was related of Milligan, of the Oregon, by Captain Clark, and it occurred during the most famous race of the war, to be described farther on. "The officers kept asking permission to fire," said Captain Clark, "so I told them to send one shot after the vessel. Just after the report of the shot the chief engineer, who had joined in shovelling coal in the engineroom, came up to me as black as anything could be, and begged that another shot be fired. He said his men were fainting down below under the heat and terrific strain, but if they could hear a few shots he was sure they would keep their strength.' CHAPTER XIII SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO ....... REASONS FOR HIS DELAY AT CIENFUEGOS-STOPPED TWENTY MILES FROM HIS DESTINATION AND THEN STARTED BACK TO KEY WEST-BREAK ON THE COLLIER-DASH OF THE MARBLEHEAD—— WHEN SCHLEY SAW CERVERA'S SHIPS AT ANCHOR WITHIN EASY RANGE-A RECONNAISSANCE" AT A RANGE OF FROM four to FIVE MILES—A BLOCKADING SQUADRON TEN MILES FROM PORT -ACTS OF AUXILIARY CRUISERS DESCRIBED. As already stated, Schley with his squadron sailed from Key West bound for the south coast of Cuba in search of Cervera on May. 19th, the very day, as it happened, that Cervera entered Santiago. His flag-ship was the Brooklyn, and he took with him the Massachusetts, the Texas, and the auxiliary Scorpion. sailing order, written by Sampson, contained this paragraph: His "It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible." On the next day (May 20th), the Iowa, the Castine, and the collier Merrimac, followed garded very important) so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago A. M. May 24th. It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take." It is important to observe that order No. 8 did not definitely tell Schley to go on to Santiago unless he was "satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos," but it is plain from these additional instructions, sent by the Hawk, that Sampson meant to have him go to Santiago immediately. Schley arrived off Cienfuegos late at night on the 21st. At daylight the next morning and again at 8 o'clock he steamed within a mile and a half of the light-house, without drawing fire, and then the Scorpion was sent away to Santiago to learn what the big scouts, supposed to be there, had seen. When closest to land a reporter on the Texas (T. M. Dieuaide, of The Evening Sun, New York, who is known by the writer hereof as a trustworthy man) looked over the harbor from the lookout-perch and saw "a gray smoke-stack and the masts of two schooners." He saw no other ships. "Most of the officers of the squadron," says Dieuaide, "were firmly convinced that the Spanish ships were not inside. Commodore Schley was firmly convinced that they were." During this day (May 22d) the Iowa and the torpedo-boat Dupont joined Schley. On May 23d, Schley wrote to Sampson saying, definitely, "the Castine, Merrimac, and ́ Hawk arrived this morning." That was in a paragraph numbered 4. He then says (paragraph 1): "In reply to your letter, No. 8, I : |