ures on their side can never be given, but a good estimate places their original force at 2,125 men, of whom nearly one-third were killed and the others made prisoners.

On a survey of the wrecks it appeared possible to save the Maria Teresa and the Colon. By the unwearied efforts of Naval Constructor Hobson, who returned to New York for wrecking apparatus, the Maria Teresa was floated in October, taken to Guantanamo, there partly repaired, and then sent North. En route a gale was encountered, and she was abandoned by her crew because her commanding officer thought she was about to sink. A few days later she was found on a coral reef off Cat Island, one of the Bahamas. Instead of sinking she had drifted sixty miles to a resting-place, and there she lies at this writing (December 1, 1898).

As an inspiration to our people, especially to our seamen, any one of these ships was worth twice the cost of a new one of equal power. It was a spirit of parsimony that allowed even the broken-backed Oquendo to lie on the rocks. She should have been taken off piecemeal, if need be, and at any cost, to be put together again and set afloat under the Stars and Stripes. The talk about the expense of saving these ships makes one wonder whether the Spaniards were wrong after all in their

favorite appellation when describing us. The bravery of Hobson on the Merrimac was magnificent, but in his work on the wrecked ships, though it was in vain, he set an example that should stir the patriotism of his country long after he is dead.

A word only of the lessons we learned at Santiago seems necessary. The first tells of the deadly nature of wood in the construction of a war-ship. The second tells of the value of quick-firing guns-that we must develop, as soon as possible, long, high-power, quick-firing seven-inch or eight-inch guns for the broadside of our battle-ships, with ammunition hoists able to keep them supplied with cartridges. The third is the need for speed in our battleships, and that is one we have taken to heart. The fourth is the need of sheathing our ships with wood and copper to keep the bottoms clean.

Last of all is the lesson of the gunner's school. We had practised well at the target while at Key West, and our relative excellence when compared with the Spanish was well-nigh a hundred to one. But actually we fired more than 6,000 shots, and when we came to count the shot-holes in the wrecks we found a record that is shown by the following table compiled by the Scientific American from the official report of the Survey Board:

To reach that number-one hundred and twenty-three hits-we counted even the tiny holes our six-pounders made in the smokestacks. Of course many hits were made in the burned up wood-work and on parts of the ships that were under water when our survey was made. But since we won a sweeping victory we may soberly face the facts. We made no more than three effective hits out of a hundred shots. And only two of our largest shots hit at all. What would we say of a trap-shot who killed but three birds out of a hundred?

CHAPTER XIX

CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA

A BOMBARDMENT THAT WAS MISTAKEN FOR A SALUTE-THE EM-
PEROR-WILLIAM GERMANS WERE INCLINED TO MAKE TROUBLE,

BUT DEWEY WAS A GOOD DIPLOMAT AS WELL AS A FIGHTER
-OUR FRIENDS, THE BRITISH-NOTABLE VOYAGE OF TWO
MONITORS.

THE destruction of Cervera's squadron was the death-blow to Spanish power in America. The capture of Santiago and the conquest of Porto Rico were thereafter matters requiring brief time and small effort. But meantime something had been done on the Pacific. An expedition to aid Dewey at Manila was planned immediately after his great victory at Cavite and the capture of the forts at the mouth of the bay gave him full control of the water there. He might have taken Manila at any hour, but he had no landing force to control it if he took it, and that such a force was absolutely necessary for the safety as well as the control of the city, appears from a consideration of the fact that the Island of Luzon, like

Cuba, was in great part overrun with a horde of insurgents, whose character was as low as Spanish cruelty and greed had been able to make it. Even the hospital at Cavite had to be protected by our marines from insurgent outrage after we had driven away the Spanish forces.

Command of the forces to be sent to Manila was given to Major-General Wesley Merritt, and the first division of his troops, numbering over 2,500, sailed from San Francisco on May 25th, convoyed by the cruiser Charleston, Captain Henry Glass. The expedition sailed by the way of the Ladrone Islands, arriving there on the morning of Monday, June 20th. A little fortification, called Fort Santa Cruz, was found on a coral-reef at the mouth of Guam's Harbor (San Louis d'Apra), and the Charleston, on passing in, bombarded it, in the hope of having a small fight, but without avail, and she steamed on unmolested to the usual anchorage. Then came a small boat with the Spanish flag flying bravely above its stern, where were sitting Lieutenant Garcia Guiterrez, of the Spanish Navy, Captain of the Port; Señor Romero, health officer, and Francisco Portusac, a native of the island, who had been naturalized in the United States and had now come out to greet his countrymen and act as interpreter. But no interpreter was needed,