School logic, as was well observed by Mr. Locke, is much better calculated for the detection of sophistry than the discovery of truth. Its forms of argumentation in mood and figure carry too much artifice, not to say mechanism, in the very front of them, to suit the free and disengaged manner of the orator, in whom every thing ought to appear perfectly natural and easy, and nothing that looks like contrivance or insidious design. But though the logician's manner is not to be copied by the public speaker, his art will be of use, sometimes in furnishing topics of argument, often in suggesting hints to assist in refutation. But true logic, it must be acknowledged, is best studied not in a scholastic system, but in the writings of the most judicious and best reasoners on the various subjects supplied by history, science and philosophy. And with regard to language, as it is the English alone with which the preachers in this country, a very few excepted, are concerned as public speakers, they ought not only to study its structure and analogy in our best grammarians, but endeavour to familiarize themselves to its idiom, and to acquire a sufficient stock of words and a certain facility in using them, by an acquaintance with our best English authors. We have the greater need of this, as in this part of the island we labour under some special disadvantages, which, that our compositions may be more extensively useful, it is our duty to endeavour to surmount.

As to the rhetorical art itself, in this particular the moderns appear to me to have made hardly any advance or improvement upon the ancients. I can say, at least, of most of the performances in the way of institute, which I have had an opportunity of reading on this subject, either in French or English, every thing valuable is servilely copied from Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, in whose writings, especially Quintilian's Institutions, and Cicero's books de inventione, those called ad Herenium, and his dialogues De oratore, every public speaker ought to be conversant. To these it will not be amiss to add Longinus on the sublime, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and some others. And as, in every art, the examples of eminent performers will be found to the full as instructive to the student, as the precepts laid down by the teacher, antiquity does here at least furnish us with the best models in the orations of Cicero in Latin, and in those of Æschines and Demosthenes in Greek. Of modern authors considered in both views, as teachers of the art, and as performers, I would recommend what Rollin and Fenelon have written on the subject, the sermons, and also the lectures on

eloquence* lately published by the ingenious and truly eloquent Dr. Blair; to which give me leave to add the sermons of my amiable and much lamented friend Mr. Farquhar, which, though no other than fragments, having been left unfinished by the author, who appears to have had no view to publication, and though consequently less correct in point of language, are, on account of the justness of of the sentiments, and the affecting warmth with which they are written, highly admired by persons of taste and discernment.t

LECTURE II.

Of the Sentiment in Pulpit Discourses.

I AM now to consider the train of sentiment, the elocution, and the pronunciation, that are best adapted to the pulpit. Of these things I only mean at first to take a more general and cursory survey, and make such remarks on each, as will hold almost universally of all the instructions given from the pulpit, whatever the particular sub. ject be. As to those which may suit the different sorts of sermons and other discourses to be employed by the preacher, I shall have occasion afterwards to take notice of them, when I come to inquire into the rules of composition, worthy the attention of the Christian orator, and to mark out the different kinds, whereof this branch of eloquence is susceptible.

I begin at this time with what regards the sentiments. Let it be observed, that I here use the term sentiments in the greatest latitude for the sense or thoughts. I mean thereby what may be con sidered as the soul of the discourse, or all the instruction of whatever kind, that is intended to be conveyed by means of the expression into the minds of the hearers. Perhaps the import of the word

* Dr. Campbell's Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence, were composed and delivered before the publication of Dr. Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric. The recommendation as above was added to the original manuscript after perusing the lectures of his friend Dr. Blair.

Here the author introduced for his second lecture the tenth chapter of the first book of his Philosophy of Rhetoric, entitled "The different kinds of public speaking in use among the moderns, compared, with a view to their different advantages in respect of eloquence." In that chapter there are several things highly worthy of the attention of the preacher.

will be more exactly ascertained by saying, it is that in any original performance, which it behooves a translator to retain in his version into another language, whilst the expression is totally changed. Thus (to preserve the metaphor of soul and body already adopted) we may say, that a discourse in being translated undergoes a sort of transmigration. The same soul passes into a different body. For if the ideas, the sense, the information, conveyed to the hearers or readers be not the same in the version, as in the original performance, the translation is not faithful. Now all that regards the soul or sense may be distributed into these four different forms of communication, namely, narration, explanation, reasoning, and moral reflection. This last is sometimes, by way of eminence, called sentiment.

