into a legal view of the question of divorce, or even into the controversies respecting the cases in which Scripture permits it. I will not attempt so much; but rather lay down a few general rules and distinctions, which may serve as landmarks, and prevent that confusion which creates difficulty where, in reality, there is none.

First, then, bear in mind the negative principle already established in this discourse. No HUMAN authority can divorce, unless in cases which GOD either expressly, or by fair inference from HIS WORD, has permitted a divorce to be pronounced. If God has not sanctioned the sentence, the sin of breaking His compact will remain the same, whatever man may decide. If, therefore, any human tribunal undertook to absolve a man from the guilt of breaking God's law, it would be exceeding its province, and the danger of God's wrath would remain undiminished.

But secondly, may a man determine, from an examination of God's law, whether his case is one in which he is at liberty to dissolve the contract?

This question will admit of a different answer, accordingly as it may relate to two different objects whether his determination is to be a mere matter of opinion for the satisfaction of his conscience; or to be the rule of his conduct in matters which may affect others.

In both these cases great deference is due to lawful authority. If doubtful questions arise, God

has commissioned the rulers of His Church to expound His word, especially in matters concerning the whole body, or the conduct of its members as towards another. The courts of law declare the will of the state, as the decisions of the Church declare the will of God: With regard then even to the satisfaction of his conscience, in matters of either civil, or ecclesiastical1 jurisdiction, as a man may not lightly despise the decisions of the lawful tribunals or ministers, so he ought to be well assured that their decisions are against God's word, before he concludes them to be mistaken rather than himself.

But with regard to his own conduct in matters affecting others, he will sin against God, as well as the community, if he shall proceed to act upon his private opinion, without the sentence of a lawful tribunal, unless that tribunal shall require compliances clearly and expressly contrary to the word of God. And, even in that case, though he may not sin against God, he must patiently suffer that which the state inflicts on those who disobey its laws.

1

I wish it to be observed that when I speak of ecclesiastical jurisdiction with respect to cases of conscience, I do not allude to the decisions of what is called the "Ecclesiastical Court" but to the formularies and Ministers of the Church. The Ecclesiastical Court is conducted by lay officers, and its decisions, though partly founded on Canon law, are also guided by a heathen code. It is not intended for the guidance of conscience any more than the civil courts, in common with which it claims that deference, I have stated.

For, when our actions may affect the community (as in the case of divorce) it is not sufficient to have come to a right conclusion in our own mind, but we must have authority from a competent tribunal to act upon that conclusion. Without such a principle what terrible evils would overwhelm any society, civil or religious. If every man were not only to satisfy his conscience, but to shape his conduct to others, by being judge in his own case, what a scene of confusion and injustice society would present! How few would be qualified to judge? How few would be found giving judgment against themselves; or doing justice to those, against whom their passions had prejudiced them? If every man were to determine in his own case the legitimate grounds of divorce, endless confusion and misery would be the result. It is clear, therefore, that a sentence of divorce, to whatever extent it releases parties from the contract, or from the guilt and penalties of dissolving it, must be pronounced by lawful authority.

The next consideration, then, is-to what extent such a sentence does release us.

To this I answer, that a sentence of divorce pronounced by any human authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil, is, so far as respects the original and divine obligations of Marriage, merely declaratory. In the case of the Church, it declares that according to the judgment of the Church to which we

belong, the parties are lawfully divorced. It also absolves us from the censures of that Church, and secures us from the sin of acting upon private judgment, against the lawful rulers of the Church.

In the case of the state, it declares the lawfulness of the divorce in the judgment of the state. It also absolves from the penalties imposed by the state on those who violate the duties, which she requires in those married, and also prevents us from incurring the guilt of acting upon private judgment in matters in which God has ordered obedience to "the powers that be."

But neither these declarations nor exemptions can annul or alter the Divine obligations, unless in cases in which these declarations and exemptions are conformable to the declarations and exemptions of God's word. The decree, that what God hath joined together man cannot put asunder, is unalterable. If human lawgivers and judges divorce, when God has not-then, though they may absolve in the points above stated, yet they cannot alter the sin of breaking God's contract. For that we must take our trial before another tribunal, at which judges and legislators, as well as those affected by their decisions, will all have to answer for "the things done in the body, whether they be good or bad."

God has in the New Testament declared only one legitimate ground of divorce, and in very strong

terms stated, that parties divorced for any other cause, and marrying again, are guilty of the sin of adultery1.

But are we to infer from this that, in all other cases wherein our courts pronounce a sentence of divorce, the parties marrying again would be guilty of adultery? No: because in some cases a sentence of divorce is not a dissolution of the marriage contract, but merely the judgment of a lawful tribunal, that the contract was never lawfully entered into. Parties so coming together are, (to use the words of the Church in the Marriage service) "not joined together by God, neither is their matrimony lawful." The man does not "put away his wife," but the Court decides, that she never was his wife. It will not be consistent with our purpose to enumerate such cases, nor can I here enter upon a consideration of the extension of the privilege of the state, to permit cases of separation, which may be inferred from Moses having, as a legislator, been allowed to establish laws, justified by the necessity of the case rather than the religious duties of the parties, for the "hardness of their hearts." In all these cases there must be sin in the sight of God-at least in one of the parties; and such separations, though requisite for the peace of society, and perhaps equitably allowable for the comfort of the innocent party, will not justify either in a second marriage

VOL. II.

1 Matt. v.

31, 32. Matt. xix. 9,

P