Arians that by parity of reasoning the creation must be eternal. Having first stated that the Arians are fools, he then insists on the distinction between a son and a thing made,1 the former being a proper offspring of the substance, whereas the latter is from outside the maker and from things non-existent,2 and is therefore produced when the Creator wills; but that which is a property of the essence is not subject to will.3 The distinction is no doubt clear and correct; but it does not meet the difficulty. The question is, if creativeness belongs to the Divine essence, what prevented God from exercising it till a few thousand years ago? And to this Athanasius replies that such an audacious question belongs to madmen. He then argues, however, that things that have become are ipso facto not eternal. But eternal productiveness of the Divine volition is really quite as intelligible as the eternal generation of the Divine substance; and although it is impossible for us to understand how a series coming from an eternal past has ever reached the present moment, it is equally impossible for us. to think of a beginning, however remote, beyond which we are unable to imagine something prior; and for my part, I find it hard to believe that God, having subsisted from eternity in the isolation of his own being, suddenly began, a few thousand years ago, to create a dependent universe. I say, a few thousand years ago, in accordance with the old supposition; but extend the time to as many millions. as you please, and the argument remains unaffected. The question is, do we reach at last a time when space was empty, and time was a motionless eternity in which God created nothing? If so, why did the Unchangeable change? Why did the Omnipotent begin to put forth power, as though he

1 Υιός and ποίημα.

2 Ἴδιον τὴς οὐσίας γέννημα, and ἔξωθεν τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων.

3 Orat. I. Contra Arianos, 29. This disposes of Bishop Gore's argument about the exercise of will.

4 Γενητά.

had become newly conscious of a latent energy? This argument certainly seems to me as cogent as that which is put forward on behalf of an eternal sonship. But if so, then God had in creation an eternal object for his will, reason, and love, and the alleged necessity for a distinction of persons within his own being disappears. This is of course a speculation; but as a speculation, it is far more satisfying to my own mind and heart than the representation of a Divine companionship filling an otherwise empty eternity with nothing but mutual love, in which, as between persons absolutely equal and of identical essence, there could be no giving and receiving, no mutual activity, but the same motionless sentiment, like a frozen sea sleeping under the chill of an eternal night.

Once more, this love among equals, who are separated by an infinite gulf from all others, can be no evidence of God's love towards finite beings. The paternal satisfaction in a coequal Son can be no guarantee of the Divine Fatherhood in relation to us. If we are children of God at all, we must be so in a sense so absolutely different that the two relationships ought not to be designated by the same name, and to say that one is the Son by nature, and others are sons by adoption, fails utterly to describe the vastness of the interval between them. In short, the mysterious relations of the Infinite within himself can offer no security for his relations towards finite and created beings; and, conversely, the latter can be no evidence of the former. Indeed, if love found its entire satisfaction within the eternal realm, it is all the more difficult to understand why it should ever step forth among the things of time, and seek for the responsive love of dependent spirits.

The argument, however, is pressed still further, and it is maintained that the existence of a second person is involved in the very idea of eternal personality. This view is ably and clearly presented by Dr. T. Vincent Tymms in his Essay on Christian Theism,' in 'The Ancient Faith in Modern

Light,' published in 1897. He starts from Herbert Spencer's dictum that in all consciousness of self a not-self, or an other-than-self, is given; and he then criticizes Dr. Martineau's attempts to provide the Divine consciousness with this other-than-self in an eternal matter, or in an eternity of created and finite minds. He quotes the admission that if there be a condition requisite for the Divine Cause, it must from the nature of the case be already there, i.e., be self-existent with Him,' and then, I think, justly argues that by parity of reasoning, if manlike persons ' are the necessary conditions of God's Personality, they must be "self-existent with Him." It follows that if God actually created all finite persons, it must be conceded that some uncreated "other-than-self" existed with God, or within God's personal fulness of being, as the indispensable condition of His own causality.' Therefore we must discover some adequate Objective or Divine Self-expression, which so enriches our conception of the Divine Personality, that we can think of God as containing in Himself all the conditions of self-conscious and spontaneous volitional energy of life.' But he does not mean another self in the sense of a second personal God, but something which corresponds to another self in the case of finite creatures. An eternal and self-existent person must contain in Himself what we can only find in other finite beings outside ourselves, or He cannot exist."1

