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1859.]

Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII.

Powers, as elsewhere, is comparative. Indeed, this is the case with all the most important material changes throughout Europe since the fifteenth century. They have been the result of national growths rather than of foreign conquest. Armies have devastated countries and slaughtered myriads, but they have left States and their rulers pretty much as they found them. What results they did produce have been rather moral than physicalrather of the soul than of the body. If a man of the Tudors', or of an after, age were recalled to life, the changes that would chiefly attract or strike him would be the result of invention, of trained and organized industry, of science applied to the arts, and of philosophy and letters, rather than of national and social changes directly produced by war. Holland, for instance, is as rich, perhaps as powerful, as she ever was, if not richer and more powerful. She has not the weight in Europe she once possessed, because other nations have grown faster than she.

To fully develop the idea here advanced by tracing the results of particular wars from the dawn of history to the downfall of feudalism, and comparing them with the similar results of the European wars since the rise of the system of the balance of power, would be a curious and not unprofitable labour. It would, however, require a volumeperhaps a large one. The remainder of this suggestive sketch will be confined to a single point of this great subject. The wars into which a lust of conquest and a love of glory have impelled France will be briefly touched upon, and the trifling results in the form of advantage to the French themselves, that followed the ruthless destruction of so much human life, and the wanton infliction of so much human misery, will be as briefly noted. In thus selecting France, it is not meant to imply that other nations have not engaged in hostilities on slight grounds or with sordid objects. But no nation has been so ready as France to plunge into wars, dazzled by the mirage of glory, or to force them upon other countries, by a restless and immoral ambition. And it will be useful to

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note how little of substantial gain their wars of ambition have produced to themselves, and how often the glory attained during their progress has vanished ere their close. Secondary wars, as it were, arising from the original aggression, will not be taken into the account, though in strictness perhaps they ought to be.

The earliest foreign war of moment in which France engaged after the modern had begun to supersede the feudal system of warfare, was the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. in 1494. A real motive of the French King was doubtless the love of glory. Charles, for a middleage monarch, was a scholar. His reading did not extend much further than the exploits of Alexander and Cæsar, but it is said to have smitten him with a desire to emulate those heroes. The first avowed object of the invasion was to obtain the kingdom of Naples. When that was conquered, Charles intended to recapture Constantinople and the Holy Sepulchre, and to re-establish the kingdom of Jerusalem. His right to attempt these latter enterprises was general, and possessed in common with every Christian man and monarch, according to the opinions of that age. His claim to Naples was founded on the rights of the second Capetian house of Anjou. These claims had originated in adoption; they were merely titular, having never been acknowledged by the Neapolitans, or realized by possession. Sismondi says that Charles derived his rights, such as they were, from a sale or cession to his father, Louis XI.; but he seems to have had some sort of claim through his grandmother, Mary of Anjou. However, a potentate-least of all a French potentate-bent upon war, is never at a loss for a reason. Italy was invaded; and the outset was as glorious as success without opposition could make it. From the Alps to the confines of Naples all was submission by the Italians, and triumph by the French, Rome herself receiving the French King. On the Neapolitan frontiers, Charles took a couple of small towns, and, according to a common custom of war in those days, massacred the inhabitants. This cruelty, which

would have exasperated some peoples to fight to the death, so terrified the Neapolitans that the reigning king resigned, the army succumbed, and the

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new king embarked for Ischia.' Sismondi is not prone to undervalue the Italians, but he sums up the first results of the expedition in a sentence. All the barons his [the Neapolitan king's] vassals, all the provincial cities, sent deputations to Charles; and the whole kingdom of Naples was conquered without a single battle in its defence.

