the conduct of the battle off Santiago have been printed, that no point of importance is now unsettled. It is possible to assert that this history has been taken, in all important matters, directly from official sources. As to parts of the narrative not taken from official reports and despatches the principal source of information has been in the accounts written by naval officers for such periodicals as Scribner's, the Century, Harper's, the Army and Navy Journal, and the Army and Navy Register. The people of the United States are greatly indebted to those officers who contributed, over their own signatures, to the general knowledge of what was done, and to the Navy Department, as well, for relaxing the rule that ordinarily prevents a naval man's appearing in print. I have also had a number of letters from and personal interviews with naval officers whose work I have described. In addition to these sources of information I have had recourse in a few cases to what has been written by newspaper reporters. It is with extreme regret that I find a word of explanation regarding the accuracy of the newspaper reports necessary. A time ought to come, and so it will come, when every reporter's sense of honor will be so strong that it will be as difficult to find a misstatement in a daily. paper as it is to find one now in a reputable monthly magazine. But that time is not yet here, and so I must say that I know every reporter whom I have quoted to be a trustworthy writer except one whom I do not know personally, the reporter of the London Mail, whose interview with Admiral Montojo is given; but I know the managing editor of the Mail, and his character warrants the use of that report in any history. Perhaps it may not be amiss for me to add here, that a very interesting feature of the war was the presence of many newspaper despatchboats in the operations around Cuba. No such work as they did was ever known before in the history of naval wars. And I know that the reporters so engaged were, with a few exceptions, unwearied and fearless in energy and enterprise, and were entirely sincere and faithful to the readers of the papers represented. I speak from actual knowledge in this matter, for I was myself one of the reporters during the earlier months of the conflict on the Cuban coast. If any inaccuracies be found in this history, they are blunders and not due to a lack of trustworthy sources of information. But to give a truthful narrative of the events of the war is not quite all that I have attempted here. It seemed necessary to review briefly the events in the history of Cuba that compelled us to interfere in the affairs of another nation. And this was the more necessary for the reason that we had been more or less involved in the trouble between Spain and her "ever faithful" island of Cuba. It has been no pleasant task to recount even briefly the facts regarding Spain's rule in Cuba, and still less so the bearing of the affairs of the General Lloyd Aspinwall and the Virginius on the conflict just ended. But unless I have labored in vain, the reader must see that these accounts could not be omitted. Perhaps while perusing them it will be seen that undue patience and forbearance in international dealings, as in dealings between men, sometimes come to be considered an evidence of weakness; that dignity and firmness, backed even by physical force, are absolutely necessary if we would preserve peace and do right, especially when dealing with those who are weak and greedy and shifty. As to the facts in the cases of these two ships, they were taken from an account of the Aspinwall, written for Scribner's Monthly by one connected with the administration then in power, and from a message of the President (Ex. Doc., No. 30, 43d Cong., 1st Sess.) containing all the documents and much other matter relating to the Virginius. Further than that I have given a short, but what I believe to be an adequate, account of the growth of our navy from the inception of the White Squadron. It is a matter that deserves attention for more reasons than one, but is needed here in order to help us comprehend the ability of our naval men. To describe the heterogeneous squadron with which Sampson went to San Juan, is to show his resourcefulThe squadron of protected cruisers which Dewey took to Manila had a battle-ship task to accomplish in attacking ships and forts at once; but what it lacked in armor-plate was made up by the Harveyized grit of its commanding officer and crews. ness. On the whole here is a story the facts of which, however told, must stir the heart of every American who has red blood in his veins. It was a war to bring peace where anarchy reigned. We sought the enemy in his own chosen arena. We met him man-fashion, and we literally swept him from the seas. Four of the finest armed cruisers and two of the best torpedo-destroyers in the world, with nearly a score of lesser war-ships were driven to the rocks or sunk out of sight, while hundreds of their crews were killed. And yet in all that work we lost one man killed, and less than a score wounded, while the damage done to our |