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1912), so that the final judgment of the state court where federal claim is involved may be reviewed on writ of error by the supreme court where the claim is affirmed as well as where it is denied.

The following are some of the cases wherein state statutes have been held void by state courts as interfering with interstate commerce, these judgments being final as not reviewable by the supreme court of the United States.

Arkansas: (1908). Railroad v. State, 85 Ark. 284, 107 S. W. 989, the statute of the state, requiring the stoppage at a given station of a train engaged in interstate com merce, where it appears that there are sufficient trains already stopping to accomodate the public.

the city or brought from outside the county, and requiring him to visit all packing-houses daily and imposing upon the importers an inspection charge while it imposes no charge on others engaged in like business. Armour & Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 134 Ga. 178.

Colorado: (1907). Stubbs V. People, 40 Colo. 414. Act of Colorado prohibiting the docking of horses and the importation and the use of them as to such horses brought into the state and used therein by the owners.

Act requiring inspection before slaughtering of certain animals in so far as it provides that fresh meats cannot be shipped into the state except that the animals shall be inspected forty-eight hours before being slaughtered. Schmidt v. People, 18 Colo. 78 (1892).

Georgia: (1909). A statute making it unlawful if a person shall solicit a sale of liquor in any county where the sale is forbidden, where any shipment of any part of the sale was an act of interstate commerce. Rose Co. v. State, 133 Ga. 353 (1909). An ordinance creating a packinghouse inspector whose duty it is to inspect all meats shipped into

Iowa: (1900). City ordinance permitting a street railroad, engaged in interstate commerce, to discriminate in rates in favor of residents of city. State v. Omaha R. Co., 113 Iowa, 30 (1901). Requiring a railway company to transfer its interstate freights, passengers, etc., at a given point. Council Bluffs v. Railway Co., 45 Iowa, 338 (1876).

Kansas: (1909). Where freight is received in Kansas to be transported over its own and connecting line to a point beyond the state, and the rate charged is the aggregate of the local rates of the two lines, and the connecting line had previously adopted and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a tariff under which its proportion of the charge on the through shipment was collected and there is a claim that the charge is excessive, the shippers redress must be through the Interstate Commerce Commission and not in a state court. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. New Era Milling Co., 80 Kan. 141.

Kentucky: (1907). Commonwealth v. Hay Company, 104 S. W. 224, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 824. The laws of Kentucky requiring that a corporation carrying on business in that state shall file in the office of the secretary of state statement of the location of its office and the

name of its agent on whom process can be served as to corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Ryan Steam Ship Line v. Common, wealth, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1276, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 1187, held that the laws of Kentucky, Sec. 571 (1903) providing that all corporations carrying on business in the state shall have an office and agent where services can be had making it unlawful for such corporation carrying on business without complying with the laws, in so far as it affects steamship companies engaged in interstate commerce.

Maine: (1892). Making a railway ticket binding on the railway company for six years. LaFarier v. Railway Co., 84 Me. 286. Railroads to remove free of charge paupers brought into the state by it. Bangor v. Smith, 83 Me. 422 (1891).

Maryland: (1907). State V. Cumberland R. Co., 105 Md. 478, Acts of Maryland, p. 413, amending the charter of the C. & P. R. Co., so as to prohibit it from allowing its tracks to be connected with the tracks of the B. & O. which passes through other states unless the latter shall arrange its freight charges on coal delivered to it from the former, so that the freight charges of the two companies shall not exceed a certain rate.

Massachusetts: (1906). Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 190 Mass. 355, act permitting the sale by peddlers of agricultural products of the United States without a license and forbidding unlicensed sales of agricultural products of other countries.

(1881). Providing for the inspection of lime imported into the state. Higgins v. Casks of Lime, 130 Mass. 1.

Missouri: (1907). State v. Mo. Pac., 212 Mo. 218. A law regulating the hours of service of telegraph operators and train de spatchers in so far as it applies to interstate traffic.

(1909). International Text Book Co. v. Gillespie, 229 Mo. 397, a law requiring a foreign corporation carrying on solely interstate commerce in Missouri to make out and deliver to the secre tary of the state a statement as to its property and business within the state and to pay a tax thereon.

New York: (1898). Goods made by convict labor in another state to be labeled as such when exposed for sale. People v. Hawkens, 157

N. Y. 1.

(1901). Providing that no stone shall be used on any municipal work except the stone was dressed or cut or carved within the state. People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 144.

Ohio: (1897). Act regulating sale of convict-made goods from other states. Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio, 417, 47 N. E. 50.

Oklahoma: (1893). Inspecting cattle driven into a state and imposing a fee therefor. Faris v. Henderson, 1 Okl. 384.

South Carolina: (1907). Wenslow v. Atlantic Coast Line, 79 S. C. 344, 60 S. E. 709, act making the carrier the agent of its connecting carrier from whom it receives freight, liable for freight lost by such connecting carrier.

(1901). Imposing a penalty of

into the state and permitting with out license, eanvassing or selling in such manner goods not shipped into the state, though such a sale without a license is prohibited only in case of selling to users and consumers. The mere fact that the goods had been shipped into the state being not alone conclusive that they have lost that character as articles of interstate commerce. State v. Bayer, 34 Utah, 257.