It may be from some inherent defect of metaphysical power, but I confess I am quite unable to assimilate the thoughts which are here presented. A personal being who is objective to God, other-than-self, must be, according to our poor thinking, a distinct person from God, and, if he be at the same time God, he must be a second God. If, in order to save the Divine unity, you deny this, and make the otherthan-self really a part of the self, it becomes simply the unknown condition of an eternal self-consciousness. The 1 1 pp. 26 sqq.

argument begins with the assumption that what is needful for self-consciousness in the finite mind is also needful in the infinite, and ends by declaring that the infinite Mind is self-conscious through a condition which is absolutely different from that through which we are self-conscious. Thus it appears to me to be really self-destructive. As a criticism of Dr. Martineau it may have some force; but I am unable to soar into that rare atmosphere of speculation, and to assert that what seems necessary to stir the sense of personality in me must have been the eternal condition of personality in the infinite Being. We surely are not compelled to be either agnostics or pantheists because we think that the method of eternal self-consciousness is inscrutable, and are content to say that God has all perfection within himself, without trying to bring all the elements of that perfection within the limits of our puny reason.1

I have stated the objections which occur to me if we assume the legitimacy of this kind of speculation. But, as I have intimated, such questions appear to me to lie far beyond the compass of our thought. The spirit may search out the deep things of God, and send flashes of holy light into the temple of our heart. But the deep things are those which concern his relations to us, and his purposes of love towards us. Into these things we can see at least as in a mirror, darkly, waiting for the time when we shall see face to face.

1904.

1 A brief review of other writers who follow a similar line of argument may be seen in 'The Trinity and the Incarnation,' by R. A. Armstrong, See also an important letter of Dr. Martineau's in Professor Knight's Inter Amicos, pp. 26 sqq. I may quote two sentences from Father Dalgairns : 'Because we arrive at the knowledge of our own personality through contact with that of others, it does not follow that personality itself is constituted by the sharp shock which comes through knocking our own self against another self.' Again, 'Who can prove that there is not one that requires no object but his own self, and in that self comprehends all things, since the universe was conceived eternally in His mind?' From an article on The Personality of God in the 'Contemporary Review,' XXIV. PP. 336 and 337.

In the early days of human thought this world was half the universe, and appeared to be no unfitting stage for the divine drama of existence. To the Christian theologian the thought of God centred there, and the fortunes of mankind were settled in the council of the Trinity. But now it has become as a speck of sand upon a boundless shore; and when we look forth at night among the countless hosts of stars, we can only bow in speechless awe before the mysterious majesty of Him who called them into being, and guides their stupendous march through the illimitable ages. The secrets of his eternal and infinite life, the method of his thought, the outflowing of his affection, we cannot penetrate. He is incomprehensible, and known only to himself. The warmth of his love towards us we can feel; rays of supernal light from his transcendent reason we can see; the mandates of his righteous will we can revere. We have enough for faith and life; but beyond lies the infinite expanse, where our highest wisdom is to acknowledge our ignorance. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain unto it,' and

'Here the highest seraphs could no more

Than veil their faces, tremble, and adore.'

Having reviewed the arguments which are advanced in. favour of the doctrine of the Trinity, and found them insufficient, we might look upon the question as closed; for the doctrine is confessedly one which no one would believe. except under the compulsion of irresistible proof. Nevertheless it may be well to consider some of the difficulties which it presents to the eye of reason. The vulgar outcry against the application of rational tests does not come from competent theologians, who know perfectly well that, if the laws of reason cannot be trusted, the whole fabric of revelation must tumble to pieces. Such men are quite conscious that the dogma labours under an intellectual difficulty; but they have satisfied themselves that, though it is above reason, and can be accepted only on the authority of revelation, it