Articles propounded by the Earl of Essex upon the Alarum given by the Spaniards in the year 1596.

BESIDES many advertisements of the great preparations

of Spain, of their forwardness or rather full readiness to set sail, of their purpose to come for England; it is now told us by two of our own countrymen, captains of two English barks, and confessed by the Portingals whom they took prisoners upon the coast, that the adelantado in person, with twenty ships of the king's and seventy others, transporters of soldiers, did set out of Lisbon more than three weeks since, and that the eighteenth of the last month, after our account, he was near the cape Finisterræ and did the next day put into the Groine or Ferrol. To this, which they deliver upon knowledge, they add reports, that there were many other ships to join with their fleet, which came out of the straits, some from Andalusia and some from Biscay and the north.

Upon these advertisements may grow two questions:

1. The first, whether they will come presently, hoping to take us unprovided, or stay till the spring, when they may come in greater strength, and have a better season of the year?

2. The other, whether they intend an invasion, or only an incursion?

3. If incursion, (though it be impossible to provide every where,) yet how he is to be impeached from making any dangerous incursion to us or greatly prejudicial to our

estate ?

4. If invasion, which are the ports he is likest to lodge in? 5. Whether any places that are of importance near to those ports, being now undefensible, should be fortified or not? 6. How if the Spaniard be lodged in any port we shall seek to dispossess him?

7. Whether if he be on foot with great forces we shall hazard a battle with him, and if at all, at what time?

8. What must be our stores of munition, and magazines of victual, and where they are to be kept?

9. What may be added to our former directions for the disciplining or training of those men, who shall make the body of the army that shall first encounter the enemy?

10. Whether the said numbers that were appointed in the year eighty-eight to be assembled, and to make a head, may not be changed, lessened, or increased, by the discretion of him unto whom her majesty gives her commission.

The Opinion of Sir Walter Ralegh upon the same Articles.

First, if we consider without further circumstance that the fleet which was at Lisbon is already gone to Groine, and has doubled cape Finisterræ, we may then with good reason conceive that they purpose to be on our coast forthwith: but there are three reasons that may again hold us in doubt that they will not set out till the spring or summer.

First, it is very certain that there is great scarcity of victual in Lisbon, and therefore the army (not being able to be sustained there) the same is drawn into Biscay, where there is great plenty of all things. Secondly, because there is a better outlet from the

Groine than from the river of Lisbon; for the winds take them short within the bay, if they fall not again directly with the mouth of Lisbon they shall be in danger of shipwreck that may be the second cause of their coming thither.

The third reason is, that it seemeth by the intelligence that they expect ships out of the straits from Andalusia, and now therefore the Groine being found fitter both for ford and outlet, their coming thither doth not so certainly prove any sudden approach, which together with the expectation of forces far off,

doth promise and assure us a longer time to prepare for defence, and that their necessities have drawn them thither, rather than that they are so far onward in their way.

Secondly, whether they intend invasion or incursion I will not presume to judge. I have not known or read that any prince hath invaded without these two, able power and party. How the Spanish king can gather such an army and fleet together in so short time, considering his late losses, I conceive not. He was three years in the preparation for Portugal, and yet had a strong party, and entered upon the same continent. The enterprise of eighty-eight required no less time. The garrisons of Naples and Milan were then drawn down, which we hear not of at this time. On the other side, it is unlikely that the Spanish king will undertake any small affair, and it is safe to provide for the worst. But if we shall believe it to be an invasion, I am of opinion that it will be late in the summer ere the same be attempted, and the enterprise will be by this observation made most manifest. If the army of the Low Countries shall be used upon any part of France or the Low Countries, whereby it may be wasted or receive loss, I do then, under correction, assure myself that there will be no invasion. If the same rest, and hold itself in strength, and withal draw down towards the sea-side, the invasion may be then very much doubted.

To the third article, I think it is impossible to provide safely for an incursion, because the purpose and counsel is unknown. There is order already for interchangeable succour between the lieutenants. It were withal in mine opinion very requisite that there be view taken how the forts upon the coast be provided of munitions, and that the captains of the same be not only commanded to repair unto them, but charged to keep their full numbers, and that those companies appointed to succour the forts be directed to come unto them armed, whereas now they make repair without weapon. And if there were a sufficient fleet of ships to lie in the entrance of the channel, then the enemy shall not dare

to engage himself in any port, and so the hope of incursion made frustrate.

To the fourth: I am of opinion that the enemy will not seek to possess any port in the west, by reason of the impassibility of the ways, and the length of the march. Neither do I conceive that they will attempt the Isle of Wight, or any other port or place of the south; for I hold it for a principle, that there is no enemy so ill advised to offer to hold any port or piece of ground upon the coast where her majesty, with the help of the Low Countries, may command the sea. The reasons are manifold manifest, and therefore superfluous to insert; but that if any such thing be intended, they will enter by the river of Thames, and make descent near London or at London itself. To prevent which, I think it very requisite to describe an army; that the same may be drawn together on the sudden. And that there be a magazine of victual for her majesty's fleet made ready, and I am of opinion, under correction, that the setting out of her majesty's [ships] by two and three at a time is not safe, for by that time the last shall be prepared the victual of the first shall be spent, and so there will be no able strength in order at any time; for if it prove an invasion, there will be time given to provide sufficiently for all. If the attempt be sudden, a lesser number shall be in danger of being lost or beaten.

To the fifth: I do not think it necessary to fortify any where but upon the Thames; for the rest, either the enemy will give us time to prepare our navy, and then it shall not need, or he will give us no time, and then we shall but begin a work of our own perils.

To the sixth: De hoc in campis consultabimus; and those which shall command the army, when they shall see what the enemy intendeth, themselves with their commanders of the army shall best judge of necessary counterwork.

To the seventh: the ways to hinder any enemy from progress are manifold, as by taking away all means of victual, I mean such provision as shall be of corn and the like,

by carriage; the rest alive, as sheep and cattle, by driving the countries with light horses. It hath been also the manner to make head upon the straits, to defend passages, bridges, and rivers, with the like; yet I do not find that an enemy hath been stayed in any passage, either in ours or former times upon any invasion. For the Switzers sought to impeach Francis the French king, in the journey of Italy; but they failed. The Spaniards resolved to impeach the constable of France at Susa, where they had fortified themselves; but it availed not. The duke of Guise passed the river of Behamby, notwithstanding that the Spaniards, with an army on the other bank, sought to give impediment. The duke of Lancaster forced his passage upon the river of Dyrne, in spite of the army of Castile. Dandelot passed at Orleans, in spite of the earl of Nemours. And the duke of Beaupont came over the Loire in my own time in France, and won La Charite, in spite of D'Aumall. So did Charles the Fifth on the river Elba, against the duke of Saxony, with many more too tedious and impertinent to

remember.

To the eighth to hazard a battle with an enemy invading is very dangerous; yet the question hath been largely disputed among those that have written of the wars, but by the greater party held perilous. Many things may be said for both opinions; but I will leave it to better judgment; only I will remember this principle; that the invader can lose nothing but his men, the defendant may lose the kingdom; and that withal the defendant hath many helps by time, the invader many wants and impediments.

To the ninth: for our store of munition I will leave the judgment to those whom it shall concern, who are to deliver in fit proportions both for land and sea. That any great quantity of munition should be left in any place but London I do not (for my poor conceit) much allow of, because we have few places guardable, Portsmouth excepted. That there be a magazine of victuals at this time, and so long as her majesty shall stand in terms with Spain, I think the most safe and most necessary counsel of all other; for with