$500 for shipping freight other than as designated by the shipper. Lowe v. Railway Co., 63 S. C. 248. Tennessee: (1909). Acklen V. Thompson, 126 S. W. 730, 122 Tenn. 43, act prohibiting the sale of plumage of birds captured or killed without the state, if applied to the case where the possessor had in the course of his trade ac quired title in a foreign state and brought the game into the state for use or commercial purposes.

(1896). Requiring all persons other than photographers of the state who shall solicit pictures to be enlarged outside of the state to pay tax. State v. Scott, 98 Tenn. 254.

Texas: (1906). Ex parte Massy, 49 Tex. Crim. App. 60. A statute making it a misdemeanor to solicit orders for the sale of intoxicating liquors in local option districts.

(1906). Texas & Pacific v. Allen, 42 Tex. 331, 98 S. W. 450, act imposing a penalty on carriers for delay in furnishing cars.

(1909). Contract made in Texas for the sale of goods to a resident corporation by a foreign corporation to be shipped from a sister state to a buyer in Texas affects interstate commerce and is not subject to Texas Anti-Trust laws. Hardware Co. v. Pottery Co. 120 S. W. 1088.

Utah: (1908). The law requir ing a license to canvass or sell by sample certain goods to be shipped

Vermont: (1908). In State v. Peet, 68 Atl. 661, 80 Vt. 449, the law of Vermont making it punishable to keep, with intent to ship out of the state for food purposes, the flesh of a calf which was less than four weeks old or weighed less than 50 pounds.

Washington: (1908). A city ordinance designating as peddlers non-residents of state taking orders in the city for groceries and imposing a penalty for doing business without a license. State v. Glasby, 50 Wash. 704.

West Virginia: (1906). Jennings v. Big Sandy R. Co., 61 W. Va. 664, 57 S. E. 272, act imposing a forfeiture on any railroad which shall demand or receive a greater toll for compensation than is provided by the act so far as applicable to interstate commerce.

Wisconsin: (1908). State v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 136 Wis. 407, a statute providing hours of service for telegraph operators, including train despatchers.



41. The beginning of federal regulation.

42. The railroad act of 1866.

43. The state control of local business of interstate railroads. 44. State regulation of railways in the United States.


Governmental regulation of railways in England.

46. The common law in interstate commerce.


Federal and state courts in the federal regulation of interstate commerce.

48. Federal cause of action in the state courts.

49. Genesis of the Interstate Commerce Act.

50. Passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.


Successive amendments of the Interstate Commerce Act.

52. Enlarged powers and jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

53. The commerce court.

54. Regulation of bridges and ferries over navigable rivers. 55. Regulation of telegraph and telephone companies.


The release of the federal regulating power.

57. Regulation by the delegation of power.


Additional acts of congress in the regulation of commerce. 59. The Department of Labor and Commerce.

8 41 (39). The beginning of federal regulation.-Although the recognized necessity for the national control of interstate commerce was the immediate occasion and moving purpose in the adoption of the constitution and the formation of the federal union, and the broad and comprehensive construction of the commerce clause by the supreme court under chief justice Marshall has laid the foundation of all subsequent decisions, the direct federal regulation of such commerce, at least as to land transportation, did not begin until the close of the first century of the republic's existence. The far-reaching importance of national control over interstate as well as over foreign commerce was not and could not be foreseen at the time of the adoption of the constitution. It was not until twenty years after the close of the civil war that changed economic conditions of the country made intolerable the diseriminating legislation of the states and led to the judicial

declaration by the supreme court in 1886,1 that in the matter of interstate commerce the United States were but one country and are and must be subject to but one system of regulations, and not to a multitude of systems. Soon after this, in 1888 and in 1890,2 the court extended the same principle of the freedom of interstate commerce to the police power of the states in the liquor traffic decisions. In 1886 it was also definitely decided, that the state power of regulation of railway traffic did not and could not extend to interstate traffic in any form, and that such shipments were national in their character, and their regulation confined to congress exclusively. Thus it was for the first time decided that this right of interstate commerce was so essentially national in its character that the inaction of congress was equivalent to its determination that the commerce must be free, and that therefore any state regulation of the right to carry on such commerce was inoperative and void. The principle of concurrent state powers during the inaction of congress and the invalidation of state action by reason, not of the existence, but of the exercise of the federal power had no application to the regulation of the right to carry on commerce between the states.

Thus the close of the first one hundred years of the government was marked by the distinct judicial declaration of the freedom of interstate commerce from any control or regulation by the states, either by police or taxing power, and the way was logically opened for the direct exercise by congress of the power of regulation conferred by the constitution.

§ 42 (40). The railroad act of 1866.-Although congress had frequently legislated on the subject of water transportation (supra, § 13), its first legislation in regard to railroad transportation, other than the incorporation of the land grant and government aided Pacific railroads in 1862, was the act of June 15, 1866, since incorporated in the revised statutes as section 5258. This act was entitled in its preamble,

"Whereas the constitution of the United States confers upon congress in express terms, the power to regulate commerce

1 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, supra.

2 Bowman v. Railway Co., supra; Leisy v. Hardin, supra.

3 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, supra.

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