to give, under one coup-d'œil, all the charms of a richly-varied landscape, with the more sterling beauties of a populous and fertile country.' -p. 282.

The army, continuing to advance, was met at Yandaboo, only forty-five miles from Ava, by Mr. Price, and two ministers of state, accompanied by the prisoners that had been demanded, and the stipulated sum of twenty-five lacs of rupees. The envoys now stated without reserve that the government had at last given in, and were ready, under the sign manual, to agree to such conditions as the conquerors might think fit to insist upon. On the 24th February the treaty was, for the second time, settled-and finally signed; the Burmese government at the same time engaging to furnish boats for the conveyance of a great part of the force to Rangoon.

Thus ended this most harassing and every way extraordinary war, in which a great, populous, and powerful empire was completely subdued by a little handful of men, who had never appeared above five thousand strong in the field, and who were now, after marching six hundred miles through the country, and advancing within forty miles of the capital, considerably under two thousand, That it was not in the nature of a British soldier, after so many conquests, to turn his back upon the Golden City' without some feelings of regret, will readily be imagined. That Ava would have fallen,' says Major Snodgrass, and we perfectly agree with him, no man will doubt, and perhaps a handsome booty might have enriched the captors; but this could only have been attempted at a great political risk, and the probable sacrifice of every object for which the government of India had been so long contending; for we should undoubtedly have found neither king nor ministers to treat with; and with all the honour and glory of subduing the capital, we should most probably have occupied merely the deserted space within its walls.'

We have now traced all the main features of this proud specimen of the extraordinary superiority of British valour and discipline over a brave but undisciplined army, amounting to more than ten times its numerical force; and we have done So, whereever we could, nearly in the author's own words. The narrative is drawn up in a clear and easy style, interspersed with notices descriptive of the country and people. Some trifling inaccuracies, and here and there an inconsistency, occur, which we have not deemed of sufficient importance to interrupt our abstract. We may notice, however, that Major Snodgrass seems to state the numbers of the enemy, if not at random, at least on no authority; that he is not always correct in his mention of distances; that his chart, if it deserves the name, does not correspond with the text;

and,

and that, on one occasion, he reports events to have taken place on a day that does not exist―a dies non-the 31st June! (p. 45.) But these are trifles when compared with the serious charge we have to prefer against Major Snodgrass: this gentleman has deemed it expedient, among his numerous omissions, to pass over the services of the naval part of the expedition almost in total silence; and where he does condescend to slip in a short sentence in its favour, incidentally as it were, this serves only to damn with faint praise.' Yet it is perfectly well known, that, had it not been for the exertions of the small naval force employed in this servicè, Sir A. Campbell could never have advanced five miles beyond Rangoon, if, indeed, he had succeeded in taking Rangoon at all; for, in point of fact, the Liffey, and the Liffey alone, placed this city in possession of the troops; the soldiers having stepped on shore without firing a musket-in truth, there was nothing left to fire at, except pigs and dogs, and a few straggling, terrified Chinese; the authorities of the town, with the men, women, and children, had all decamped when the shot went through the custom-house.

We have said that the valuable services of the navy in the Burmese war are well known ;-we might have added that they have been acknowledged. This appears from the repeated thanks of the governor-general in council, and of Sir Archibald Campbell, who gives it unqualified praise. That excellent veteranofficer, Sir Thomas Munro, has pronounced the little naval force to have been the life and spirit of the expedition, without which they could have done nothing. How can it have happened that Major Snodgrass has been betrayed into this glaring injustice of suppressing services avowed by his superiors to have been of vital importance to the successful issue of the war? 'The jealousy,' says a naval officer, who bore a great share of the campaign, that constantly existed respecting the naval command, will account for the very little notice that is taken of the navy in the recent publication of Major Snodgrass.' Sir Archibald Campbell (who happens to be father-in-law to the Major) has, of course, been made to share the blame; but, we think, most unjustly, for no man appears to have lamented more than he did the baneful effect of the jealousy in question, the seeds of which had been sown in Calcutta. The governor-general and his council had no objection to his Majesty's ships Liffey and Larne convoying the expedition to Rangoon, but at the same time they thought fit to place the whole of the Company's ships, the transports, the cruisers of their marine, and the gun-boats, under the orders-of whom?-one of their own naval officers ?-No such thing; but, under the orders of the quarter-master and adjutant-general!

The

The mischief likely to arise from such an absurdity was honestly represented at the moment by a captain of the navy to Sir Archibald Campbell himself;-but the general, inexperienced as he then was, coolly replied, That he could very well have dispensed with the services of the navy, and that he had no doubt they could get on as well without as with it.'