Thus far all was in the veni, vidi, vici, style of one of the French king's great models. But like many another sudden success, the reverse came quickly. Moral causes began to operate, and strategical difficulties to embarrass. French license and French disregard of the rights and feelings of others exasperated the people. The king's original ally, Ludovico, Duke of Milan, and some other Italian Powers, were planning hostilities in the north of Italy; Spain, Austria, and England, appeared to be meditating mischief towards France. Instead of proceeding to Constantinople and Jerusalem, it became necessary to think of getting back to Paris. Charles,'

says the latest English writer on French history, 'compensated himself with an increase of rank and dignity for the mournful condition of his affairs. He proclaimed himself Emperor of Constantinople by donation from Andrew Paleologus, King of Jerusalem, and the Two Sicilies; and made another solemn entry [into Naples], clothed in the emblem of his new dignity. He made a silent exit in eight days after.' His return, with part of his army, was attended with difficulty, but no disgrace. The stubborn resolution of the Swiss, and the fiery spirit of the French, carried the king through all oppo. sition, and the glorious victory of Fornovo, gained over the confederate Italian army, secured his unmolested retreat, and gave the Italians the first taste of barbarian' valour. In every other point of view the expedition was a failure. Nine months after the king's retreat, his forces in Naples were compelled to capitulate. Not a

trace was left of the French conquests; and France had dissipated the finest army she had yet raised.

Louis XII., the father of his people,' ascended the throne in 1498, and in the following year invaded Italy. He did not abandon the claims of his predecessor to the throne of Naples-indeed, he called himself King of Naples and Jerusalem; but he advanced a claim through his grandmother to the Duchy of Milan (Lombardy). The claim had no valid foundation, as the Duchy was a male inheritance. The invasion, however, took place, and was attended with that striking success which generally accompanies the French at the outset. Louis invaded Lombardy in August, 1499; in October he entered Milan in triumph; and by February, 1500, the license, insolence, and disregard of the rights and feelings of others which the French displayed in Naples a few years. earlier, and all over Europe three centuries later, roused the country against them; and Duke Ludovico returning with some soldiers, the people universally rose against the French. Cities whose names another war is rendering familiar-Como, Milan, Parma, and Pavia, opened their gates to Ludovico; Novara capitulated after a short siege. But without allies the Duke could not resist the power of Louis, aided as it was by the treachery of the Swiss. A new French army crossed the Alps; the Swiss in the service of the Duke of Milan, communicated with the Swiss in the army of Louis; with more of policy than chivalry, the French paid the sum the mercenaries demanded, and were permitted by the treacherous troops to arrest Ludovico, Sforza, and others of lesser note. The Duke was sent into France, where he died in captivity; and the Milanese continued for some years subject to France.

Machiavelli has subjected the Italian policy of Louis XII. to a particular examination, and pronounces that he committed five capital errors.' Yet all these might have been remedied if he had not crowned them by a sixth. One error which the great politician censures more than once was his

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fault in the invasion of Naples. An English reader will be more startled at the crime than the blunder. In November, 1500, the French king entered into a treaty with Ferdinand the Catholic of Spain, by which it was stipulated that Louis should invade Naples; that Ferdinand under pretence of assisting the King of Naples, should despatch a Spanish force from the south under Gonsalvo di Cordova, 'the great captain;' and that when the two armies met together, instead of fighting, they should shake hands, and divide the kingdom. In the summer of 1501, this treaty, audaciously iniquitous even laughter, was successfully carried out in its first stage. The parties met, and despoiled the King of Naples. They then began to quarrel about the division of their prey. Negotiations continued for some time. Hostilities followed, and war waged for awhile without much result. On the 21st April, 1503, the French, after a glorious struggle, in which Bayard first distinguished himself, were defeated at Seminara. In a week afterwards their army was taken, or rather destroyed, at Cerignola. Not deterred by the loss of one army, Louis despatched another. This the generalship of the Great Captain delayed for two months in the plains flooded by the Garigliano. When disease had weakened the French forces he crossed the river with his Spaniards, on the 27th December, 1503, attacked and again destroyed_the army of Louis. On the 1st January, 1504, Gaëta surrendered to

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Gonsalvo, and Naples was lost to the French.

