right, is to leave it to the casual opinion of the Congress. They will not reason with Virginia about the effect of this Constitution, they will not take the opinion of this Convention as to its operation, they will construe it as they please. Subsequent amendments stand against every idea of fortitude and manliness in a State, or in any one. Evils admitted in order to be removed, and tyranny submitted to, in order to be excluded by subsequent alteration, were things new to him."

Madison claimed great allowance for the plan: "Its friends have never denied that it has defects, but have claimed that the defects were not dangerous. As all are agreed that it has defects, it will be easy to remedy them by the healing power in the instrument itself. Other States have been content to ratify, and rely on the proba bility of amendments. Why should not Virginia do the same? She has hitherto always spoken with respect to her sister States, and has been listened to with respect. It is neither the language of confidence nor respect to say that she does not believe that amendments for the promotion of the common liberty and general interest of the States will be consented to by them."

Innes took the subtle ground that, "if previous amendments were proposed, the people would not have had an opportunity of expressing their views upon them; whereas, upon subsequent amendments, they would have a facility of examination, and an expression of judgment. He did not apprehend any danger from the dissimilarity of interest, North and South. He could not conceive that with the brotherly affection, reciprocal friendship, and mutual amity, so constantly inculcated, and with the strongest reasons of self-interest besides, the Northern States could be so blind as to alienate the affections of the Southern States, and adopt measures which would produce discontent, and terminate in the dissolution of a Union so neces

sary to the happiness of all. To suppose that they would act contrary to such principles would be to suppose them not only destitute of honor and of probity, but void of reason; not only bad men, but mad men."

It is apparent that, if the Federalists had profited by the example of Massachusetts, had at once admitted defects, and concurred in amendments, their object would have been gained with little loss of time and great saving of temper. As soon as they yielded what they should have proffered, the Constitution was ratified by 89 yeas to 79 nays. What would have happened, if they had continued obstinate, may be learned by the vote upon a motion to strike out one of the proposed amendments. Although all the great leaders who had championed ratification spoke and voted for the motion, it was defeated by a majority of twenty.

The form of a ratification drawn up by a committee exclusively Federalist-Randolph, Nicholas, Madison, Marshall, and Corbin-contains these words: "The powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will." As soon as possible after the Constitution became the Government of the United States, the amendments so eagerly desired were imbedded in it. The ninth and tenth meant something to the mind of that generation; to subsequent generations the meaning depended upon degrees of latitude.

THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, 1788.

In the Convention of New York, after the preliminaries of order were settled, debate was opened by Livingston (the Chancellor). He directed attention to the fact that throughout the United States one language was spoken, one religion professed, and one political principle recognized that all power is derived from the people. "It must be of little moment to the people how much of that power they vest in a State government, and how much in the councils of the Union. . . . Our situation admits of a Union and our distresses point out its necessity. Our existence as a State depends on a strong and efficient Federal Government. The State has great natural advantages from its valuable and abundant staples, the situation of its principal seaport, from the command of the commerce of New Jersey by the river discharging in its bay, from the facility of intercourse with the Eastern States by the Sound, from the Hudson bearing on its bosom the wealth of the remote parts of the State. A lasting peace affords a prospect of its commanding the treasures of the West by the improvement of its internal navigation. The domestic debt of the Union is light; the back lands will pay the foreign debt, if a government vigorous enough to avail of that resource is adopted. For that Government, imports, at no distant day, will be sufficient, and taxation will only be needed for internal government. But the State has disadvantages, in the detached situation of its parts, particularly Staten Island and Long Island, in the vicinity of States which,

in case of disunion, would be independent, and might be hostile. To the northeast, Vermont, a State with a brave and hardy people whom we have not the spirit to subdue nor the magnanimity to yield to, will avail of the weakness of New York. On the northwest there are the British posts and hostile savages. In case of domestic war, the Hudson, intersecting the State, weakens it by the difficulty of bringing one part to support the other. Consequently, our wealth and our weakness equally require the support of a Federal Union. A Union can only be found in the existing Confederation, or in that under consideration; and as a Union can only be founded upon the consent of the States, it should be sought when that consent may be expected. The powers of the Confederation were very similar to those in the proposed Constitution. Why had they not been efficient? Why was Vermont an independent State? Why have new States been rent from those in the West, in defiance of our plighted faith? Why are the British posts within the limits of the States? Because the Confederation is defective in principle and impeachable in execution, operating on States in their political capacity, not upon individuals. The powers intended to be vested in the Federal head have been impossible of execution, on the principle of a league of States totally separate and independent, therefore the form of government must be changed." Lansing said: "We ought to be extremely cautious how we establish a government which may give distinct interests to the rulers and the ruled. The objections urged against the Confederation are, that it affords no defense against foreign attack, and no security for domestic tranquillity. Both might be compassed if Congress could be vested with power to raise men and money, its legislation to act on individuals, after requisitions had been made and not complied with. This proposed Constitution I suppose to be a new experiment in politics. A Govern

ment so organized and possessing such powers will unavoidably terminate in depriving us of civil liberty. Conquest can do no more; that, in the present state of civilization, subjects us to be ruled by persons in whose appointment we have no agency. I am content to risk a possible, even a probable evil, to avoid a certain one. I contemplate the idea of disunion with pain, but, if it should ensue, what is to be apprehended? We are connected both by interest and affection with the Eastern States, we harbor no animosities against each other, we have no interfering territorial claims. Our manners are nearly similar, they are daily assimilating, and mutual advantages will probably prompt to mutual concessions and enable us to form a Union with them. I have declared that a consolidated government, even partaking in a great degree of republican principles, which had in its object the control of the inhabitants of the extensive territory of the United States, could not preserve the essential rights and liberties of the people. Reflection has given that belief greater force, and, as the representative of others, my duty is to offer amendments to this Constitution. Any amendment which will have a tendency to lessen the danger of the invasion of civil liberty by the General Government will meet my approbation, while none which in the remotest degree originate in local views will receive my concurrence." The Chancellor rejoined that, "if a Federal requisition upon a State was disregarded, subsequent Federal action upon individuals must be a source of eternal disorder, for then there would be a body of Federal officials acting in a State in direct opposition to the declared sense of its Legislature.'

Melancthon Smith was "willing to sacrifice anything for a Union except the liberties of his country. That was the point to be debated. As for alarm from the inimical disposition of the Eastern States, he did not believe in the existence of such feelings. It could not be supposed that