串

which they are placed. They further allege that self-instruction is the best, and as the law will scarcely allow time for a complete course in England, partial education does not compensate for the disadvantage to parents and guardians from delaying the period of admission to actual service. In answer to these arguments I would observe, that the acquisition of English habits and attachments is, in my view of the subject, a positive advantage, nor do I consider that at nineteen or twenty there is any danger of inconsolable regret for change of country or society; nor does any material diminution of quickness in perception or docility take place between sixteen and twenty, so as to give the former age a decided superiority; while, lastly, although self-instruction will do much for minds so happily constituted as to persevere in the arduous attempt, it can never be relied upon as a source of general qualification. On the whole, therefore, the passing two or three years at one of the national universities, appears to me the most eligible preparation. This preparation should, however, take place antecedent to appointment, so as not to combine an academical and official station. Expulsion from the University might be made a positive disqualification for entering the Company's service.'-p. 22.

As connected with the subject of qualification in the civil servants, the author just quoted points out the deficiency of legal knowledge among those servants by whom the law is administered; and he suggests that the first five years in India should be employed in acquiring a competent knowledge of the several codes, including the Company's regulations, the Hindoo and Mahomedan laws. This period he does not consider more than sufficient, and he further recommends that competency of knowledge should be ascertained by positive examination. If the want of professional knowledge in the judges of the distant and provincial courts be such as this author describes, (page 32,) the course of study proposed is indispensable; and we quite concur in the opinion, (page 34,) that 'with such an amount of legal knowledge, and a thorough acquaintance with the languages of the country in the European judges, much more might be left to final decision than at present, and the multiplicity of judicial records and translations for the purpose of instituting appeals avoided.'

In passing to the subject on which, of all others, his opinion must be important, Sir John Malcolm (vol. ii. p. 201) remarks, that, 'however much the success of our internal government may depend upon the civil administration of our eastern empire, our efforts to improve that must be given in vain, unless we maintain a commanding military power; and this consideration gives the utmost importance to every question connected with our military establishment in that country, as being the only means by which we

By law no person can be appointed to the civil service after twenty-two years of age.

can

can preserve India, and as being likely, if mismanaged, to prove our ruin.' The native troops (he goes on to state) consist of 238,000 rank and file, and the whole army amounts to nearly 250,000 men. The organization of this gigantic force is unquestionably a matter of paramount importance; and it is satisfactory to know that, with a few exceptions, the conduct of the Company's army, whether in war or peace, has been such as to justify complete confidence in its discipline and efficiency. The apparent anomaly of placing the control of so large a military establishment in the hands of the directors of a mercantile corporation, has naturally led to a frequent discussion of the expediency of incorporating the army of India with the general military service of the nation. The question was particularly agitated in 1811, and the argument urged against the transfer by the Court of Directors is repeated, in the work before us, as conclusive. The directors avowed their belief, that the respect evinced both by native subjects and neighbouring nations towards the Company's government arose from the possession of a great military force; that this cause of respect, everywhere powerful, was particularly so in Asia, where civil authority, unsupported by the presence of military aid, could never be maintained. They further contended, that any general control left to the local governments would not be sufficient; and that to give to the army a different and a superior master would inevitably lead to the degradation of the civil service, and consequently affect in an unfortunate manner the whole internal administration. The arguments, on the other hand, in favour of a transfer of the Indian army to the direct authority of the English crown, have been rather derived from circumstances connected with the European officers, than the native soldiers. The former have, on more than one occasion, entered into combination against measures of the local governments, affecting their pecuniary interests, upon principles happily unknown to the officers of the king's army. In the case of the Madras army this spirit of combination proceeded to the extent of armed resistance to all authority. Such occurrences, if not outweighed by years of distinguished service and exemplary discipline, would prove the inadequacy of the controlling authority; but, as the case stands, may fairly be viewed as accidents not affecting the general force of the reasoning by which, under a presumed continuance of the political privileges of the East India Company, the expediency of not separating the military from the civil administration of our Indian empire is defended.

The improvements suggested by Sir John Malcolm in the regulation of the Indian army may be divided into three heads ;as they affect, firstly, the European officers alone; secondly, the

European

European officers and native soldiers jointly; and thirdly, the native soldiery. In regard to the first, a power of exchange, under certain regulations, between the King's and Company's services, together with the employment on general service of officers of high rank in the Company's army, are recommended. The regulations, under which the proposed exchange could be permitted, necessarily involve such a knowledge of the languages and manners of the native soldiers, as should qualify the King's officers for the alteration of service. But this qualification would be more likely to occur among the subalterns and captains, than among the field-officers of His Majesty's service, and it is, therefore, doubtful whether any effect would be produced beyond diminishing the apparent distinction of authority under which the officers respectively serve. Practically, we believe, that exchanges would be so seldom desired by the parties, that the regulation as a general measure would be wholly nugatory. It might be a matter of accidental or private convenience, but would fall far short of those extended effects, in elevating the character and conciliating the feelings of the Company's officers, that are anticipated by Sir John Malcolm. The second suggestion, that of employing the Company's officers of high rank in general service, even if so far adopted as to recognise their eligibility, would not, in our opinion, be of much greater practical importance. The general officers in the King's army are already so numerous, that the great majority of them seem of necessity condemned to inactivity; and unquestionably when a question of selection happened to arise, the career of a King's officer is, in all ordinary cases, more likely to qualify for general service than that of the man whose experience has been confined to India, which, from the military inferiority of the enemy, cannot be considered a scene as pregnant with knowledge, as that which has displayed all the varieties of conflict against the equal skill and discipline of European armies. There are also certain peculiarities belonging to service in India that have a positive tendency to disqualify for subsequent employment elsewhere; and it may be fully asserted that a continual discharge of military duty for thirty years or more in India, leaves the physical strength and habits of very few in a condition to encounter the fatigues and vicissitudes of a novel service upon a novel field. It is further to be observed, that these alterations are all proposed by Sir John Malcolm upon the assumption that the officers of the East India Company's service do de facto consider themselves as neglected and degraded, and that a spirit of discontent and depression, eventually injurious to the discipline and character of the army, is the consequence. Of these things, however, we certainly have no proof in the works before us; and we feel convinced that while any extensive system of exchange

