largest guns were not fired often with fullservice charges, more is the pity, but what is called sub-calibre practice-the firing of a onepounder rifle fitted into the axis of the big bore, by which the eye of the gunner was fairly well trained-was kept going steadily.

Emphasis should be given to any statement regarding the work of Admiral Sicard before war began. We know now what "the man behind the gun" was able to do when the test came, and it should not be forgotten that it was Sicard who, to a great extent, trained the man. The training given our tars in the previous days of peace, though as good as that of other navies, was wholly inadequate if judged in the light of our naval traditions. And yet, during all those days of constant care and labor, the Admiral was suffering from a form of malaria due to the Gulf climate, and this at last overcame him so that he was obliged to give way. He was relieved from duty on March 24th, and Captain William T. Sampson, of the Iowa, who had served as chairman of the Maine Court of Inquiry, was placed in command of the squadron.

Selecting the man who had convinced the world of the treachery of the Spanish in the Maine affair was a wise bit of diplomacy-an expression of supreme confidence in that Court of Inquiry. But there was a still more impor

tant reason for giving him the command, and that was his manifest fitness, as appeared in his record in every post he had held since entering the service. He had shown conspicuous bravery at Charleston, in the Civil War, where he faced a fire so fierce that he sent all of his men to cover while he alone stood exposed to pilot the ship (the Patapsco), and throughout his service in various bureaus of the Naval Department, as well as in command at sea, he had made a reputation as one who could be depended on in any situation. As a writer on naval subjects he was unsurpassed for breadth and lucidity, and it is not unlikely that a paper read by him before the Naval Institute, in 1889, on "The Naval Defence of the Coast," was an important factor in the decision to select him. At any rate that paper established his reputation as a tactician. It is a notable fact that, although Sampson was fourth on the list. of captains, and there were men of higher rank available, no protest was made when he was appointed. Captain Robley D. Evans took Sampson's place on the Iowa.

To sum up the work in connection with the navy, during the weeks of peace following the destruction of the Maine, it is apparent that we made every effort to strengthen our fleet and improve our men afloat-in short to prepare for war; and we were so successful that

declaration of the British Government that the moment the combination was consummated, the whole British fleet should be placed at our disposal. The Anglo-Saxon race was at last united for a moment, and in their presence the rest of the world instantly bowed in submis

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR MESSAGE

SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CUBAN AFFAIRS-AGGRAVATING PROOF OF WORK OF SPANISH SPIES AND SPANISH INSINCERITY-DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ENDEDTHREATENING MOVEMENTS OF WAR-SHIPS.

Now although the civilized nations of Europe were unwilling to combine against England and the United States, nothing could prevent Spain's fighting to save Cuba. As has been recently pointed out by Captain F. E. Chadwick, the Spanish are always stubborn in defence. Even Spanish officials, who should have known better, believed they still might win, and those who were hopeless of success were compelled to lead on to war in obedience to the popular demand, lest a civil war come upon them through an uprising of the Carlists.

Spain had sent her beautiful 7,000 ton cruiser, the Vizcaya, to New York, to let us see what able ships floated her blood-and-gold banLater she sent a sister-ship, the Oquendo, to Havana, to cheer the hearts of her forces

ner.