The like may be thought of smelling; for man himself, abounding with phlegm, is otherwise affected in smelling than he is if the parts about the head be full of blood; and many things afford a delightful smell to some living creatures, which smell to other living creatures seemeth not to be so.

In the taste the same reason appeareth; for to a rough and dry tongue that very thing seemeth bitter (as in an ague) which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be so. Diverse creatures then having tongues drier, or moister, according to their several temperatures, when they taste the same thing, must needs conceit it to be, according as the instrument of their taste is affected, either bitter, or sweet, &c. For even as the hand in the striking of the harp, though the stroke be one, yet causeth a sound sometimes high, sometimes base, according to the quality of the string that is strucken; even so one and the same outward object is diversely judged of and conceited, according to the several and diverse qualities of the instrument of sense which conveyeth it to the imagination. Ointment is pleasing to man, but beetles and bees cannot abide it. Oil to man is profitable, but it killeth bees and wasps. Cicuta feedeth quails, and henbane sows; but both of these hurt man. If a man eat ants he is sick; but the bear, being sick, recovereth by eating them.

If then one and the very same thing to the red eye seem red, to another pale, and white to another; if one and the same thing seem not hot or cold, dry or moist, in the same degree, to the several creatures which touch it; if one and the selfsame sound seem more shrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear, and more base to him that hath an open ear; if the same thing, at the same time, seem to afford a pleasant and displeasant smell to diverse and several creatures; if that seem bitter in taste to one, which to another seemeth sweet; that to one hurtful, which to another seemeth healthful; I may report how these things appear diverse to several creatures, and seem to produce diverse effects.

But what they are in their own nature, whether red or

white, bitter or sweet, healthful or hurtful, I cannot tell. For why should I presume to prefer my conceit and imagination, in affirming that a thing is thus or thus in its own nature, because it seemeth to me to be so, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may as well think it to be otherwise in its own nature, because it appeareth otherwise to them than it doth to me?

They are living creatures as well as I: why then should I condemn their conceit and phantasy concerning any thing, more than they may mine? they may be in the truth and I in error, as well as I in truth and they err. If my conceit must be believed before theirs, great reason that it be proved to be truer than theirs: and this proof must be either by demonstration or without it. Without it none will believe: certainly, if by demonstration, then this demonstration must seem to be true, or not seem to be true. If it seem to be true, then will it be a question, whether it be so indeed as it seemeth to be; and to allege that for a certain proof which is uncertain and questionable seemeth absurd.

If it be said, that the imagination of man judgeth truer of the outward object than the imagination of other living creatures doth, and therefore to be credited above others, (besides that which is already said,) this is easily refuted by comparing of man with other creatures.

It is confessed the dog excelleth man in smell and in hearing: and whereas there is said to be a twofold discourse, one of the mind, another of the tongue; and that of the mind is said to be exercised in choosing that which is convenient, and refusing that which is hurtful in knowledge, justice, and thankfulness: this creature chooseth his food, refuseth the whip, fawneth on his master, defendeth his house, revengeth himself of those strangers that hurt him. And Homer mentioneth Argus, the dog of Ulysses, who knew his master, having been from home so many years that at his return all the people of his house had forgot him. This creature, saith Chrysippus, is not void of logic: for

when in following any beast he cometh to three several ways, he smelleth to the one, and then to the second; and, if he find that the beast which he pursueth be not fled one of these two ways, he presently, without smelling any further to it, taketh the third way; which, saith the same philosopher, is as if he reasoned thus: the beast must be gone either this, or this, or the other way; but neither this, nor this; ergo, the third and so away he runneth.

If we consider his skill in physic, it is sufficient to help himself; if he be wounded with a dart, he useth the help of his teeth to take it out, of his tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption: he seemeth to be well acquainted with the precept of Hippocrates, who saith, "that the rest of the "foot is the physic of the foot ;" and therefore if his foot be hurt, he holdeth it up that it may rest; if he be sick, he giveth himself a vomit by eating of grass, and recovereth himself. The dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse.

