currency
all over the world. But it does not follow from this
superiour conveniency, that there exists any where a
power to establish such a bank, or that the world may
not go on very well without it.
Can it be thought that the constitution intended, that
for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Con-
gress should be authorized to break down the most
ancient and fundamental laws of the several states,
suth as those against mortmain, the laws of alienage,
the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws
of escheat and forfeiture, and the laws of monopoly?
Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means,
can justify such a prostration of laws, which constitute
the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. Will
Congress be too strait-laced to carry the constitution
fnto honest effect, unless they may pass over the foun-
dation laws of the state governments, for the slightest
convenience to them "
The negative of the President is the shield provided
by the constitution to protect against the invasions of
the legislature, 1, the rights of the Executive; 2, of
the judiciary; 3, of the state and state legislatures.
The present is the case of a right remaining exclu-

sively with the states, and is, consequently, one of those intended by the constitution to be placed under his protection. It must be added, however, that unless the President's mind, on a view of every thing which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the constitution, if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgement, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance in favour of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by errour, ambition or interest, that the constitution has placed a check in. the negative of the President.” The opinions thus expressed, Mr. Jefferson, ever after, invariably maintained. In a letter to Mr. Gallatin, dated December 13, 1803, he thus expresses his fears of the overpowering influence of this monopoly: “This institution is one of the most deadly hostility existing against the principles and form of our constitution. The nation is, at this time, so strong and united in its sentiments, that it cannot be shaken at this moment. But suppose a series of untoward events should occur, sufficient to bring into doubt the competency of a republican government to meet a crisis of great danger, or to unhinge the confidence of the people in the publick functionaries; an institution like this, penetrating by its branches every part of the Union, acting by command and in phalanx, may, in a critical moment, upset the government. I deem no government safe which is under the vassalage of any self-constituted authorities, or any other authority than that of the nation, or its regular functionaries. What an obstruction could not.

this bank of the United States, with all its branch
banks, be in time of war? It might dictate to us the
peace we should accept, or withdraw its aids. Ought
we then to give further growth to an institution so
powerful, so hostile ! That it is so hostile we know,
first, from a knowledge of the principles of the persons
composing the body of the directors in every bank,
principal or branch; and those of most of the stock-
holders; second, from their opposition to the measures
and principles of the government, and to the election
of those friendly to them: and, third, from the senti-
ments of the newspapers they support. Now, while
we are strong, it is the greatest duty we owe to the
safety of our constitution, to bring this powerful enemy
to a perfect subordination under its authorities. The
first measure would be to reduce them to an equal foot-
ing only with other banks, as to the favours of the
government. But in order to be able to meet a general
combination of the banks against us in a critical emer-
gency, could we not make a beginning towards an in-
dependent use of our own money, towards holding our
own bank in all the deposites where it is received, and
letting the Treasurer give his draft or note for payment
at any particular place, which, in a well conducted
government, ought to have as much credit as any pri-
vate draft, or bank note, or bill, and would give us the
same facilities which we derive from the banks? I
pray you to turn this subject in your mind, and to give
it the benefit of your knowledge of details; whereas I
have only very general views of the subject.”
The views of the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr.
Hamilton) were equally decided in favour of the estab-

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