REPORT OF ACCIDENTS. BRUSH SIDING ACCIDENT. Hon. Horace Boies, Governor of Iowa, Des Moines: DES MOINES, IOWA, February 16, 1893. SIR-At 3 o'clock, on the morning of February 8th, a rear end collision occurred at a passing station named Brush, on the main line of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, about five miles east of Osceola, in which eight persons were injured, three of them seriously. Six of them were stock shippers accompanying their stock, and two employes. From information furnished them the Commissioners regarded it their duty to investigate the accident, and went on the morning of Feb ruary 8th, to Chariton, where the persons injured were taken. They saw all of them, and as soon as practicable took testimony which developed the following facts: First and second trains No. 72 were stock trains for Chicago running on fast time. First 72 left Osceola about seven or eight minutes before second 72 and reached Brush at 2:54 A. M. The length of the passing track at this station is ahout 3,200 feet, the telegraph office being at the east switch or the east end of the side track, the main line at this place being a single track. First and second 72 had the right to the track and would have gone on without stopping but had orders at Osceola to meet 346 at Brush. First 72 had 26 loaded cars and stopped having 12 cars east of the telegraph office and 14 west, the evident purpose being to have the middle of the train opposite the telegraph office; the time was 2:54 A. M. The conductor directed his brakeman to protect the rear end of train, walked the fourteen car lengths to telegraph office and had just signed order Exhibit B, time 3 A. M., when the collision occurred. In order more fully to understand the situation we give the orders by which the trains were run from the dispatcher's office at Creston. Exhibit A; Order No. 1: "Operator Brush, 2, 8, 93. Conductors and engineers 2nd and 3rd 86, 1st and 2nd 72, Osceola. Conductors and engineers Ex. 346 west, Woodburn, 2nd and 3rd No. 86, 1st and 2nd No. 72 and Ex, 346 west will meet at Brush instead of Woodburn. (Signed) J. H. D, Completed 1:26 A. M. Exhibit B. Order No. 15, 2, 8, 93. "Conductors and engineers 2nd and 3rd 86 and 1st 72, Brush. Conductor and engineer 190 west, Woodburn, 2nd and 3rd 86, 1st 72 and Ex. 190 west will meet at Brush instead of Woodburn. J. H. D." Heasley 2, 86, completed at 2:37 A. M. Wooden 3, 86, completed at 2:46 A. M. Dubois 1, 72, completed at 3:00 A. M. (Signed) Exhibit C, order No. 17, 2, 8, 93. "C & E 2nd and 3rd No. 86, 1st and 2nd 72, Brush. Take a ful tank of water at Woodburn, none at Lucas. Completed at 2:06 A. M. We give below some of the rules of the company governing the condition at Brush: J. H. D." Exhibit D, Rule 74: When a train turns out to meet or pass another train, the red lights must be removed and green displayed as soon as the track is clear, but the red must again be displayed before returning to its own track. Headlights on engines when on side track must be covered as soon as the track is clear and train has stopped, and also when standing at end of double tracks. Rule 93: All trains must stop at schedule meeting or passing points on single track, and if train to be met or passed is of the same class, unless the switches are plainly seen to be right and the track clear. The point at which a train should stop is the switch used by the train to be met or passed in going on the siding. When the expected train of the same class is not found at the schedule meeting or passing point, the train having the right of track must approach all sidings prepared to stop until the expected train is met or passed. Rule 524: If an operator receives an order to hold a train, or receives an order addressed to a train which is at his station, he must not expect the order until the conductor of such train has seen and signed the same whether it be a 31 or a 19 order." The meaning of figures 19 and 31 are special orders which must be repeated to the dispatcher, and when the order is complete a response, with the superintendent's initials, will be given when author. ized by train dispatcher; a copy of the order must be delivered to each person addressed except the engineer. The rules for the running of trains are here stated, so far as they apply to the case investigated, and appear so far as the orders and dispatches are concerned, and make it evident that no fault lies in either the rules or orders. The alignment of the railway for at least a mile west to Brush passing track was straight, with a grade slightly ascending to Brush; the night was clear and the light of the locomotive on the side track was distinctly seen from the approaching train for this distance. The train 2nd 72 left Osceola 7 or 8 minutes after 1st 72; was running on this straight line at the rate of 30 miles per hour; the engine was provided with power brakes and steam, and two cars next the engine had power brakes that were applied from engine. Rule 74 requires that head lights on engines when on side tracks must be covered as soon as the track is clear and the train stopped. From the evidence this was neglected. It is claimed by the engineer of 2nd 72 that the neglect of this rule, or rather the reflection from the headlights of the engines on the escaping steam obscured the signal light at the depot and also the rear lights of train 1st 72. Rule 97 requires that when a freight train stops at any point not its usual stopping place (as in this case) the flagman must go back not less than twenty telegraph poles to protect the rear of his rain. It was in evidence that 1st 72 reached Brush east switch at 2:54 A. M.; that the conductor walked to the telegraph office and had just signed the order at 3 A. M. when the collision occurred. The facts are that the approaching train was running at the rate of thirty miles per hour; that the lights on the engines on the side track were not covered, and the brakeman of 1st 72 did not go back twenty telegraph poles or any great distance to protect the rear of the train. His testimony that he went back immediately on stopping, and that there was but a moment's