vation of taste, as a more limited portion of that etherealizing sensation-a sensation which, from being the parent of taste, Akenside and Blair have both mistaken for taste itself." Before, however, we make this concession to Mr. Stuart, or yield the superiority, in matters of taste, to a sensibility less plastic, or less susceptible of impressions, we must observe, that beauty, whether sensible or intellectual, is the direct object of taste;-that what we denominate beauty is nothing but certain qualities in matter or in mind which produce certain sensations in us; and that we are accustomed to designate the object in which these qualities inhere, and which excite these emotions, by the epithet beautiful. If, then, the term beautiful take its name from certain emotions produced in us by the mental or visible presence of intellectual or sensible objects, it necessarily follows, that whoever is most susceptible of the emotions produced by these external influences, whoever yields with least resistance to the power which they exert, must necessarily be better qualified to recognise and perceive those qualities in body and in mind which excite the emotions, if he pay equal attention to them, than a person who cannot feel them but when they exert a stronger and more perceptible influence. That quality which is only known through the medium of emotions, must

surely be best known to him in whom the emotions are most easily excited, if he be as attentive to the exciting cause as a person by whom the emotion is not so distinctly felt; for he not only feels every emotion more sensibly than the latter, but he feels many emotions which the latter cannot feel at all. The man of grosser feelings cannot be moved by the slighter influences of beauty, and is therefore less apt to perceive her latent charms when they are communicable only through the medium of those finer and less perceptible stimuli; but he whose sensations are exquisitely attuned to all the harmonies of nature, yields to the slightest influence, and therefore has an opportunity of perceiving the cause of the slightest impression.

By what process of reasoning, then, can it be shown that an extreme sensibility is an impediment to the acquisition of a correct and refined taste? What is sensibility, when properly considered, but a quality in man of being affected by the qualities of sensible and intellectual being, or of every subject that can become an object of sensation? Where this quality is gross, its possessor can only discern the grosser and more palpable qualities of the beings that are without him: Where it is finer and more delicate, its possessor can discern those finer and minuter qualities that escape the former: Where this

quality is exquisitely fine, it can discern still finer and minuter qualities that are invisible to other eyes. If this were not the case, how can other animals discern qualities in the beings that surround them, which elude the most exquisite sensibility of man. We do not, it is true, require this extreme sensibility; but it is not the less certain, that if we possessed it, we could discern many qualities in objects, of which we shall never form the slightest conception. It must, therefore, be granted, that in proportion as our sensibility is acute, in the same proportion do we perceive qualities in objects which others cannot perceive; and it must equally be granted, that we are better qualified to judge of those objects than those who cannot feel them. Whether the possession of such exquisite feelings would tend to render us more or less happy, more or less perfect, on the whole, is a question of another nature : whether they would or would not, it would still be equally true, that they would render us better judges, and better qualified to discern the beauty or deformity of every object to which we directed our attention, which is all that I wish to establish; for if he who sees more is not a better judge than he who sees less, the man who possesses the eyes of a lynx can have no advantage over him who only sees through the "mole's dim curtain.' With regard to happiness, my opinion

is, that, constituted as we are, it is impossible we can possess sensibility in such an exquisite degree as to render us unhappy. A different contexture of our organs must take place, before we can see like the lynx, feel like the spider, smell like the hound, or taste like the bee, whose

Sense, so subtly true,

From poisonous herbs extracts the healing dew!

The apprehension of that man is therefore imaginary, who fears to become miserable by the cultivation of his feelings and sensibilities. The eye must possess a microscopic power, before it can perceive that tribe of invisible insects which inhabit the air which we breathe, and the water which we drink; and so of the other organs of sensation: so that our senses can never become the source of unhappiness to us from their extreme delicacy.

I have no doubt but the opinion, that extreme sensibility is hurtful to taste, originally proceeded from the affectation of some, and the extreme, nervous irritability of others. Some men affect to be pleased or displeased at every object that arrests their attention, though they are, in general, the most miserable judges of grace and beauty. Others, again, possess an extreme irritability of passion, that keeps them continually fluctuating between pleasure and pain: they are at all times

either happy or miserable. "Upon any prosperous event," says an elegant writer, "their spirits are apt to be elevated beyond all bounds; and in adversity their grief pierces so deep into the tender frame that it becomes insupportable. It is possible perhaps, that, in some instances, they may have more lively enjoyments than men of a coarser mould; but then they have also more pungent sorrows. Occurrences which would have no effect upon a stronger mind, afflict them to the last degree; the most trivial disappointment, the omission of a ceremony, a careless word or gesture, nay even a look, will discompose their temper, and cast a heavy gloom on their minds."* From a general observation, that neither of these characters are found to be excellent judges, in matters of taste, the opinion probably arose, that extreme sensibility was prejudicial to it. It is easy, indeed, to perceive, that if taste consist, according to Dr. Blair, in the mere power of receiving pleasure, this opinion would be founded in truth; but when it is understood to be a power of discriminating beauty, we have some reason to pause before we admit that this extreme delicacy of passion is hurtful to taste. In the first place it is an error to suppose, as I have already shewn, that mere sensibility

*

Fugitive Pieces. Essay on Delicacy. Dialogue II.