Unwarned by the result of his iniquitous compact with Ferdinand, Louis, in the same year in which he lost Gaëta, signed another treaty with the Emperor Maximilian, for the partition of the territories of Venice. No action followed this treaty of Blois, but it eventually grew into the well-known League of Cambray, December, 1508. Everybody knows what a glorious French success heralded the war that followed. At the battle of Aignadel the French defeated the Venetians, and the territory of the Republic was quickly conquered, or at least overrun, but with no advantage to Louis. The quarrels of the confederates superseded the League of Cambray by the Holy League. Its members were the Pope, from whom it took its name; the Kings of England and Spain; the Swiss and the Venetians; all combined against Louis, and nominally Maximilian. It gave rise to a campaign as glorious as any that ever distinguished the French arms, followed by results as profitless as usual. The nephew of Louis, Gaston de Foix, overran the North of Italy in two months, striking down two opposing armies in opposite quarters in succession, and terminated his career at the yet famous battle of Ravenna, where twenty thousand lay dead with him upon the field. Byron has commemorated the action in a stanza well known, but which may be quoted for its concluding lines, that point the moral of so many wars of ambition :

I canter by the spot each afternoon
Where perish'd in his fame the hero boy,
Who liv'd too long for men, but died too soon
For human vanity, the young De Foix !
A broken pillar, not uncouthly hewn,

But which neglect is hastening to destroy,
Records Ravenna's carnage on its face,
While weeds and ordure rankle round the base.

With the battle of Ravenna ended the glory of the French under Louis. Pressed by Spain and England, the king was compelled to withdraw some of his troops from Italy, and revolts soon drove out the remainder. The battle of Ravenna was fought on the 11th April, 1512. In the beginning of June the French evacuated the Milanese; on the 29th,

Genoa, conquered some years before, rose and expelled the troops of Louis; all hopes of Naples had long since vanished. 'In short,' observes Sismondi, the possessions of France were soon reduced to a few small fortresses in that Italy which the French thought they had subdued.' In the following year unsuccessful battles, the hopeless

nature of his foreign prospects, and the exhausted state of France, compelled Louis to sue for peace, to obtain which he had to abandon all he had striven for, and promise the Pope to surrender the liberties of the Gallican Church.

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Louis XII. died on New Year's Day, 1515, and Francis I. succeeded. His reign was long considered as an age of chivalric and martial glory; though it is difficult to see why, unless as an illustration of Sallust's idea of the influence of fortune and self-display upon fame. Sed, profecto, Fortuna in omni re dominatur; ea res cunctas, ex libidine magis quam ex vero, celebrat obscuratque. Atheniensium gestæ, sicuti ego æstimo, satis amplæ magnificæque fuere; verum aliquanto minores tamen, quam fama feruntur.' The peace which Louis XII. had patched up from necessity and a regard to his people was quickly brought to an end. Francis invaded Italy in the autumn after his accession to the throne, and on the 13th and 14th September the glorious victory of Marignano, the battle of giants,' gave him possession of the Duchy of Milan, with Parma and Placentia, to which he afterwards added Genoa. But in a few years the reverses which seem fated to follow French success began. In May, 1522, the French, under Lescunes, were compelled to capitulate, and evacuate Lombardy; and on the 30th, Genoa was surprised and plundered by the Spaniards. In the autumn of 1523, Bonnivet, Admiral of France, led into Italy another army, which the Fabian tactics of Prospero Colonna delayed for nine months, and then com pelled to retreat without a battle. In February, 1525, the disastrous day of Pavia occurred, when the French army was scattered, and the king captured. The treaty of Madrid gave liberty to Francis, but extorted from him, among other things, the surrender of his claims on Italy. That treaty, as we all know, was repudiated by the king as made under compulsion, and the Papal authority confirmed the royal casuistry. Disaster, however, still attended the arms of Francis. In 1527 a French army, under Lautrec, marched upon

Naples; but the commander perished of a pestilence, which shortly after reduced the French forces to 4000 effective men; and these attempting to escape, were overtaken and compelled to capitulate. Another French army, under the Count de St. Pol, was surprised in 1529 by the Imperial General, Antonio de Leyva, at Landriano. St. Pol and his principal officers were captured, the army was dispersed, and Genoa, rising in revolt about the same time, recovered its freedom. By 'le traité des dames,' Francis again renounced his claims in Italy. Into a war that ensued towards the close of his reign, Francis was in a measure forced, and the victory of Cerisolles added another day of glory to the French arms; but it was a barren glory. It did not prevent the invasion of France by Charles V. and Henry VIII., or arrest the necessity of a peace in 1544.

