perfect our science by additions to that which is already known or believed to be so. Doubtless the doctrines of phrenologists are mainly correct, while regarded as a whole; yet we do fear that some minor points, if not some of the later systematic generalisations, have been assumed rather more hastily than a strictly philosophical induction would warrant. We speak here of proofs. It is one thing to satisfy our own minds, but another and often a more difficult labour, to adduce sufficient proofs to make doubt in others become unphilosophical. In the conflicting opinions respecting the real functions of some of the organs, there is ample evidence that individual observers do not find the received notions of others to be wholly authorised by the facts of nature. Whether the facts have been ill observed, or conclusions from them have been drawn prematurely, we need not here stop to enquire; it is a sufficient support to the accuracy of our remark, that such discrepancies do largely exist, whatever may be taken as the explanation of them. Facts, we repeat, numerous facts, accurately observed and precisely recorded, are yet wanting for the more satisfactory elucidation of many points in Phrenology; and we shall endeavour to specify under another article (probably in our next Number) the kind of observations which are among our desiderata on this head.

In addition to the record of mere facts, we would have a watchful eye kept to the conclusions drawn from them by individuals. Sweeping generalisations in science are always to be received with caution, as being usually the offspring of slender knowledge or superficial powers of reasoning. Such are the natural manifestations of minds, whose range is too contracted to take in the counter-possibilities and the varied explanations of the self-same facts, such as may be given by different observers. To spring at once to conclusions, seems to be commonly a far more agreeable effort, than is the slower process of testing the soundness of our opinions, by a careful examination of the grounds on which they rest at each progressive step. Our best phrenologists, they whose opinions carry most weight in the estimation of others, have constantly endeavoured to make each step sure and solid; and keeping in view the difficulties of the subject, it may confidently be asserted, that they have steered clear of false conclusions with singular felicity. At the same time, it must be allowed, that some others have brought a temporary discredit upon the science, by venturing rash conclusions and dogmas, nominally on phrenological data, which they have been unable to support when pressed by the adverse arguments of opponents. We have occasionally witnessed with pain the dilemmas into which half-informed phrenologists have in this way caused themselves to be drawn. Per

haps we may not be wide of truth, in attributing much of the distaste towards Phrenology, without absolute denial, which is avowedly felt by several scientific men of high attainments, to the injudicious manner in which crudely-formed conclusions. have sometimes been set in array against received opinions, and with which more mature deliberation may show them to be less discordant than has at first appeared. Besides this, most persons receive their earliest ideas about Phrenology, orally, in course of ordinary conversation. Injudicious enthusiasts and the mere pretenders to knowledge abound; and they unwittingly circulate much that is fallacious or wholly false. Such errors are received by others in the light of expositions of Phrenology ; and as a natural consequence, persons imbibe a distaste to the subject, who would have been attracted towards it, had their first notions of the matter been accurate. It is difficult to apply an effectual remedy in correction of this evil; but a rigid and cautious examination of all that comes into print will be a partial palliative; and the diffusion of sound knowledge will gradually tend to prevent the mischief, by increasing the number of competent persons, who will teach the public that a man is not necessarily acquainted with the subject just because he chooses to call himself a phrenologist. We shall be obliged to any friends who may draw our attention to such misrepresentations as get into public circulation.

But the observation and record of isolated facts, the systematic combination of those facts into general rules or principles, and conclusions deduced from them by a process of reasoning,supposing all this to have been done quite accurately, together make up only an unapplied or theoretic science; which can be of no real value to mankind, otherwise than as it affords an agreeable study for a few individuals, until its principles are brought to bear upon the practical affairs of life. It is this application of science which changes mere knowledge into “useful knowledge;" it is only when thus applied that knowledge can be truly designated as power; and it is in its adaptation for these practical applications, that the science of Phrenology shines out as vastly superior to the abstract philosophy of mind, so long and sedulously cultivated by the Scottish school of metaphysicians. Whatever the talents of the individuals of this school may have been, their labours have invariably proved of such extremely little service to mankind at large, that the name and subject of Metaphysics have become the staple of numerous current jests against the natives of Scotland, and amongst them likewise. We regard, then, one of the most important sections of our prospective labours, to be that of applying the facts and principles brought to light by phrenolo

gical investigations, to the elucidation and improvement of all matters in any way connected with the training and direction of the human mind, as well as to the more exact appreciation of many others in which the influence of mind constitutes an element for consideration. Education, legislation, and morals in general, come under the former head; while our social customs, civil institutions, political economy, national statistics, and general literature, are more or less touched on under the latter. It is on account of such applications of phrenology, that we have adopted the subsidiary title of "Magazine of Moral Science;" being well assured, that on Phrenology only can moral science be steadily based. In support of this asseveration we might cite many of the papers published in former volumes of this Journal, and proceeding from the pens of writers every way entitled to take a foremost rank amongst the expounders of practical ethics.