Now, let us see, in the first place, what sort of a thing is the composition of a naval expedition from India, that we may the better be able to judge how far the abilities of the quartermaster-general were likely to manage the unwieldy and heterogeneous machine. The regular India ships taken up for the conveyance of troops are manned chiefly with Lascars; and their masters-captains, as they style themselves-are high and im portant personages; the company's cruisers are manned with English, Hindoos, and Mussulmen; the hired transports with what they can get; the gun-boats with Coolies; and the Malay vessels with Malays. The army, which these vessels were destined to carry, was composed of Europeans, some king's, and others company's troops; the latter partly of Mussulmans-partly of high caste Hindoo sepoys, and partly of Hindoos of lower castes, with whom the higher will no more associate than with Europeans, each separate class eating alone, and each having their separate provisions and water; and lastly, we must take into account the usual followers of an Indian army, equal in number to the army itself, crowding the ships, and always in the way. The expedition of which we are speaking was composed of all these discordant materials, and in a very peculiar manner required the order and discipline which were to be expected from nothing but the controul of a naval officer. The governor-general and council thought otherwise, and placed the whole under the command of the quarter-mastergeneral, who was probably sea-sick during the whole passage. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that all were commanding, and none obeying. The gentlemen of the company's cruisers, who have long been aspiring to take rank with the officers of the navy, and to wear the naval uniform, were not sorry not to obey the officers of the navy; the masters or captains of the Indiamen did not deign to obey the gentlemen of the company's cruisers. On the fall of Rangoon, provisions, stores, and ammunition were indiscriminately lying on the beach, without any responsible person to take charge of them; boats laden with powder remained for days at the wharf, all sorts of people running over them to step into other boats, frequently with lighted segars in their mouths; complaints and murmurs without end were heard on every side, and remained without redress; the

VOL. XXXV. NO. LXX.

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masters

masters of transports refused to let their boats be sent on service, as being contrary to their charter-party; the agent for these transports was continually quarrelling with the quarter-mastergeneral, and, to general scandal, expressions were made use of, which no gentleman ought to make and none ought to receive; the Europeans commanding the gun-boats tendered their resignation; engineer officers were ordered to inspect these gunboats and their carronades by the quarter-master-general, though both the boats and their guns could only be efficiently worked by the seamen of the men of war. Capt. Marryat, of his Majesty's ship Larne, threw up in disgust all command and responsibility, except over the officers and men of his ship, but, at the same time, declared himself ready to go on any service that might be required of him. It was not long before Sir A. Campbell, feeling to his cost the consequences of placing a naval flotilla under the orders of a soldier officer,' attempting to direct naval operations, and employing an engineer to fit out gun-boats, solicited Capt. Marryat to resume what he had abandoned. Indeed, it was very soon discovered, that, without a rigid state of discipline in the marine part of the expedition, nothing but disgrace and disaster was likely to occur. The people who manned the gunboats refused to work the guns, alleging that they were told, when hired at Calcutta, that they were only to pull and not to fight.' Whenever, therefore, it became necessary to cannonade a stockade, to make a practicable breach, the men-of-war's men were obliged to leave their own boats to man the guns; when the troops were to be landed, the men-of-war's boats were obliged to precede the gun-boats; receiving thus the first volley in every attack, and suffering out of all proportion. For exampleon the 16th May, when the first hand to hand conflict took place, in storming a stockade and outwork about two miles from Rangoon, the command of the boats was fortunately given to Lieut. Wilkinson, of his Majesty's ship Liffey, who led in with the menof-war's boats to the very foot of the stockade, which was immediately carried; but the Burmese fought desperately, leaving upwards of a hundred men killed in the stockade. Our loss was twenty-two killed and wounded, among the former was Lieut. Kerr of the 38th regiment, and in the latter Lieut. Wilkinson himself. Not a syllable of this conflict is mentioned by Major Snodgrass. One circumstance occurred which could hardly have escaped his recollection. When the sailors, with that characteristic carelessness and prodigality of life for which they are distinguished, jumped out of the boats and scrambled up the stockade, the Burmese soldiers, not knowing what to make of men without arms,

in rusty blue jackets and tarry trousers, stood looking and laughing at them; meanwhile the blues, making a rush upon them, drove them fairly off the parapet.

As military secretary to the commander-in-chief, the major, we imagine, can scarcely be allowed the plea of ignorance for his numerous omissions; and the existence of a publication called the 'London Gazette,' bars that of a want of recollection; yet, in the grand display of the feats of the army, during the first seven or eight days of December, which we doubt not was well merited, the co-operation of the navy is nearly passed over in silence; whereas, the fact is, that the boats of the navy were constantly on the alert night and day; were the first to lead in to the attack on the strong stockades on the Dalla creek; were the only opponents of the powerful war-boats, numbers of which were captured; and, lastly,-were the only people who could grapple with the immense and destructive fire-rafts, which, but for them, must inevitably have burned the whole fleet of helpless transports lying before Rangoon. Day and night, for weeks together, were the boats of the navy employed in watching, seizing, and towing away those formidable fire-rafts.

In the fatigue undergone there was no comparison between the two services; fresh troops were sent to each several attack, but owing to the smallness of the naval force, the same officers and men had to attend every expedition, and to lead in to the hottest fire; otherwise the boats in which the troops were could not have moved an inch. The consequence of this severe service was, that out of about one hundred and thirty men, the complement of the Larne, at one time not more than eight were fit for duty; the rest, officers and all, being laid up with fever, cholera, and dysentery. In this season of sickness, while the rains continued, the army and navy lost nearly two thousand men.

When it was determined to make an attack on Kemmendine, on the 3d June, Captain Ryves of the Sophie was requested to take the command of the flotilla; but, on finding that Sir A. Campbell meant to embark personally, that no plan of the attack was given to him (Captain R.), and that, to all appearance, no means of communication with the land column, by signals, had been thought of, he very properly declined it. What was the consequence? The fire from the flotilla, managed by landsmen, killed and wounded many of our troops on-shore, who returned the compliment on the floating force. The Burmans held the position, and both land and marine columns were obliged to retreat in disorder, leaving one hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. This disaster could not be concealed, and is accord