Such were the results of fifty years of unprovoked warfare. Naples had been once conquered, Milan twice, and Genoa thrice; great battles had been won and lost; seven French armies had been destroyed or dispersed; the waste of French treasure must have been enormous; indeed the exhausted state of France had more than once compelled a discreditable peace. When all was over not a trace of her conquests remained to France; but she had contrived to aggrandize her enemies. She had given Naples to Spain, and the Milanese to Austria. From the moral point of view, she had destroyed the liberties or more truly the independence of Italy, and without any benefit to herself.

The century that intervened between the death of Francis I., in 1547, and the deaths of Richelieu and Louis XIII. in 1642-43, was not fruitful in French wars of glory. France was too much engaged at home to embark in great foreign enterprises or to interfere arrogantly with other nations. Henry II. certainly was involved in hostilities with Charles V., and the repulse of the Emperor before Metz was a great military triumph; but it was more than counterbalanced by the battle of St. Quen

1859.]

French Wars without Profit to the Nation.

tin, the most disastrous day that the French experienced between Pavia and Waterloo, though rendered useless by the hesitating incapacity of Philip II. The degenerate grandchildren of Francis I. -namely, Francis II., Charles IX., and Henry III.—had neither character, power, nor means to engage in such wars as their predecessors. Courtly pageants and pleasures, or more truly disgusting profligacies, the intrigues of courtiers and the quarrels of chiefs, religious persecutions, civil and religious conflicts, particular assassinations, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, constitute the matter of their reigns. The wars of Henry IV. himself were for the most part intestine. When the justice and vigour of his peaceful rule were terminated by the knife of an assassin in 1610, eivil and religious conflicts began again. Throughout this disastrous and disgraceful period France, it is true, was engaged in foreign wars, but they were in a measure wars of necessity, and often, as regarded the interests of the State, wars of treason, being instigated by one of the contending parties to damage the other. And it is curious to observe how these civil wars, like most other French wars, were devoid of profit to the French people. The three great conflicts of opinion already alluded to, namely, the Revolt of the Netherlands against Philip II., the religious wars of Germany, and the Great Rebellion of England, not only accomplished their immediate purpose, but advanced the principles for which the combatants really took up arms. Few will deny but the cause of what is compendiously termed 'civil and religious liberty' was greatly forwarded in each of the three instances. Every one must admit that the main object of the insurgents was attained. It may perhaps be possible to find persons who would maintain that the Dutch were not justified in resisting Philip and Alva. They could not deny that the rebels' succeeded not merely in throwing off the yoke, but in establishing a national government, civil freedom, and religious toleration. It is difficult to discern VOL. LX. NO. CCCLV.

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what benefit resulted to France from her century of intestine quarrels, or indeed that could have resulted. The Edict of Nantes was a personal gift from Henry IV., or at least a temporary compromise, rescinded by the same uncontrollable will and pleasure' that granted it. The genius and vigour of Richelieu finally succeeded in crushing the substantial privileges of the French nobility and concentrating in the Crown the whole power of the State; but the triumph did not benefit France, for it overwhelmed her with taxation and plunged her into miseries from which even the consequences of the Revolution of 1789 were a relief. Neither was the triumph of any final advantage to the dynasty or the throne, for it resulted in the destruction of both. Yet it cannot be argued with any certainty that the triumph of the noblesse would have benefited the people. A sort of Venetian oligarchy in France, with a nominal king at their head, might not have made the condition of the peasantry worse than it is described as having been during the last century. It is extremely doubtful whether it would have made it any better.

With the exception of some philosophes, the reign of Louis XIV. was considered by Frenchmen the most distingué in the annals of the world till the great King was eclipsed by the glories of the great Emperor. And a remarkable reign it undoubtedly was. For half a century of its seventy-two years, continued success attended the king's undertakings abroad and at home. From Conde's first field of Rocroy, won when Louis had just ascended the throne at five years old, till the once famous battles of Steinkirk and Nerwinde, in 1693, when Luxembourg defeated William III., the successes of Louis were almost uniform by land, and considerable, though chequered, by sea-albeit his wars were rarely founded__in justice or waged with mercy. The supremacy of le Grand Monarque and la Grande Nation was established; universal empire was talked of. Philosophers, poets, wits, artists, thronged around the king. Paris and Versailles gave the law to

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