To the first of these, narration, there will be pretty frequent occasion of recourse, both for the illustration of any point of doctrine or portion of scripture wherewith the subject happens to be connected, and also for affecting the particular aim of the discourse. nothing is better adapted to this history properly related. But what are the rules, it will be asked, by the due observance of which propriety in this matter may be attained? One of those most commonly recommended is, to be brief. But this rule needs explanation, as there is nothing we ought more carefully to avoid than a cold uninteresting conciseness, which is sometimes the consequence of an excessive desire of brevity. Brevity in relating, as in every thing else, is only so far commendable, as it is rendered compatible with answering all the ends of the relation. Where these are not answered, through an affectation of being very nervous and laconic, comprehending much in little, the narration ought not to be styled brief, but defective. In strictness, the relation ought to contain enough, and neither more nor less. But what is enough? That can be determined only by a proper attention to the end for which the narration was introduced. A narrative may contain enough to render the story and its connection intelligible to the hearer, yet not enough to fix his attention and engage his heart, and may therefore be justly chargeable with a faulty conciseness. But if this extreme ought to be carefully guarded against, it well deserves your notice, that the contrary, and no less dangerous, extreme of prolixity, by entering into a detail too minute and circumstantial, ought with equal care to be avoided. If, in con

hearers in a way suitable to the And indeed it often happens, that end, than an apposite passage of

sequence of the first error, the hearer's mind remains unsatisfied, in consequence of the second, it is cloyed. Both faults can be avoided only by such a judicious selection of circumstances, as at once excludes nothing essential to the purposes of perspicuity and connection, or conducive to the principal scope of the narration, and includes nothing, that in the respects aforesaid can be deemed superfluous. Such is every circumstance that can be denominated remote, trivial, or necessarily implied in the other circumstances mentioned. But to assist the preacher in conducting such narratives, when pertinent, nothing will serve so well for a model, as the historical part of sacred writ. No where else will he find such simplicity, as brings what is said to the level of the meanest capacity, united with such dignity, as is sufficient to engage the attention of the highest. Passages of scripture history, when they happen to coincide with the speaker's view, are much preferable to those which may be taken from any other source; and that on a double account. First, it may be supposed, that not only all the serious part, but even the much greater part of the audience, being better acquainted with these, will both more readily perceive and more strongly feel the application which the preacher makes of them; and secondly, the authority of holy writ gives an additional weight to that which is the intent of the narrative. I do not say, however, that a preacher, in quoting instances, examples and authorities, ought to confine himself entirely to the sacred history. Our blessed Lord, though addressing himself only to Jews, did not hesitate to lay the foundation of some of his parables in those customs which had arisen solely from their intercourse with the Romans. Of this the parable you have, Luke xix. 12, &c. of the nobleman who travelled into a distant land, in order that he might obtain the royal power, and return king over his countrymen, is an evident instance. Such was become the general practice in all the provinces and states dependent upon Rome. The royalty was often not to be attained without applications to the Roman senate and these were often thwarted, as in the parable, by counter applications, either from the people, or from some rival for power. Nay, there is very probably in that parable an allusion to some things which had actually happened in regard to the succession of Archelaus, son of Herod, king of Judea, with which many of his hearers conld not fail to be acquainted, the thing having happened but recently and in their own time. Nor was the apostle Paul at all

scrupulous in illustrating the sublimest truths of the gospel, by the exercises and diversions which obtained at that time among the idolatrous Greeks. But even in those cases wherein scripture doth not furnish the facts, it supplies us with an excellent pattern of a natural, simple and interesting manner in which the relation ought to be conducted. I shall only add on this article that the different circumstances ought to be so fitly and so naturally connected, that those which precede may easily introduce those which follow, and those which follow may appear necessarily to arise out of those which precede. This, by adding to the credibility and verisimilitude, greatly increases the effect of the whole. I shall not at this time say any thing of those qualities which more regard the expression than the thought, as there will be scope for this afterwards.

The second thing comprised under the term thought, or sentiment, was explication, in which I include also description and definition. And on this, the rules laid down upon the former article will equally hold good. The same care and attention will be requisite, both in culling and disposing the particulars, that the whole may be neither tedious nor unsatisfactory. In regard to disposition and arrangement, there is rather more art necessary in this case than in the former. In the former, to wit, narrative, all the material circumstances are successive, and the order of introducing them must in a great measure be determined by the order of time. But in explication, they are simultaneous, and therefore require the exercise of judgment and reflection, in assigning to each its proper place and order in the discourse. Need it be added, that in all descriptive enumerations particular care ought to be taken, that nothing foreign be comprehended, and that nothing which properly belongs to the subject be omitted. The logical rules in regard to definition are sufficiently known, and therefore shall not here be repeated. On the whole, in regard to both the preceding articles, a certain justness of apprehension is of all things the most important in a speaker. If he has not a clear conception of the matter himself, it can never be expected he should convey it to others.

The third thing mentioned as belonging to the thought, was reasoning. When it is considered, what a mixed society a Christian assembly for the most part is, and how little the far greater number, even of what are called the politest congregations, is accustomed to the exercise of the discursive faculty, it will be evident that any thing in the way of argument would need to be extremely simple, consisting of but a very few steps, and extremely clear,