time, is in conflict with the other statements showing that the train had been stopped six minutes when the collision took place, When this seemed inevitable he ran into the caboose and waked up the stockmen who were asleep. and was one of the most seriously injured. Second 72 was running into this station when it had an order to stop (the locality being distinctly seen and known) at a rate of speed entirely too great, and the train was shown to be beyond control, as the one it ran into was nearly half its length over the east or further switch. How much weight is due to the neglect to cover the headlight the Board is unable to determine, but probably this precaution is a safeguard or it would not be required in the rules. The accident was due to the neglect of two, if not three, of the rules by different persons. If either had obeyed them it would not have so occurred. If the train had run into the station where it was ordered to stop at a rate that it was under control and in condition to stop (rule 97 says that freight and extra trains must pass through stations completely under control, speed must be reduced and enginemen and trainmen must commence to get their train under control a half mile before reaching station, so that under no circumstances would it be possible for it to strike any train. The entire responsibility for safety rests with the approaching freight.) Obedience to this rule would hvae saved the wreek. Second. If the brakeman on train first 72 had gone back to protect the rear of his train he would have signalled the approaching train in time to stop as there were two cars with air. Third. If the headlights of the trains going west had been covered it may be that the station signal and the lights on the rear of first 72 would have been seen in time to have stopped. On this latter the Commissioners are in doubt as to whether the effect is as claimed by the engineer of train econd 72, obscuring the other lights. They can, however, assign no other reason for covering the headlights than some effect tending to confuse the train approaching. Since writing the above the Commissioners are informed that the headlight of the first train going west was covered. No deaths have occurred as yet. Six men in charge of stock were injured, one very seriously, leg broken in two places and head and body injuries; the other injuries to stockmen were comparatively slight. The rear brakeman, when he saw the collision inevitable, went into the caboose and while awakening the stockmen was caught and badly hurt. The fireman on second 72 jumped from his engine and was badly hurt, and when the Commissioners were there seemed to be suffering from a shock that affected the brain besides some external injuries. Respectfully submitted, BY ORDER OF THE BOARD. STRATFORD ACCIDENT. W. W. AINSWORTH, Secretary. DES MOINES, Iowa, 12 o'clock M., October 12, 1893. To J. M. Whitman, General Manager Chicago & Northwestern Rallway Company, Chicago, Illinois: Please report to this Board the accident near the Des Moines river last night. BY ORDER OF THE BOARD. W. W. AINSWORTH, Secretary. CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, October 12, 1893. Mr. W. W. Ainsworth, Secretary Board of Railroad Commissioners, Des Moines, Iowa: DEAR SIR-I will advise that a special freight train east, which left Lake City, Iowa, at 5:05 P. M., October 11th, with Conductor Erb and Engineer McAllister in charge, and special freight east, Conductor J. Hoover and Engineer E. Bates in charge, which left the same point at 7:20 P. M., met with an accident one mile west of the Des Moines river bridge about 10:30 P. M. Conductor Erb cut off a portion of his train at a point 11⁄2 miles east of Des Moines river bridge to double into Stratford, his brakeman taking the head end of the train into that station, Conductor Erb remaining with the rear end. The rear portion ran down the grade across the Des Moines river bridge and struck Hoover's train at a point about one mile west of the bridge. This accident resulted in the death of Conductor Erb, and in the loss of a leg above the knee by Brakeman F. E. Smith. Engineer Bates is also sprained and bruised, but not seriously. The cause for this accident we are unable to learn, as the only man who could explain it, Conductor Erb, is dead. Yours truly, J. M. WHITMAN, CRESCENT ACCIDENT. DES MOINES, Iowa, September 28, 1893. To J. M. Whitman, General Manager Chicago & Northwestern, Chicago, Illinois: 27th. BY ORDER OF THE BOARD. W. W. Ainsworth, Secretary: W. W. AINSWORTH, CHICAGO, September 28, 1893. A full written report of accident near Council Bluffs on September 27th will be sent you immediately. I have so instructed Superintendent Hallenbeck. J. M. WHITMAN. Chicago & Northwestern wire, 2:21 P. M., September 28, 1893. BOONE, IOWA, September 28, 1893. Mr. W. W. Ainsworth, Secretary of Board of Railway Commissioners, Des Moines, Iowa: DEAR SIR-Referring to collision two miles west of Crescent, September 27th, at about 11:09 A. M. Conductor Jackson, Engineer Dawson, engine 200, with pile driver train, had orders to work special between Council Bluffs and Honey Creek September 27th, and flag against all trains after 8:00 o'clock A. M. They were working at a bridge about three miles east of Crescent until 10:55 A. M., when they started for Council Bluffs. Train slowed up at Crescent and picked up flagman, leaving Crescent about 11:00 A. M. and collided with special east, Conductor Van Gorder, Engineer Blaine, engine 109, when about two miles west of Crescent. The special train east, Van Gorder, conductor, had an order to run special, Council Bluffs to Honey Creek, and a message that Jackson was working between Council Bluffs and Honey Creek under a flag. Brakeman, Bert Jenkins, on pile driver, and Soren Peterson, section laborer, who were on the special east, were instantly killed. John Condon, laborer, who was on pile driver, burised on shoulder. Christ Knutson, section laborer, was bruised on shoulder, side and leg. The crew with pile driver failed to get clearance at Crescent; also failed to have a flagman ahead of them leaving Crescent. Yours truly, P. HALLENBECK, |