Now outward speech is not needful to make a creature reasonable, else a dumb man were an unreasonable creature.

And do not philosophers themselves reject this as an enemy to knowledge? and therefore they are silent when they are instructed. And yet even as barbarous and strange people have speech, but we understand it not, neither do we perceive any great difference in their words; but a difference there seemeth to be, and they do express their thoughts and meanings one to another by those words: even so those creatures, which are commonly called unreasonable, do seem to parley one with another, and by their speech do understand one the other. Do not birds by one kind of speech call their young ones, and by another cause them to hide themselves? do they not by their several voices express their several passions of joy, of grief, of fear, in such manner that their fellows understand them? do they not by their voice foreshew things to come? But we will return to that creature we first did instance in. The dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth, another

when he howleth, another when he is beaten, and another when he is angry. These creatures then are not void of outward speech.

If then these creatures excel man in sense, and are equal to him in inward and outward discourse, why should not their conceits and imaginations convey the outward object in as true a manner as ours? and if so, then seeing their imaginations are diverse, and they conceit it diversely, according to their diverse temperaments, I may tell what the outward object seemeth to me; but what it seemeth to other creatures, or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me, or any other of them, I know not.

But be it granted that the judgment of man in this case is to be preferred before the judgment of beasts; yet in men there is great difference, both in respect of the outward shape, and also of the temperature of their bodies; for the body of the Scythian differeth in shape from the body of the Indian; the reason of it ariseth (say the dogmatists) from a predominancy of humours in the one more than in the other; and as several humours are predominant, so are the phantasies and conceits severally framed and affected: so that our countrymen delight in one thing, the Indian not in that, but in another, which we regard not. This would not be, if their conceits and ours were both alike; for then we should like that which they do, and they would dislike that which we would dislike. It is evident also that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies, else why should some more easily digest beef than shell-fish? and others be mad for the time, if they drink wine? There was an old woman about Arbeus, which drank three drams of cicuta (every dram weighing sixty barleycorns, and eight drams to an ounce) without hurt. Lysis, without hurt, took four drams of poppy; and Demothon, which was gentlemansewer to Alexander, was very cold when he stood in the sun, or in a hot bath, but very hot when he stood in the shade. Athenagoras felt no pain if a scorpion stung him. And the Psilli, (a people in Libya, whose bodies are venom

to serpents,) if they be stung by serpents or asps, receive no hurt at all.

The Ethiopians, which inhabit the river Hydaspis, do eat serpents and scorpions without danger. Lothericus, a surgeon, at the smell of a sturgeon would be for the time mad. Andron of Argos was so little thirsty, that without want of drink he travelled through the hot and dry country of Libya. Tiberius Cæsar would see very well in the dark. Aristotle mentioneth of Thratius, who said, that the image of a man went always before him.

If then it be so, that there be such differences in men, this must be by reason of the diverse temperatures they have, and diverse dispositions of their conceit and imagination; for if one hate and another love the very same thing, it must be that their phantasies differ, else all would love it, or all would hate it. These men then may tell how these things seem to them good or bad; but what they are in their own nature they cannot tell.

If we will hearken to men's opinions concerning one and the same matter, thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it, we shall find this to be impossible; for either we must believe what all men say of it, or what some men only say of it. To believe what all men say of one and the same thing is not possible; for then we shall believe contrarieties; for some men say that that very thing is pleasant, which others say is displeasant. If it be said we must believe only some men, then let it be shewed who those men are; for the Platonists will believe Plato, but the Epicures Epicurus, the Pythagoreans Pythagoras, and other philosophers the masters of their own sects; so that it is doubtful to which of all these we shall give credit. If it be said we must credit the greatest number, this seemeth childish; for there may be amongst other nations a greater number which deny that very point, which the greatest number with us do affirm; so that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed.

This argument seemeth to be further confirmed, if the differences of the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, touch