In one or other of the departments mentioned,-facts, conclusions, and applications, - Phrenology, as the Science of Mind, bears directly and intimately on most of the ordinary pursuits of life; and it thus becomes the interest and the duty of all to know something of our science, to have some knowledge of mind, of the corporeal conditions on which its due manifestations depend, and of the manner or degree in which one mind is able to exert an influence upon others. To no one can knowledge of this kind be wholly useless; to very many must it be in the highest degree beneficial. The happiness of individuals and the prosperity of nations rest alike on the natural powers and direction of the individual and national mind. To know what those powers are, is fundamental; to know the extent to which they can be changed and guided, and the limits which nature prescribes to our successful efforts, is of vital consequence; and to apply this knowledge, for the removal of evil and increase of happiness, is all-important.

It is to be feared that many and deep-rooted prejudices will long have to be contended against, by those who would apply phrenological analysis as a test of the soundness of our opinions, habits, and institutions. There is a constant proneness in the human mind, and more especially in the minds of the ignorant and half-educated, to decide on the truth or value of new views solely by reference to the ideas previously imbibed or formed. These latter being assumed true, sound, and safe, the more novel views are forthwith rejected (so far as they differ) as untrue, unsound, or unsafe. Comparatively few persons are sufficiently imbued with the spirit of philosophical impartiality, to submit their notions to a re-examination, when any newer and different views are suggested to them; and thus it happens, in

every community, that much of its intellectual and moral power is spent in resisting the advance of improvement. All persons hold some kind of ready-made opinions, on questions of moral and political philosophy. They may be totally unable to give any reason for the faith which is in them; they may not be able to explain, or even may not themselves clearly know, what their real opinions are: from extreme ignorance or defective capacity, they may be utterly incompetent to form a correct judgment; nevertheless, they will have some vague notions or feelings of their own, by which every proposition novel to themselves is at first to be tried, and is then to be received, doubted, or rejected, according as it may chance to chime in more or less harmoniously with opinions which they have earlier adopted. It is only in the minds of the young, which are still comparatively unoccupied, that we usually see any fair estimate of rival doctrines. The history of Phrenology itself affords an example of this. Few elderly persons have quietly allowed its progress, when the subject has been brought before them; fewer still have in any way assisted to advance it; almost none of such have made themselves duly acquainted with its real merits. It is the young who have adopted the science; who have studied it; and who have exerted themselves to diffuse a knowledge of it. There are now excellent phrenologists advanced in years; but they are phrenologists of long standing, indeed, excellence implies this, who early imbibed the principles of their science. The difficulty of inducing persons to adopt ideas which may conflict with others before taken up, has become proverbial in the oftrepeated couplet, slightly altered here,—

"A man convinced against his will

Remains but half-converted still."

Our comments upon this familiar topic may appear to be longer than needful. We dwell upon it, because the judgment of every person is influenced thus; and we are desirous of drawing especial attention to the circumstance, as one of the greatest difficulties with which all have to contend, who would either expound new views in moral science, or modify and correct older ones which they deem erroneous. Perhaps every reader will admit this tendency of his fellows to reject all propositions which are at variance with their pre-conceived notions; and, perhaps, at the same time- even for that sole reason every reader will at first be inclined to dispute something that he may find in our pages. We can only beg of those who would do so, to take the course which we shall now recommend to them. Let us suppose one of our readers to have met with some statement or suggestion which appears not exactly conformable to his own opi

nions. Either he or we must be in fault; but is it just in him to decide that we, and not he, must be so? We should rather say, let him first determine exactly (the better, if in form of written propositions) what are his own ideas on the subjectmatter, and what grounds he has for keeping to them. This done, he may examine whether there really exists any variance between his own and our conceptions. Supposing a discord actually existing, he may then consider whether he is able to prove his own views, and to show that ours are false or fallacious, either by a direct appeal to the realities of nature, or by fair inferences from undoubted facts. Some such process as this, carried on by the minds of persons who dispute each other's opinions, would no doubt often remove the obstacles to concord. Men will inevitably feel differently; but thoughts ought to be uniform, if such have been reached by a process of correct reasoning. For our own share, we can say to any of our readers inclined to disagree with us on ethical questions, that we shall be glad to offer them the opportunity of appealing through our pages to the same parties to whom our own remarks are addressed. We stipulate only that their grounds of dissent shall be based on something real and demonstrable to others, and not merely upon the egotistic arguments of "I think," or "I feel," which are often so freely used in moral discussions. Such are undoubtedly always very convincing reasons to the parties who do use them in the light of arguments; but there is no legitimate claim to force them upon others, either as argument or as demonstrative evidence.

We do not here enter into detailed explanations as to what may be the proper objects and full scope of phrenological enquiries. That we esteem them most comprehensive will be evident from the tenor of our present allusions, and from the varied subjects treated of in former volumes. Our purpose just now is rather to indicate the direction which it is wished that our own labours should receive. The subjects to which they will relate will be in some measure apparent from the remarks already made; and the order of arrangement, in which it seems most convenient to introduce them, will be as follows: - Miscellaneous Papers Cases and Facts Notices of BooksShort Communications Notes on Opinions - Intelligence. Although such may be taken as a general plan of arrangement, it may happen that examples of each of these sections will not be found in every successive Number of our Journal. They will appear rather from time to time, in accordance with the accumulation of our materials; and, though wishing to give a sea. sonable diversity to our matter, we shall be averse to the sacrifice of value or importance for the sake of variety alone.