1 the manner, than in the substance of the impeachment. So fell Lord Danby. His talents, as a speaker in the House of Commons, had raised him to the high office of Lord Treasurer. His conduct in that great post was as little creditable to his wisdom and skill as to his honesty and patriotism. He gave way to the King, as far as was necessary to preserve his place, but not sufficiently to acquire the royal favour. He concurred in measures which endangered both our religion and government, and yet lost the friendship of the Duke of York. He extended the system of corrupting members of Parliament, increasing the sum allowed for that service, from 12,000l. to 20,0001. *; and yet he was impeached by the same House of Commons he had endeavoured to buy; and he sent for the letters and acquittances, the day after he had declared in his defence before the Lords, that there had not been one farthing granted by the Commons, which had not been strictly applied by him as the acts had directed. This assertion rested upon the miserable quibble, that the money which he had used to corrupt the Parliament was unappropriated. * Report from Comm. of Surrey, May 24. 1679. was paid by the commissioners of Excise. It The proceedings relating to Lord Danby have contributed to settle three points concerning parliamentary impeachments. First, that impeachments laid by the Commons in one session, or one Parliament, continue in force to the next; secondly, that a peer impeached by the Commons is ordered to withdraw; thirdly, that the King's pardon cannot be pleaded in bar of an impeachment. Every one of these questions, but especially the last, is of high importance to the constitution. April 21. It was at this time that Sir William Temple, thinking that the ministry, and finally the succession, would fall into the power of Monmouth, proposed a new privy council. It was to consist of 30 members. Some of the most violent Whigs, Russell, Cavendish, Capel, and Powle, were admitted. According to the present theory of our constitution, there is no part of it more perfect than that which regards the appointment of the ministers of the crown. As the power of refusing supplies has brought all public business within the sphere of the House of Commons, it follows, as a necessary consequence, even though the House should offer no advice on the subject, that ministers must be capable of bearing their scrutiny, and acquiring their con as members of Parliament, before they are trusted as servants of the crown. The mo narchy itself derives great advantage from this restraint to the personal will of the sovereign. Not only is the King less liable than other sovereigns to errors, which even the best intentioned are exposed to, by the arts of specious impostors and dishonest flatterers, but he has this security for the conduct of the most violent parliamentary leaders, that ambition can hardly lead them to wish the total destruction of that monarchy, of which they may hope at a future time to exercise the powers. But such ideas were far from being understood before the Revolution. During the reign of Charles the First, indeed, an attempt seems to have been made to conciliate the great parliamentary leaders, by entrusting them with offices of the crown. The Earl of Bedford, as we have seen in the early part of this work, was amongst those who were thus favoured. But the King was soon disgusted with them, and Lord Clarendon thinks he has sufficiently justified this dislike, when he tells us, that they always advised the King to comply with the wishes of his Parliament. Nor was the measure now proposed by Temple likely to be attended with the success which he expected from it. Had he begun by asking the dismissal of all the obnoxious ministers, and the formation of a new council, by the union of the great Whig leaders, with Secretary Coventry and others, who had experience of office without the ambition of being chief ministers, a firm administration would have been formed, and the necessity of a revolution might have been prevented. But Temple had only in view to add to the strength of the old court. Fifteen of the thirty members of whom the new council was to be composed, were to be officers of the crown, on whom it was supposed the King might rely. It was thought that fewer concessions would be required, when the leaders of the Commons were members of the council, and that the King, with such assistance, might safely dissolve the parliament should it persist in unreasonable demands. It was considered as a most favourable circumstance, should affairs come to an extremity, that the property of the new council amounted to 300,0001. a year, whilst that of the members of the House of Commons seldom exceeded 400,0001. It is obvious, that such a council was formed rather to be a rival to the Parliament than dependant on it, and the Whig leaders, to obtain at most half the confidence of the King, were the manner, than in the substance of the impeachment. So fell Lord Danby. His talents, as a speaker in the House of Commons, had raised him to the high office of Lord Treasurer. His con duct in that great post was as little creditable to his wisdom and skill as to his honesty and patriotism. He gave way to the King, as far as was necessary to preserve his place, but not. sufficiently to acquire the royal favour. He concurred in measures which endangered both our religion and government, and yet lost the friendship of the Duke of York. He extended the system of corrupting members of Parliament, increasing the sum allowed for that service, from 12,000l. to 20,000l.*; and yet he was impeached by the same House of Commons he had endeavoured to buy; and he sent for the letters and acquittances, the day after he had declared in his defence before the Lords, that there had not been one farthing granted by the Commons, which had not been strictly applied by him as the acts had directed. This assertion rested upon the miserable quibble, that the money which he had used to corrupt the Parliament was unappropriated. *Report from Comm. of Surrey, May 24. 1679. was paid by the commissioners of Excise. It |