conspiracy in restraint of trade has been more extensively discussed in connection with the more comprehensive provisions of the so-called Anti-Trust Law of 1890, infra, § 432 et seq. See also charge to grand jury by Grosscup, J., as to what constituted a criminal conspiracy in interstate commerce, 62 Fed. 838 (1893); charge to grand jury in California by Ross, J., 62 Fed. 834 (1893); by Morrow, J., 62 Fed. 840. See supra, ch. VI. § 338 (258). Construction of the statute.-Under the statute before its amendment in 1903 it was held that a corporation could not be indicted thereunder, as the only parties punishable were individuals. United States v. Michigan Central Railroad Co., 43 Fed. 26. (But see act of Feb. 19, 1903, infra, § 422.) The agent who was a party to the carrying of freight or passengers at a rate less than the published tariff was subject to indictment. Under that provision of the section making it unlawful for carriers to receive greater or less compensation from one shipper than from another for an equal service, an indictment stating that a carrier gave a rebate to one shipper without stating any instance in which he refused a like rebate to another shipper, is defective in not showing discrimination. United States v. Hanley, 71 Fed. 672 (1896). It was held in the same case that an indictment for paying or receiving rebates would not lie under the clause making it unlawful for the carrier by means of false billing, classification or any other device knowingly to assist or suffer any person to obtain transportation at less than the regular tariff rates. An agent of a railroad who merely collects freight and has nothing to do with fixing the rates is not indictable under the act for collecting a greater rate for a shorter than for a longer haul. United States v. Mellin, D. of Kan., 53 Fed. 229 (1893). As to essentials of indictments under the act, see also United States v. De Coursey, 82 Fed. 302; United States v. Henley, 71 Fed. 672. This offense of obtaining transportation of property at less than regular rates by means of false billing, etc., is not one that requires the transportation of the property to its destination to make it complete, but the offense is complete when the contract for the illegal rate was secured, and could only be prosecuted in that district. Davis v. United States, 104 Fed. 136 (1900). In United States v. Howell, 56 Fed. 21 (1894), West Dist. of Ark., it was held that shippers of lumber could be convicted of conspiracy to violate the Interstate Commerce Act upon showing that their servants procured unlawful discrimination in rates by false weights, provided they knew of the unlawful acts and permitted them to continue. United States v. De Coursey, 82 Fed. 302 (1897). For an indictment for alleged violation of section 3, held defective for want of sufficient allegations of alleged undue preference in the furnishing of switching connections and car distribution, in 1906 before the amendment of that year, see U. S. v. B. & O. R. R., 153 Fed. 997. § 339 (259). Removal of indicted persons to other districts for trial.-In Davis v. United States, 43 C. C. A. 448, 104 Fed. 136 (1900), the appellant was indicted in the northern district of Texas for trial under an indictment alleging violation of section ten, paragraph three, of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The United States district court at Cincinnati made an order directing the removal of the appellant for trial to the northern district of Texas. It was claimed that the offense was committed in Texas, although the shipment was made from Cincinnati to Texas, under the provision of section 781, R. S. U. S., providing that when any offense against the United States was begun in one judicial circuit and completed in another, it should be deemed to have been committed in either and may be dealt with, inquired of and tried or punished in either district, in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein. The court held that this section was intended to provide for that class of cases where the crime was not completed in one district, but where a separate and essential act of commission constituting the crime is committed in another district, and that this section therefore had no application to the case of a shipper who obtains lower rates by means of false classification, billing, etc. The offense in that case is complete when the shipment is made. The court therefore held that the district court erred in ordering a removal of the defendant to Texas, and he was ordered discharged. As to removal of United States prisoners from one district to another under 1014, R. S., see Green v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249, 46 L. Ed. 177 (1904); Beaver v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73, 48 L. Ed. 882. § 340 (259a). Limitation of criminal prosecution under the act. While there is no limitation of criminal prosecution fixed in the act, sec. 1044, R. S. U. S. provides limitation of three years, in case of all offenses "other than capital." "Suits and prosecutions for penalties and forfeitures" are subject under sec. 1047, R. S. U. S. to limitation of five years. SECTION 11. § 341. Interstate Commerce Commission-How appointed. 342. The organization and membership of the commission. § 341 (260). Interstate Commerce Commission-how appointed. SEC. 11. That a commission is hereby created and established to be known as the Interstate Commerce Commission, which shall be composed of five Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commissioners first appointed under this Act shall continue in office for the term of two, three, four, five, and six years, respectively, from the first day of January, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and eight-seven, the term of each to be designated by the President; but their successors shall be ap Terms of commissioners.] pointed for terms of six years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired time of the Commissioner whom he shall succeed. Any Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Not more than three of the Commissioners shall be appointed from the same political party. No person in the employ of or holding any official relation to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or owning stock or bonds thereof, or who is in any manner pecuniarily interested therein, shall enter upon the duties of or hold such office. Said Commissioners shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. No vacancy in the Commission shall impair the right of the remaining Commissioners to exercise all the powers of the Commission. (See section 24, enlarging Commission and increasing salaries.) § 342. The organization and membership of the commission. The commission was organized in 1887 by the appointment by President Cleveland and confirmation by the senate of the following members: Hon. Thomas M. Cooley, of Michigan, Hon. Aldace F. Walker, of Vermont, Hon. Augustus Schoonmaker, of New York. Judge Cooley served as chairman until his retirement in 1891. He was succeeded by Mr. Morrison, who served as chairman until December 31, 1897, when he was succeeded by Judge Martin A. Knapp, who had succeeded Mr. Schoonmaker, of New York, on the commission. Judge Knapp continued as chairman of the board until his appointment and confirmation as presiding justice of the new commerce court in December, 1910. Vacancies in the commission have been filled from time to time in accordance with the directions of the act that not more than two shall be members of the same political party. The commission is now (October, 1911), composed of the following members: Hon. Judson C. Clemens, of Georgia, Chairman, Hon. Franklin K. Lane, of California, Hon. Edgar E. Clark, of Iowa, |
