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We need not illustrate a principle that is so nearly axiomatic. Included within it are all the agencies that relate to the various ramifications of government. Any work that has for its object the preservation of the peace, security, convenience, health, or comfort of the people -any improvement that conduces to the public welfare in any sufficient manner-is within the power of the municipal authority, and to be classed, in its discretion, as an object of government.

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In Booth v. The Town of Woodbury, (32 Conn., 128,) we find the following: "If there be the least possibility that making the gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy and the determination of the legislative power is conclusive. . . . such gifts to unfortunate classes of society as the indigent blind, the deaf and dumb or insane, or grants to particular colleges and schools, or grants of pensions, swords, or other mementos for past services, involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are frequently made and never questioned."

It would serve no good purpose to attempt to give a recapitulation of all the works the character of which has been passed upon by the courts, inasmuch as the grounds of decision are uniformly the same. The rule we have laid down is a sufficient guide by which to determine the character of any purpose. Unless the expressed will of the Legislature be "clearly, palpably, and plainly "a violation of the organic law, unless it be so obviously at variance with the Constitution that the discrepancy appears "at first blush," the courts will refuse to set it aside.

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The people, the source of all our powers of government, demanding the advantages that spring from modern civilization, constantly insisting upon every work that will add to their progress or convenience, will per

mit no retrogression. They will force the courts forward rather than allow them to remain stationary. And the rules and principles of to-day, which appear to the overcautious thinker to be liable to modifications by which their validity may be affected, will, within a few years, have become" ancient precedents," upon which will be founded the authority for new reforms.1

1 In the foregoing we have preferred to confine our discourse chiefly to a mere recital of principles, with such leading citations as pertinently illustrate them. The fullest discussion will be found in the opinions given under the different States, to which attention is directed, and especially to the following cases: Talcott v. Pine Grove, Michigan; Stockton, &c. R. R. v. Stockton, California; Stewart v. Supervisors, &c., Iowa; Chicago, &c. R. W. v. Smith, Illinois. These, the latest adjudications, contain the most careful and intelligent reviews of the subject of this chapter, and, written as the opinions were, after the most exhaustive argument and examination, are peculiarly valuable and instructive, and entitled to be considered conclusive.

CHAPTER IV.

ALABAMA.

THE Constitutional provisions of the State of Alabama are those which obtain in a large majority of the other members of the Union. Her organic law is embraced in the Constitution of 1868, which, having been framed subsequent to the Rebellion, may, as far at least as the question of internal improvements is concerned, be taken to have been the real organic law, so to speak, at the time of its adoption. It is a fact, which may be one that the conservative mind will deplore, that the Constitutions of the States are not, in the strict philosophical sense of the term, organic laws. They are organic for many practical purposes. They serve as limitations upon the coordinate branches of government, materially assisting in preserving the necessary political equilibrium that has always been considered essential to the liberties and safety of the people. They serve as definite guides, for the action of the different powers, and set the metes and bounds in matters of public moment. They are useful and necessary, but do not possess the quality of absolute permanence which is the great cardinal feature of a true Constitution.

It, therefore, follows that the constitutional provisions of a State are not to be regarded as more than the most solemn expressions of the will of the people. They are clothed with a consequence and dignity that pertain but remotely to an Act of the Legislature; and yet the same necessities that transform the statutory enactments, go far

towards compelling changes in the provisions by which the latter are restricted. Thus we find that in some of the States, within a period of half a century, the organic law has been remodelled again and again, the last Constitution being almost wholly different from the first. And in perhaps every instance the reasons for the changes have appeared to be such as entitled them to the greatest weight.

By reference to the proceedings of the Constitutional Conventions of the different States held within the last decade, it will appear that clauses of commanding importance have been adopted substantially with a view to their repeal by a subsequent convention. Abuses, which it seemed impossible to correct, or curtail, by the usual legislative proceedings, have been made the subject of constitutional limitations as matters of confessed expediency, to be tested as political experiments, and cancelled in due season if found to be productive of evil. No more satisfactory and complete definition of a Constitution of almost any one of the States of the American Union can be found, than that it is a statute passed by the people, without the intervention of the Legislature. It is a law that the people as the people adopt, and which they may modify or repeal at any time.

It is very necessary, in a practical light, that the above facts be borne in mind in considering the positions that are occupied by the several States in respect to their constitutional restrictions touching the issue of Municipal Bonds. However certain the organic law of to-day, a few years may be sufficient to effect a radical change, such as will appear to be a perfected revolution, which may, in turn, prove but a naked and temporary departure that speedily gives way to still another transformation. But looking upon these instruments as laws passed by the people proper, their nature and effect appear to be readily

apprehended, and no false view is likely to be long adhered to.

Section 36 of Article IV. of the Constitution of Alabama is the leading feature that affects the issue of bonds by municipal corporations, and is as follows:

"The General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any municipal corporation to pass any laws contrary to the general laws of the State, nor to levy a tax on real and personal property to a greater extent than two per centum of the assessed value of such property."

The terms of this section are so plain that their violation is scarcely possible, as far as the last provision is concerned; and the first is clear enough to prevent any probability of misconception. The section as a whole is as specific as it could be made by statute. It is essentially close and pointed, and not entirely in harmony with the popular notion of written Constitutions. It is none the less, however, illustrative of the principles above alluded to; and is especially apposite, as showing the natural means by which the abuses of municipal powers may be controlled.

As has been remarked in another part of our treatise, a small minority of the jurists of the present century have from time to time stoutly resisted the current of authority, in respect to municipal powers, that has been constantly increasing in volume as time has passed. The judges of some of the Western States particularly, imbued apparently with that abhorrence of imposition, and respect for personal rights that prevail almost as natural laws within their grand jurisdictions, have been carried so far by considerations of public welfare, that they seem to have lost sight of the conservative side of their offices, and to have "immolated truth, justice, and the law" rather than wrong the people. They seem to have wholly ignored the fact that the people, if injured, have

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