with the King's service must in practice affect grievously the emoluments of the officers of the Indian army, the chances of distinction or promotion in their own country could not be augmented, so as to make such sacrifices generally acceptable.

The proposed change of organization, affecting the officers and native soldiers jointly, consists in the consolidation of the armies of the three presidencies, and the consequent identification of pay, allowances, and internal regulations. We regret that our limits will not allow us to quote at length the arguments by which this proposition is supported; we must rest satisfied with stating the substance. Sir John Malcolm shows, first, that in the present uninterrupted extent of the Company's territory, it is often indifferent, as a question of convenience, from which presidency the military occupation of the great majority of the stations is effected; secondly, that such a general similarity of character, language, and habits, now prevails among the native soldiery, as to render the proposed consolidation unobjectionable; thirdly, that occasions (as heretofore) may arise in which the public tranquillity shall be best secured by the employment of troops unconnected by local attachments or family ties with the provinces where their services may be required; and that, in the case of a consolidated army, such precautions might be adopted without any exhibition of distrust, than which nothing can be more injurious to the stability of our authority; fourthly, that the constantly recurring employment of the armies of the three presidencies on the same service must render uniformity of pay and regulations indispensable, even if it were not, in every point of view, expedient. In regard to the European officer, Sir John Malcolm says, It is desirable on every ground that he should never be local. The more he is exposed to the vicissitudes of the service, and to be employed in different parts of the empire, the more his experience and knowledge will be enlarged, and those qualities, with whatever of inconvenience and hardship their attainment is attended, must ultimately prove as beneficial to the individual as to the government.'-vol. ii. p. 216.

In the discussion of his third topic, Sir John has the following passage:

In an army of nearly 240,000 natives, the highest pay which a Soobahdar✶ of infantry can attain is 174 rupees a month, and after attaining that rank, he enjoys no consideration which can save him from the harshness of an European officer, a boy, perhaps, who has just joined that corps to which he, the native officer, has perhaps belonged thirty or forty years. He has in barrack and in camp no other accommodation than that provided for the Sepoys; and although

* A captain in name, really something more than a serjeant,

on

on his retiring to the invalid list his pay is continued, that is become from habit necessary to his support, so that he can make no provision for his children; and as pride in his own condition, or alarm at their being subject to corporeal punishment, prevents, in most cases, his bringing them into the army, they are generally a burden on him while he lives, and when he dies, they are left poor and discontented.' -Political History, vol. ii. P. 233.

In a note to this paragraph we find it stated that a Soobahdar major has been recently appointed to each corps, and that in so far the prospects of the native officers have been improved. The description, however, remains in the general true, and the case presents difficulties that, although susceptible of diminution, do not admit of removal. The measures recommended by our author are perhaps as efficacious as the nature of the case will admit; but they fall very far short of holding out excitements to fidelity and zeal amongst the classes whose individual and political interests have been depressed by the extension of the British power, and they can scarcely be hoped to prove effective, even with the more gallant spirits that will still seek employment in our native army; in fact, the employment of native commissioned officers, in the present organization of our regular army, appears to us extremely questionable, and the continuance of the arrangement seems rather justified by the hazard of disturbing that which has been established, than by any argument of intrinsic utility. Sir John Malcolm proposes that civil distinctions and privileges should be granted to native officers, on retirement from the service; that these advantages should descend to their children; that the latter, in the event of their entering the army, should be exempted from corporal punishments: and he takes the opportunity of again recalling to notice the suggestion, that native officers and soldiers should be employed in the police establishments. He does not enter into any explanation of these 'civil distinctions and privileges,' but we may presume, from his use of the expression trivial,' that they could not be such as to place natives in a class of society much higher than that from which they had originally entered the army. The want of details on this part of the subject is to be regretted, as the experience of our author in the affairs of Indian administration, civil and military, would have rendered his suggestions especially valuable.

While Sir John Malcolm attributes the exclusion of native officers from the exercise of high military command to the nature of our power and to policy,' the civil servant expresses his belief that in all the physical qualities, and in the moral energy required for the higher degree of military character, the natives of India are decidedly inferior to Europeans generally, and especially to our countrymen; that they have courage enough to follow, but not to

lead.