keta, left behind in the establishment of Payofa, your heavy artillery, 500 borfes, your cloathing, and powder magazines, &c.) and though your wounded remained on the fie d of battle where they fell into our hands. We cannot conceive what wore you could have done had you been beaten; but we know what you could and would have done had you been victorious, and had your statement been true. You would have mantained poffeffion of the pofitions that cover Corunna, you would have employed the 17th in burying your dead, carrying off from the field of battle the bodies of your Generals, Colonels, and inferior officers; collecting the ftragglers, always numerous after an action continued until the approach of night; and in bringing in the wounded, who ufually after an engagement in the night time, feramble into farm houses and cottages, to wait for the return of day-light. You would have embarked on the night of the 17th, if your view of the general system led you to think Jourfelves too weak to refift the French troops. Such would have been the refult of the most petty advantages; but you have done nothing of all this.-You did not take time to evacuate your magazines, to pay the last honours to your General, to carry off your wounded, to fave your four pieces of cannon, Or to protect the re-reat of the 300 men, who covered your rear, and who fell into our bands in the purfuit.'

GAZETTE The whole of the army were embarked with an expedition which has seldom been equalled."

Moniteur" The expedition with which you embarked, is a very equivocal proof of the fuccefs you pretend to have had in its en gagerment

Gazette-" The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town, soon after eight o'clock in the morn ng of the 17th, and fhortly after occupied the hights of St. Lucia, which commanded the harbour."

Moniteur-" In reading this account, it is easy to perceive, that it is not the production of a military man, or else it has been fabmitted to the revisions of some of the Clerks in Mr. Canning's office. In fact, you wish to make us believe, that you maintained your pofition, that is, remained masters of the field of battle, yet you tell us "the enemy, &c." What! Sir John Hope! On the 16th you obtained fo brilliant a fuccefs; and yet during the night you evacuated" the height of St. Lucia, which command the

harbour," upon which the French Immediately erect batteries that " command the habour," fink four of your tranfports and thus give your fleet a signal to cut their cables and put to sea? Though an officer in the land service, you have often embarked and disembarked troops. You must have fome nautical knowledge, and you ought to have reflected that on the 17th the wind might have changed (a very common occurrence) and had the wind changed, and your transports forced to remain in the harbour under the tire of the French batteries, that had already funk four of their number, would you not have exposed yourself to reproach for having evacuated "the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harb ur?" in allowing that the French troops at day break o cupied the heights of St. Lucia, you clearly allow that you were then without retreat, and that if not compelled to give way before a tuperior force, you must, of your own fault, wantonly or without reflection, have put to hazard the fate of your army. You alledge that you were victorious; the French fay that you were beaten. The nature of things can alone decide between you; but from the nature of things it refults, that you have done the contrary of what would you have done had you been victorious, and that you have acted in every respect as if you had been beaten; it follows, therefore, that you have been beaten. This consequence which you with to diffemble, demonftratively results from all the details of your own narrative." GAZETTE. Circumstances forbid us to hope, that the victory with which it has pleafed providence to crown the efforts of the army," &c.

Moniteur. "This is the manner in which the English people are gulled. The fame manœuvre has been employed by the ministry upon ali occafions, and it must be granted that it has frequently succeeded. Truch however, wil make its way-but the minitry will have gained time, the anxiety of the public will abite, and the administratiu, after having deceived hem, will find fome fresh means of diverting their attention.Heavens grant that the English may gain fuch a v ctory every month!"

GAZETTE." The army which entered

Spain, under the fairest pro pects, had no fooner completed its junction than, owing to the multiplied difafters that difperfed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources.

Moniteur.

Moniteur. So, at laft, you admit that the Spanish armies were difperfed, and that you found yourselves left to your own reSources I Is it the fault of the Spaniards that you made them wait fo long for useless succours? never did you fit out so poweriul an expedition. You ought to thank Provie dence, that, a part of your army, has been able to re-embark and effect its escape.

GAZETTE.—" The advance of the Britith corps from Doctu, afforded the best hope. that the South of Spain might be relieved."

Moniteur." Thefe hopes were just as well founded as all those which the British Cabinet entertains at this moment."

GAZETTE." But this generous effort to fave the unfortunate people, afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every

ort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his principal resources for the des truction of the only regular force in the North of Spain."

Moniteur. Why was there not anather regular force there at the time you advanced?-It was because you did not advance until the regular force of Spain was defiroyed."

GAZETTE." The native and undaunted

valour of British troops was never more con. fpicuous."

Moniteur." Our Soldiers did not find any thing fo very brilliant in the English foldiers' ftyle of fighting; but they agree that the English Officers conducted themfelves with the courage which belongs to men of honour."

GAZETTE." The greater part of the fleet having gone to fea yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embark: tion neceflarily much mixed on board, It is impoffible at present to lay before you a return of our cafualties."

Moniteur." How the truth forces its way in spite of every effort to conceal it Mr. Cannings clerk forgot to obliterate this expreffion of General Hope's, What an overfight! The troops in the embākation were Deceffarily much mixed on board, the transports, because the embarkation was conducted in diforder and confufion. Terror made the foldiers rush with precipitation to the boats, every one loofing fight of the colours, and thinking only of h s own fafety.-What must have been the result? That which is fact was thesefult—' the troops in the em

barkation were neceffarily much mixed on board."

On General Hope's estimate of killed and wounded, the Moniteur has the following

note.

"You had 2000 wounded; you left on the field of battle, the dead bodies of three of your Generals and 800 soldiers and officers we counted them. We took 300 of you prifoners; you did not take a fi gle man of ours. We had not 200 men wounded, and our lofs in killed did not amount to 100, among whome there was not a single officer of diftinction."

TO CORESPONDENTS

The character of Probity, honor and difinterestedinefs which "Adme. tus" has given of an Attorney, appears to us fo extraordinary, that we would not venture to give it to the Public on Anonymous authority. If Admetus would take the pains to fend to us for his paper and have it properly certified under the hands and feals of the Gentleman's wife, Domeftics, Neighbours and Clients, we fhall be proud to prefent to the world, fuch a phenomena, as an ho neft Attorney.

The Editor returns his moft fincere thanks, 6. 8d. for his kind communication.

The letter to Doctor O'Reilly, writtenby an inhabitant of Drogheda, is better calculated for a private than a public Communication.